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**Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya Framing of the 2024
Israeli War on Lebanon**

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Abstract

This study examined Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya media framing of the 2024 Israeli war on Lebanon. Through adopting an inductive qualitative framing analysis and framing theory, this paper analyzed 30 articles from Al Jazeera Arabic and 35 from Al Arabiya's websites, published between September 23 and November 27, 2024. The findings identified nine frames across Al Jazeera Arabic and Al Arabiya: (1) Humanitarian Consequences, (2) Attribution of Responsibility, (3) Victory/Defeat, (4) Security Justification, (5) Military – Security, (6) Diplomacy/Peace, (7) Martyrdom, (8) Organizational Legitimacy/Illegitimacy and (9) Culture Frame. The Security Justification and Culture Frames were specific to Al Arabiya, while the Martyrdom frame was unique to Al Jazeera Arabic. Al Jazeera Arabic generally portrayed Hezbollah as a resistance group, while Al Arabiya depicted it as an Iranian proxy. The ceasefire deal was represented by Al Jazeera Arabic as a win for Hezbollah and a loss for Israel, while Al Arabiya presented Israel as the victor and Hezbollah as defeated.

Keywords: Al Jazeera Arabic, Al Arabiya, Hezbollah, Israel, Lebanon, Framing Theory, Qualitative Framing Analysis

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Acknowledgments

I dedicate this dissertation to the resilient Lebanese people, to my ancestors who left the Bekaa valley, the piece of heaven on this earth, and endured harsh Canadian winters, to my forefathers who commanded us to protect our land, our olive trees, our plains and mountains.

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May our Arab nation see days of peace and prosperity.

Introduction

The Israeli war on Gaza between 2023 and 2025 arguably sparked one of the most significant regional Arab-Israeli escalations since the 2006 war in Lebanon and 2014 war in Gaza (Al Jazeera English, 2024f; Khoury, 2025a; 2025b; Popalzay et al., 2025; Lob et al., 2025). It led to the involvement of multiple regional actors including Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen (Al Jazeera English, 2024f; Khoury, 2025a; Popalzay et al., 2025). The involvement of these actors eventually led to Israel launching a wide-scale war in Lebanon, a short war in Iran, and two attacks on the Arab gulf state of Qatar (Lob et al., 2025; Khoury, 2025b). Given the continuous major occurrences that affected the region from the Levant to the Persian Gulf from 2023 to 2025, understanding the context and the series of events leading up to the eventual Israeli war on Lebanon is thus crucial and highly relevant to this paper.

On October 7, 2023, Hamas launched an attack on Israel which killed 1,200 people and hundreds of hostages were taken (Reuters, 2025a). The attack was followed by an ongoing war on Gaza that has so far resulted in the killing of more than 66,005 Palestinians (Al Jazeera English, 2025e). On September 16, 2025, the UN commission found that Israel had committed genocide against Palestinians in Gaza (OHCHR, 2025). The day following the initial attack, on October 8, 2023, Hezbollah fired rockets in Israel in support of Hamas (Reuters, 2025a). This led to Israeli bombardment of southern Lebanon and the displacement of tens of thousands of people, despite neither Israel nor Hezbollah formally declaring war (Reuters, 2025a).

Since then, Israel has launched multiple attacks targeting Hamas and Hezbollah officials in Lebanon. One of the most significant strikes occurred on September 17, 2024, when Hezbollah experienced one of the largest cyberattacks in its history (Reuters, 2025b). The attack occurred through explosive-bugged pagers and walkie-talkies that killed nine people and injured 3000 (Reuters, 2025b). The attacks, described as a “crime” by Lavazza and Farina (2024), were executed without controlling the consequences as children were killed and injured. The pagers also exploded in crowded civilian places such as hospitals, streets and shops (Lavazza & Farina, 2024). These attacks were “an unprecedented use of civilian technology as a weapon of war,” (Lavazza & Farina, 2024, p. 68). Moreover, the pager attacks caused a sense of insecurity in Lebanese society regarding everyday communication devices (Back, 2025)

On September 23, 2024, a week after the pager attacks, Israel launched a wide-scale attack on Lebanon, which lasted until the signing of the ceasefire deal between Israel and Hezbollah on November 26, 2024, which went into effect on November 27, 2024 (Reuters, 2025b). According to the Lebanese ministry of health, the war resulted in the killing of approximately 3,823 and the injury of 15,859 others (MOPH, 2024). Despite signing the ceasefire deal, Israel has continued to strike Lebanon and kill civilians in violation of the agreement and of international law, which UN experts have repeatedly warned about (OHCHR, 2025).

Purpose and Significance of the Study

A high volume of studies have examined the media framing of various events and wars occurring in the Middle East, especially the recent Israeli war on Gaza 2023 – 2025 (Elmasry, 2024; Michilot & Sanchez, 2025; Muharam, 2024; Abdullah, 2025; Ab, 2025; Tarek, 2025; Grimm et al., 2025; Satkhed et al., 2025; Jebiril, 2025; Bejermi & Nilsson, 2025; Noori, 2025; Guta & Eissa, 2025). On the other hand, across the high volume of studies on the Israeli war in Gaza, Lebanon has received extremely limited academic interest, as demonstrated by the search that yielded very limited results, especially with the latest incidents in Lebanon including the pager and walkie-talkie attacks and the last war in 2024. Some studies appeared on the media framing and representation of the 2006 Israeli war on Lebanon, but much of the literature on that specific war were published years after the war, with the most significant study being published by Melki (2014), 8 years after the war (Shinar, 2009; Ringrose, 2011; Melki, 2014; Parry, 2010; Cooper, 2007; Kalb & Saivetz, 2007; Schwalbe & Dougherty, 2015; Hoewe et al., 2012; Cavari & Gabay, 2014; Elbaz & Bar – Tal, 2016; Harb, 2009). Similarly, no studies to this day have investigated the media framing or representation of neither Western nor Arab media of latest Israeli war in 2024, despite the geopolitical significance of Lebanon that heightened since Hezbollah joined the war immediately after Israel launched a genocidal war on Gaza (Reuters, 2024a).

This paper aims to address a significant gap in Lebanon-focused research, in this case the Arab media framing of the recent Israeli war on Lebanon which took place from the from September 23 until the signing of ceasefire deal on the 27th of November 2024. Furthermore, this study employs framing theory as pioneered by Goffman (1974), Tuchman (1978), Gitlin (1980), and Entman (1993), accompanied by contemporary interpretations by more recent

scholars such as Semetko and Valkenburg (2000), Reese (2001; 2007), Scheufele (2000), D'Angelo (2002), de Vreese (2005) and Brugman (2025). With framing theory as a basis, qualitative framing analysis, based on Alozie's (2005) inductive approach to framing analysis, is further utilized to explore the dominant frames present in Al Jazeera Arabic and Al Arabiya's coverage and reporting on the war (As cited in Lindstrom & Marais, 2012). This approach will also observe how Arab politics and foreign policy affect the media framing of Lebanon, especially during war and conflict.

Literature Review

Al Jazeera Arabic and Al Arabiya

Al Jazeera

To understand the media framing of the war, a discussion of the background and history of Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya is essential. Al Jazeera Arabic was established in 1996 in Qatar as the first 24-hour Arab broadcaster (Al Jazeera Media Network., n.d.). Abunajela and Jebril (2020) pointed out that the channel presented “itself as a channel of pride that belongs to Arabs” (p. 1). The channel promoted a notion of pan-Arabism to its audiences due to various factors such as using standard Arabic and the name “Al Jazeera” that means an island or peninsula, which could symbolize Qatar, but it could also symbolize the Arabian Peninsula (Zayani, 2005). Al Jazeera has grown highly popular and widely admired throughout the Arab world and has contributed to shaping Arab public opinion, especially with its coverage of major events such as the Arab Spring in 2011 and Israeli wars on Gaza and Lebanon (Zayani, 2005).

The Qatar-based channel has also been seen as liberalizing and “counter-hegemonic” during times when the Arab media landscape could be characterized as authoritarian (Wojcieszak, 2007; Zayani, 2005; Samuel-Azran, 2013; Abunajela & Jebril, 2020). The claim for Al-Jazeera’s unconventional autonomy has opened the door to arguments on the applicability of framing analysis to the channel’s media coverage of events. For instance, Wojcieszak (2007) argued that framing analysis might not be applicable to Al Jazeera since the theory presumes elite control over media and has only been studied within Western contexts (p. 115- 116). Al Jazeera, on the other hand, has “semi-independence” and counters hegemony, proving that media that is state-sponsored does not always have to be hegemonic as previous scholars have argued (Wojcieszak, 2007, p. 116). Also, Zayani (2005) asserted that Al Jazeera is a free and autonomous channel for the most part, despite Qatari-state sponsorship (p. 23). This was especially evident in the policies of Qatar’s previous Emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, who abolished the Ministry of Information, and lifted media censorship (Zayani, 2005, p. 2). Furthermore, some Al Jazeera officials stated that the channel’s stances have involved the state of Qatar in diplomatic problems with several neighboring Arab states and even Iran, due to its criticisms of regimes (Samuel-Azran, 2013, p. 1297). Al Jazeera’s credibility was proven once again after surveys conducted in the Arab region found the channel as a credible and autonomous media source (Samuel-Azran, 2013, p. 1297). For instance, a survey conducted by Johnson and Fahmy (2010), found Al Jazeera to be perceived as the most

credible source by Arab audiences, in comparison to other channels like Al Arabiya and Al Hurra, as well as other Arab media which were perceived as less credible.

In addition to the democratizing aspect of Al Jazeera, the channel has been described as a tool of public diplomacy. In his 8-year study, Samuel-Azran (2013) posited Al Jazeera as a powerful public diplomacy tool after analyzing articles published on the Arabic Al Jazeera website on the Saudi – Qatari conflict in 2002. During that period, the number of articles criticizing Saudi Arabia severely increased on Al Jazeera’s website, which disappeared a year after the conflict was resolved, which showed a salient connection between Al Jazeera’s coverage tone and Qatar’s affairs (Samuel-Azran, 2013, p. 1306). Thus, Al Jazeera Arabic was found to be an example of successful public diplomacy, unlike in what he described as unsuccessful models by Iran’s Press TV, Russia Today and Saudi Arabia’s Al Arabiya (Samuel – Azran, 2013).

With the reputation Al Jazeera has for its editorial autonomy, the promotion of pan-Arab ideals, and treasuring the existence of different opinions in its public sphere, some scholars argued that Al Jazeera’s ideals and stances have shifted. In his paper, Cherkaoui (2014) stated that because of Qatar’s officials’ decision to become a counterpower to Saudi hegemony, Al Jazeera’s ideals have transformed from pan-Arabism to pan-Islamism, due to their support of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (p. 28). This support triggered Saudi Arabia and the UAE who adopt a pro-Egyptian regime stance (Cherkaoui, 2014). However, in their book, Abunajela and Jebril (2020) suggested that Al Jazeera’s usage of language that portrays the victimhood of the Muslim Brotherhood and their portrayal of the group’s Islamic identity as compatible with democracy. Abunajela and Jebril (2020) explained that it is not a reflection of the notion that Al Jazeera’s tone aligns with the Qatari state’s foreign policy or their political economy, but rather a reflection of the channel’s journalistic values (pp. 135 – 145). This is because the group won the Egyptian elections in a democratic manner which grants them the right to exist within the political sphere (Abunajela & Jebril, 2020, pp. 135 - 145).

Al Arabiya

With the proven influence and power of Al Jazeera as a pan-Arab channel, Al Arabiya rose in competition. Al Arabiya was established in Dubai in 2003 by Saudi businessman Sheikh Walid Al-Ibrahim as part of the Middle East Broadcasting Channel (MBC) (El Nawawy & Strong, 2012; Elmasry et al., 2013). The channel was founded as an alternative to Al Jazeera, especially as it launched during the Iraq war allowing Al Arabiya to make a name for itself (El

Nawawy & Strong, 2012). Prior to its launch, a USD 300 million investment was made by the Lebanese Hariri family, as well as Jordanian, Kuwaiti and other parties close to the Saudi state (Khalil & Kraidy, 2017, p. 84). The strategy of Al Arabiya focused on acquiring the Arab audience share, starting from Saudi Arabia and then to the Arab world (Khalil & Kraidy, 2017, p. 85). Today, it exhibits high viewership rates in the Arab world (Ajaoud & Elmasry, 2020). Al Arabiya, in an attempt to appeal to women and younger audiences and to distinguish itself from Al Jazeera, created *Sabah Al Arabiya* – a replica of *Good Morning America* (Khalil & Kraidy, 2017, p. 87).

Although Al Arabiya was not state-owned like Al Jazeera, it was nevertheless found to have its editorial policy tightly aligned with US and Saudi policies in the region (Khalil & Kraidy, 2017, p. 86; El Nawawy & Strong, 2012). This was illustrated in its lack of live debates and guests with opposing opinions (Khalil & Kraidy, 2017, p. 86). In addition to that, Al Arabiya was questioned on its independence due to alleged claims of being pressured by the Saudi government (El Nawawy & Strong, 2012). This is demonstrated through the channel's dependence on advertisers who could withdraw support if Al Arabiya covers events or broadcasts content that goes against the Saudi government (El-Nawawy & Strong, 2013). Regardless of the pressures, Al Arabiya's employees were found to enjoy high job satisfaction percentages, where journalists were aware of the political red lines that cannot be crossed due to the channel's association and funding by Saudi Arabia before accepting their positions (El Nawawy & Strong, 2013).

Al Jazeera Arabic and Al Arabiya's Coverage of the 2006 Israeli War on Lebanon

The 34-day 2006 Israeli war on Lebanon can be considered the only comparable war to 2024, given its scale and the similar dynamics. On the July 12, 2006, Hezbollah launched an operation northern Israel, killing eight IDF soldiers and kidnapping two (Britannica, 2024). Israel then responded with major strikes on Hezbollah targets in Beirut and the South of Lebanon (Britannica, 2024). Israel also bombed the only international airport in Beirut and destroyed major infrastructure in Lebanon (Britannica, 2024). The war ended on August 14 with the acceptance of the UN resolution 17101, that called for an immediate ceasefire and deployment of UN peacekeepers along the southern Lebanon border (Britannica, 2024).

Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya's coverage of the war illustrated stances aligning with their political economies. Both channels showed human suffering and the aggressiveness of Israel;

However, Al Jazeera adopted positive stance for Hezbollah while Al Arabiya criticized the group. Kalb and Saivetz (2007) argued that both channels portrayed Israel as an aggressor, however the theme of victimization of Lebanese civilians was more emphasized by Al Arabiya than Al Jazeera. Similarly, Melki (2014) compared between Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, while also including Lebanese channels - Al Jadeed, Al Manar, Future TV and LBC – in his analogy. Al Jazeera and Al Jadeed highly aligned with Hezbollah's Al-Manar, except in their slight criticism of the group (Melki, 2014). On the other hand, Al Arabiya, Future TV and LBC showed less support for Hezbollah and some mild support for Israeli narratives through emphasizing the group as losing and blaming them for the war (Melki, 2014). A Hezbollah official even called Al Arabiya, Al Ebriya (The Hebrew one) due to what was perceived as being sympathetic in their coverage of Israel (Khalil & Kraidy, 2017). Furthermore, Saber (2016) identified the ideological structure followed by Al Jazeera in their reporting using Ricœur's "three moments" philosophy. Al Jazeera first legitimized Hezbollah's kidnapping operation of the two Israeli soldiers, then continued with a similar pattern as the war unfolded through presenting Israel as an aggressor and Hezbollah as legitimate resistance (Saber, 2016). The end of the war was framed by Al Jazeera as a "divine victory" and Hezbollah was portrayed as a hero (Saber, 2016).

Media Coverage of the Israeli war on Gaza (2023 - 2025)

With the interrelation between the 2024 war in Lebanon and the war in Gaza, it is important to explore studies that examined the media coverage of the latter. This war has been highly studied through various angles and different media outlets. Some authors investigated the media coverage on social media through different organizations' accounts such as UNRWA, Skynews Arabia, BBC and several U.S. media outlets, as well as citizen journalism (Elmasry, 2024; Tarek, 2025; Moharam, 2025; Bejerimi & Nilsson, 2025; Satkhed et al., 2025). Other research has examined international media outlets' general news coverage (Abdullah, 2025; Grimm et al, 2025; Michilot & Sanchez, 2025; Jebril, 2025; Miladi & Miladi, 2025). Only one study mentioned Al Jazeera's coverage (Abdullah, 2025), however, none of these recent studies included Al Arabiya, which illustrates a major research gap this paper aims to address. This appears to be a broader, persistent gap throughout the years, where according to recent knowledge, only one study by Elmasry (2013) conducted comparative research on the coverage of Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya. Elmasry et al. (2013) found Al Jazeera Arabic and Al

Arabiya to have similar considerations to the coverage of the Israel – Gaza conflict (Elmasry et al., 2013). The difference was in the quality of media produced, where Al Jazeera had fully edited packages by on-ground reporters, Al Arabiya relied on studio-based voiceovers using footage from foreign agencies, which were considered cheaper for the station (Elmasry et al., 2013, p. 763). This is because Al Jazeera is not classified as a commercial media channel, but rather possesses the funding and resources to produce the best quality possible, whereas Al Arabiya, on the contrary, is owned by the Saudi-funded MBC group which is a commercial institution (Elmasry et al., 2013). Also, the stories produced by Al Arabiya were notably shorter than those of Al Jazeera, however, both media highlighted Palestinian victimhood and suffering, and depicted Israelis as aggressors (Elmasry et al., 2013, p. 764). However, Al Jazeera did condemn Israeli actions at a higher rate than Al Arabiya and interviewed more Palestinians in their reports and shows (Elmasry et al., 2013). Al Arabiya, on the other hand, adopted a negative tone toward Hamas and positive toward the Egyptian state as well as Fatah, the Palestinian rival of Hamas (Elmasry et al., 2013). Whereas Al Jazeera adopted a positive tone toward Hamas but a negative one toward the Egyptian state (Elmasry et al., 2013).

Regarding social media, several studies tackled the media representation and coverage of the war on Instagram. Elmasry (2024) conducted a study on the media coverage of several Western – British and U.S. – media outlets on their Instagram accounts, which showed a strong tendency to support Israel through the use of pro-Israeli sources and the emphasis on Israeli victims, more than Palestinian victims and portraying Israeli aggression as self-defense. Similarly, Tarek (2025) analyzed the visual framing of BBC Arabic, Sky News Arabia, as well as Channel 1 Egypt, on their Instagram accounts. The results showed a common usage of video reporting posts, with different focuses on cooperation and solidarity by the Egyptian Channel 1, “political interactions” by Sky News Arabia and balanced framing by BBC Arabic (Tarek, 2025). On the other hand, Moharam (2024) studied the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees’ (UNRWA) Instagram content. Three themes emerged in UNRWA’s Instagram content: (1) “Human interest”, (2) “Destruction” and (3) “Providing humanitarian aid” (Moharam, 2024). Furthermore, Satkhed et al. (2025) examined how Instagram users contributed to the Palestinian narrative of the war through showing different aspects of Palestinian struggle such as human rights violations. On the other hand, Bejerimi and Nilsson (2025) pointed out that the Palestinian diaspora in France and Sweden relied on Instagram and citizen journalism as their main source of information for the Israeli War on

Gaza. This tendency was attributed to the bias in reporting as perceived by the Palestinian diaspora, which led to a feeling of deprivation of fair and balanced reporting (Bejerimi & Nilsson, 2025).

As to the general investigation of the news coverage of the recent Israeli war on Gaza, there has been a diversity in the countries whose media have been studied, such as Qatari (Al Jazeera), British (BBC), Egyptian, German, Israeli and Latin American media (Abdullah, 2025; Grimm et al, 2025; Michilot & Sanchez, 2025; Jebril, 2025; Miladi & Miladi, 2025). The majority of these studies included the coverage of the British Broadcasting Corporation BBC and compared it to other media organizations. Jebril (2025) studied BBC's media framing of the first three weeks of the Israel-Gaza war and found a noticeable favoritism toward Israel in party-specific frames, with Palestinian marginalization and the attribution of terrorism and criminal frames to Palestinians in the negative cross-party frames. The sources used were also predominantly more Israeli than Palestinian (Jebril, 2025). Similarly, Miladi and Miladi (2025) explored the media framing of BBC and the Israeli channel i24. The authors identified the prominence of Orientalist notions in the framing of Palestinians and the usage of Israeli security frames and the absence of frames of Israeli responsibility (Miladi & Miladi, 2025). And while BBC's coverage appeared more balanced than i24, both outlets employed Israeli centric frames (Miladi & Miladi, 2025). BBC's policy towards covering the war appeared consistent in its Arabic version where Abdullah (2025) found that Al Jazeera and Al Qahira News showed a high percentage of opposition to the Israeli war on Gaza (92%) while BBC Arabic showed a 49% opposition and adopted a more neutral tone (35%).

On the other side, German media tended to emphasize and personalize stories of Israeli victims through emotionally driven narratives and use of human-interest frames (Grimm et al., 2025). Palestinian victims were presented as collateral damage of war in the form of numbers and statistics with the usage of conflict and responsibility frames that dehumanized them and lacked a distinction between civilians and militants (Grimm et al., 2025). German media also emphasized a connection to the Holocaust and justified the killing of Palestinians as self-defense (Grimm et al., 2025). Contrastingly, Latin American media focused on human and conflict frames and generally avoided "usual orientalisms" in their coverage of the Israeli war on Gaza (Michilot & Sanchez, 2025).

Theoretical Framework

Framing Theory

The theoretical framework was based on Framing Theory. Framing has been widely studied and examined by many scholars such as Goffman (1974), Tuchman (1978), Gitlin (1980) and Entman (1993). These scholars set the foundation for framing theory, which was followed by more contemporary scholars, such as, Semetko and Valkenburg (2000), Reese (2001; 2007), Scheufele (2000), D'Angelo (2002), de Vreese (2005) and Brugman (2025) who further developed framing theory with more complexity.

As to the first accounts on framing theory, Goffman (1974) introduced the concept of frames, in his work, *Frame Analysis*, defining them as “schemata of interpretation” that allow people to “locate, perceive, identify and label” events (p. 21). In other words, frames are mental structures used to interpret and make sense of reality (Goffman, 1974). Despite Goffman's (1974) work not being directed to study mass media, he established the notion that meaning is constructed through certain interpretive frameworks.

Tuchman (1978) identified frames within the context of news in his widely cited book *Making News*. Tuchman (1978) discussed that frames arrange the different aspects of reality or everyday life. While Goffman (1974) explained reality or everyday life as organized through frames, Tuchman (1978) argued that order could be a possible inherent trait of society, where frames then transform the unclear occurrences into a recognizable event or issue, which could otherwise lack significance (pp. 193 - 194). In the context of news, framing is a salient feature that determines the newsworthiness of events where journalists turn events and happenings into a news story, which is also part of everyday life and reality (Tuchman, 1978, p. 194).

Gitlin (1980) pointed out that media frames arrange and organize events and occurrences, especially for journalists, as well as the audiences and readers who follow these news stories and reports (p. 6). Media frames assist journalists in sorting out large data sets with speed and efficiency (Gitlin, 1980, p. 7). Based on Gitlin's (1980) account, Gamson and Modigliani (1989) argued that media discourse is a collection of “interpretive packages”, as frames take place at the core of the structure of these packages (p. 3). These frames also include an array of opinions and sides which allow a level of discussion amongst audiences sharing views on a certain issue (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). As to the interpretive packages, they construct meaning and public opinion through embedding other events within frames, in order to maintain their function (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989).

Building upon Goffman's (1974) foundation on framing, Entman (1993) linked it to the field of media and mass communication, describing it as a "fractured paradigm". Entman (1993) defined framing in terms of selection and salience whereas in media, framing selects specific sides of a "perceived reality and make them more salient," (p. 52; Gitlin, 1980, p. 6). Framing has four main functions in news media: (1) Define problems, clarify the context of an event or conflict and its importance, (2) diagnose causes, identifying the actors involved and attributing responsibility, (3) make moral judgments, offer judgments on the actors and guide the audience on what is right and wrong, and (4) suggest remedies, promote solutions or courses of action (Entman, 1993, p. 52). Furthermore, Entman (1993) pointed out that framing occurs on the side of the communicator, as well as the receiver – the audience. This implies that not only do people in control of the media engage in framing, but also audiences based on their schemata (Entman, 1993). Also, Entman (1993) highlighted the concept of cognitive accessibility which is when certain information or facts are repeated consistently and linked to culture and values, they are more likely to be recognized and remembered by audiences.

On the contrary to Entman's (1993) approach, other scholars conceptualized framing theory as a multiparadigm rather than a single "fractured" paradigm. For instance, D'Angelo (2002) argued against Entman's (1993) judgment of framing research as fragmented – meaning that Entman (1993) viewed framing under one paradigm that has been fragmented - but rather because of the diversity of research conducted on this theory. D'Angelo (2002) differentiated between the two terms of "theory" and "paradigm", which the author points out Entman (1993) as grouping them as one (p. 871). D'Angelo (2002) pointed out in what he described as a "flaw" in Entman's (1993) approach to framing, that the latter identified four functions or locations for framing in the media and communications field, which indicated framing as multifaceted rather than a single paradigm, in which Reese (2007) also agreed on. In this sense, D'Angelo (2002) suggested three news framing paradigms: (1) cognitive, (2) critical and (3) constructivist. The cognitive paradigm deals with the relationship between the schemata and the stimulus message and how frames activate the schemata and guide a person to identify and utilize media messages (D'Angelo, 2002, p. 875). The critical paradigm, however, focuses on the newsgathering mechanism of journalists, while the constructivist paradigm, as previously presented by Gamson and Modigliani (1989), relies on the notion that journalists use "interpretive packages" which contain news frames (D'Angelo, 2002, p. 877). D'Angelo (2002) pointed out that his approach encourages considering framing research as diverse rather than dismembering the

framing theory as Entman (1993) suggested (p. 879). Reese (2007) acknowledged D'Angelo's (2002) multiparadigm approach to framing theory and stated that framing theory should also be considered as a "bridging" model. Reese (2007) suggested that a bridging framing theory model could connect and link different research approaches such as quantitative and qualitative approaches.

There have also been approaches to arguing distinguishing framing from agenda setting (Reese 2001; 2007; Scheufele, 2000; de Vreese, 2005). Scheufele (2000) identified a typology consisting of two dimensions to categorize and classify framing: the between-level and the within-level. The between-level approach treats media frames across two levels, macroscopic and audience levels, and suggests many hypotheses to the nature of the relationship between the two levels (Scheufele, 2000, p. 306). As to the within-level, it distinguishes between audience frames and media frames as dependent and independent variables (Scheufele, 2000, p. 306). Moreover, Scheufele (2000) split the framing model into three parts, (1) frame-building, (2) frame-setting, and (3) framing consequences on the individual-level. Reese (2001; 2007) viewed framing partly as a reaction to the theoretical limitations of second -level agenda setting. Similarly, in the context of the process of framing, de Vreese (2005) affirmed the claim to the independence of framing theory because it deals with issues of representation, whereas agenda-setting focuses on the salience and importance of issues. de Vreese (2005) also suggested a typology of framing consisting of two aspects: (1) issue-specific and (2) generic frames (p. 54). Issue-specific frames apply only to specific issues, for instance, the intifada, and allow for a detailed examination of the framing. The generic frames, however, can be applied to more than one topic (de Vreese, 2005, p. 55).

Aside from the theoretical aspects, framing has been studied in terms of its types and prevalence in media reporting. Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) offered a deductive approach to frame identification based on previous literature. This approach identified five deductive frames: (1) Conflict, (2) Human Interest, (3) Economic consequences, (4) Morality and (5) Responsibility (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). On the other hand, Brugman (2025) recently distinguished between equivalence and emphasis frames. Equivalence framing is the presentation of an aspect of the same matter in numerous ways, such as the description of quantitative values through variant scales (Brugman, 2025). Equivalence framing, thus, resembles generic frames which can be applicable universally (Brugman, 2025). Emphasis frames, however, posit the same issue through different aspects (Brugman, 2025). This could

be illustrated through the portrayal of the different consequences of homelessness, which would include moral and economic consequences (Brugman, 2025). In this sense, Semetko and Valkenburg's (2000) typology falls under emphasis framing (Brugman, 2025).

Framing is significant in journalism, particularly during wartime. It is a key tool used by journalists to influence public opinion, especially during war (Boaz, 2005; Neuman et al., 1992). For instance, the US media was found to use conflict frames at the levels of individuals, groups, and countries (Neuman et al., 1992). Thus, framing theory is highly applicable to this study as it explores media framing of a war, and it will help identify the main frames and explain how Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya represented the 2024 war.

Research Questions

Drawing on previous research on framing theory and literature examining Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya in terms of their political economy and media coverage of the 2006 Israeli war on Lebanon and the 2023 – 2025 Israeli war on Gaza, this study aims to examine Al Jazeera Arabic and Al Arabiya's media framing of the 2024 Israeli war on Lebanon. To achieve this goal, the following research questions were developed to guide the study:

- RQ1: How did Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya frame the 2024 Israeli war on Lebanon?
- RQ2: How was Hezbollah framed during the war?
- RQ3: How were major events during the war framed by both outlets?

Based on the literature studying both outlets in previous conflicts (Kalb & Saivetz, 2007; Melki, 2014; Khalil & Kraidy, 2017; Saber, 2016; Abdullah, 2025; Elmasry et al., 2013). Al Jazeera is expected to focus on frames of Lebanese human suffering, legitimization of armed groups such as Hezbollah and highlighting Israeli aggression, aligning with Qatar's foreign policy, while Al Arabiya is expected to focus on frames of the vilification and delegitimization of Hezbollah as an armed resistance group and blaming the group for triggering Israeli attacks and initiating the war on Lebanon, reflecting Saudi Arabia's foreign policy.

Methodology

The paper used Qualitative Framing Analysis to examine the frames used by Arab media to cover the Israeli war on Lebanon in 2024. Qualitative Framing Analysis involves emphasizing the capture of the “meanings embedded in the internal relations within texts,” (Reese, 2007, as cited in Linstrom and Marais, 2012, p. 26). According to Connolly-Ahern and Broadway (2008), Qualitative Framing Analysis includes a process of repeated and rigorous engagement with a text and identification of frames in a holistic manner (p. 369). While much framing research prefers the quantitative approach, the qualitative approach helps counter the reductionism of quantification of media texts into countable units which fail to capture details present in these elements, and to interpret their meanings (Reese, 2001, p. 8; Linstrom and Marais, 2012, p. 27).

Sampling

To better understand the media framing the 2024 War in Lebanon in Arab media, Al Jazeera Arabic and Al Arabiya’s websites were considered. Articles directly acknowledging the war published between September 23 and November 27, 2024 were selected from the respective media outlets. The choice of these two outlets is primarily due to their popularity among Arab audiences in the region and their juxtaposition, where Al Jazeera Arabic is a Qatari-funded media institution, while Al Arabiya is a Saudi-funded media institution owned by the MBC group (Zayani, 2005; Al Nawawy & Strong, 2012). As to the unit of analysis, it consisted of the textual elements within each article, including the headline, lead, and full body, excluding pictures, videos, and their captions. Based on close reading of the material, the following major events which occurred during the war in 2024 were chosen for the analysis:

1. **Day of Israeli Attack on Lebanon** (September 23) – Israel launched a wide-scale attack on Lebanon, resulting in the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians from the south of Lebanon and the killing of hundreds (Reuters, 2025a).
2. **Assassination of Hassan Nasrallah** (September 27) – Israel assassinated the secretary-general of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, after a heavy bombing campaign on the southern outskirts of Beirut, known as “Dahye” (Reuters, 2025a; Al Jazeera English, 2024a).
3. **Heavy Israeli bombing of Dahye** (September 27) – Israel launched a heavy bombing campaign targeting Hezbollah officials in the densely populated

Dahye, like that of the 2006 war, resulting in the death of Nasrallah, as well as large destruction and civilian casualties (Gebeily et al., 2024)

4. **Israeli Ground Invasion of south Lebanon** (October 1) – For the first time since 2006, the Israeli army launched a ground invasion of south Lebanon, occupying bordering Lebanese villages (Reuters, 2025a).
5. **Assassination of Hashem Safieddine** (Killed on October 3, confirmed on October 23) – In another heavy bombing operation of Dahye on October 3, Israel assassinated the newly appointed Hezbollah Secretary-General alongside other major Hezbollah officials, whose bodies were recovered after three weeks of searching on the 23rd of October (Reuters, 2025a).
6. **Hezbollah’s drone attack on Benyamina, Israel** (October 13) – Hezbollah launched a large drone attack on the Israeli military base in Benyamina, killing four Israeli soldiers and injuring seven others (Al Jazeera English, 2024c)
7. **Heavy Israeli bombing of the city of Tyre** (October 28 and November 1& 22) – Across multiple occasions, Israel launched heavy bombing campaigns claiming to target Hezbollah officials in the historic city of Tyre, resulting in extensive destruction and civilian casualties (Al Jazeera English, 2024b; EFE, 2024)
8. **Heavy Israeli Bombing of Bekaa Valley** (October 6 – November 3) – Israel bombed the Bekaa Valley located in eastern Lebanon on multiple occasions, most prominently late October and early November, claiming to target Hezbollah officials (Wright, 2024; Reuters, 2024c; Reuters, 2024d)
9. **Announcement of the Ceasefire Deal** (November 26) – A ceasefire deal was reached between Hezbollah and Israel through US and French mediation, ending the bombardments and giving the two sides sixty days to end armed presence in the area (BBC News, 2024).
10. **Enforcement of the Ceasefire Deal** (November 27) - After the deal was signed on the 26th of November, it went into effect on the 27th (Gebeily & Taher, 2024).

The initial search was done using two methods. On Al Jazeera Arabic, the search was done on the Lebanon section of the site through scrolling manually until the date range was reached. As to Al Arabiya the word “لبنان” (“Lebanon” in Arabic) was searched and then the filtering feature available was used to omit irrelevant items and limit it to news items and

specify the wanted date range. This search yielded a total of 2,038 news articles (AJA, N=1107; Al Arabiya, N=931). After categorizing and excluding articles that do not fit within the events chosen for analysis, the total number was 211 (AJA, N=97; Al Arabiya, N=114).

Systematic random sampling within topics was then applied to select news items for framing analysis. For each outlet (AJA, N = 97; Al Arabiya, N = 114), a target sample size was set (n = 30 and n = 35, respectively) and proportionally distributed across the ten events using the largest remainder method to reflect their original coverage. Within each event, items were ordered chronologically, and a sampling interval was calculated. A random starting point was chosen, and then every k-th item was selected until the target number for that event was reached. This ensured that all events were proportionally represented in the sample.

Table 1: Major Events and Number of Articles per Event and Outlet

Event		Al Jazeera Arabic	Al Arabiya
E1	Day of Israeli Attack on Lebanon (September 23)	3	6
E2	Assassination of Hassan Nasrallah (September 27)	8	9
E3	Heavy Israeli bombing of Dahye (September 27)	1	3
E4	Israeli Ground Invasion of south Lebanon (October 1)	2	3
E5	Assassination of Hashem Safieddine (Killed on October 3, Confirmed on October 23)	2	2
E6	Hezbollah's drone attack on Benyamina, Israel (October 13)	1	1
E7	Heavy Israeli bombing of the city of Tyre (October 28 and November 1, 22)	2	2
E8	Heavy Israeli Bombing of Bekaa Valley (October 6 – November 3)	3	4

E9	Announcement of the Ceasefire Deal (November 26)	1	2
E10	Enforcement of the Ceasefire Deal (November 27)	7	3

The number of articles for each event depended on the frequency of coverage of each channel. For instance, Al Arabiya and Al Jazeera Arabic have similar levels of reporting for some events like E5, 6 and 7. However, in other events like E10, Al Jazeera Arabic published more articles than Al Arabiya while in E1, 2, 3, 4, 8 and 9 Al Arabiya had more coverage. This was also reflected in the overall number of articles in the initial sampling where Al Arabiya (N=114), has more articles covering the war, than Al Jazeera Arabic (N=97).

Analytical Framework

Based on the process explained by Linström and Marais (2012) for conducting framing analysis, the frames were identified inductively. A pilot study was conducted through a random subset of the selected sample, where each article was carefully read with detailed notes taken about each article. Then dominant and secondary frames were identified for each news article. As to the process of frame identification, it was based on Wimmer and Dominick's (2006, pp. 117 – 118) comparative method for qualitative analysis, which consists of assigning incidents to frames, refining their frames and looking for links and themes within these frames and finally simplifying the information into a solid theoretical system (as cited in Lindström & Marais, 2012). Alozie's (2005) approach was also considered including reading the article multiple times while taking notes, then interpreting the articles and identifying the dominant frames (As cited in Lindström & Marais, 2012).

Considering the previously mentioned approach, the criteria for assessing the tone and identification of frames relied on several criteria. This included identifying the general focus of each article through the headline and lead on one level. At a second level, the framing identification process consisted of focusing on the terminology used to describe events, people or certain figures or parties. This would be illustrated through looking for repetitive word choices for describing Hezbollah and Israel, the victims of bombing and the assassination of Hezbollah leaders – for example, the use of terms such as killed **مقتل** or **استشهد** martyred for instance – and the tone of announcement of enforcement of the ceasefire deal where there was an emphasis on identifying any themes of victory or loss in the word choice and prioritization

of information in the headline and lead and the rest of the article body. After carefully reading and identifying the reoccurring themes and patterns in each article, they were grouped into more general frames, with the attribution of a primary and secondary frame to each – sometimes a third frame when needed - followed by a thorough interpretation and discussion.

Results and Analysis

Following an inductive approach in framing analysis, nine dominant frames were identified across Al Jazeera Arabic and Al Arabiya:

- 1- Humanitarian Consequences Frame: refers to instances that include human casualties, civilian area destruction and civilian economic losses, as well as evacuations and fleeing.
- 2- Attribution of Responsibility Frame: includes terms and phrases that attribute responsibility for specific events or acts done by any of the two parties – Hezbollah or Israel – such as bombings, attacks, human suffering and assassinations.
- 3- Victory/Defeat Frame: includes terms and phrases or quotes that signal victory or defeat, such as portraying Hezbollah or Israel as weak, strong, resilient, winning or losing the war.
- 4- Security Justification Frame: illustrates context, language, and attributions that demonstrate a justification for a certain act such as evacuation orders and bombings.
- 5- Military – Security Frame: demonstrates articles that cover events from a military and security angle where reasons and implications of a given act or event on Israel or Hezbollah is analyzed and explained.
- 6- Diplomacy/Peace Frame: includes calls and discussions on peace or a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hezbollah.
- 7- Martyrdom Frame: demonstrates phrases, terms, or quotations that showcase the death of certain figures as martyrs.
- 8- Organizational Legitimacy/Illegitimacy Frame: refers to the discussion of the structure and existence of organizations – i.e., Hezbollah or Israel – as legitimate or illegitimate.
- 9- Culture Frame: includes phrases and attributes that discuss cultural or heritage sites such as ruins and temples.

These frames emerged differently across Al Jazeera Arabic and Al Arabiya. Some frames appeared in AJA only, such as the Martyrdom frame. Others were only present in Al Arabiya, such as the Security Justification and Culture frames. Table 2 demonstrates the dominant frames that emerged across AJA and Al Arabiya at every event.

Table 2: Dominant Frames Across Al Jazeera Arabic and Al Arabiya

Events	Al Jazeera Arabic	Al Arabiya
E1	• Humanitarian Consequences • Attribution of Responsibility • Victory/Defeat	• Humanitarian Consequences • Attribution of Responsibility • Security Justification
E2	• Martyrdom • Attribution of Responsibility • Victory/Defeat • Military/Security • Diplomacy/Peace	• Attribution of Responsibility • Victory/Defeat • Security Justification • Military-Security • Organizational legitimacy/illegitimacy
E3	• Attribution of Responsibility • Humanitarian Consequences	• Humanitarian Consequences • Attribution of Responsibility • Security Justification
E4	• Military-Security • Humanitarian Consequences	• Security Justification • Military-Security • Diplomacy/Peace
E5	• Attribution of Responsibility • Martyrdom • Organizational legitimacy/illegitimacy	• Victory/Defeat
E6	• Victory/Defeat	• Humanitarian Consequences

		• Attribution of Responsibility • Victory/Defeat
E7	• Humanitarian Consequences • Attribution of Responsibility • Victory/Defeat • Military – Security	• Humanitarian Consequences • Attribution of Responsibility • Security Justification • Military – Security • Culture
E8	• Humanitarian Consequences • Attribution of Responsibility • Victory/ Defeat	• Humanitarian Consequences • Attribution of Responsibility • Security Justification • Culture
E9	• Humanitarian Consequences • Victory/ Defeat • Diplomacy/Peace	• Diplomacy/Peace • Military-Security
E10	• Humanitarian Consequences • Victory/Defeat • Military-Security • Diplomacy/Peace	• Humanitarian Consequences • Diplomacy/Peace • Victory/Defeat

(E= Event)

E1: Day of Israeli Attack on Lebanon (September 23)

On the day of the Israeli attacks, Al Jazeera Arabic (AJA) used three frames: humanitarian consequences, attribution of responsibility, and victory/defeat. The humanitarian consequences frame was highlighted through presenting the sudden evacuation alerts civilians received and showcasing the fear and panic among civilians such as an article titled “*Unprecedented*

displacement from southern Lebanon following deadly Israeli airstrikes,” published on September 23, 2024, used terms like “horror” (الذعر) and “frustration” (الإرباك) (AJA-E1-A2). The frame was also illustrated through pointing out the human casualties, “the fall of 274 martyrs” (سقوط 274 شهيداً) (AJA-E1-A2). The attribution of responsibility frame was present through describing Israel as the perpetrator and “enemy” (العدو) and accusing it of launching a “psychological warfare” (حرب نفسية) (AJA-E1-A1, A2). As to the victory/defeat frame, AJA presented Hezbollah as a “resistance” (مقاومة) group through its quoting of Ali Hamieh, a military expert, who saw Israel as failing in its security attacks, while Hezbollah as remaining strong and resilient (AJA-E1-A2). Israel was also shown as weak in an article titled “*Hezbollah rockets strike settlements in the West Bank, and Israel declares a state of emergency,*” published on 23 September 2024, where it showcased Israel as panicked as soon as Hezbollah sent rockets (AJA-E1-A3).

Al Arabiya’s articles demonstrated three frames: Humanitarian consequences, attribution of responsibility, and security justification. Al Arabiya showcased the humanitarian consequences frame by mentioning the scenes of mass displacement and the high number of deaths, for instance, in an article titled “*Fire embraced the sky and smoke enveloped it... Southern Lebanon under bombardment,*” published on 23 September 2024, mentioned the “fall of 100 people” (سقوط 100 شخص) (ARA-E1-A5). Human suffering was further illustrated through mentioning the scale of destruction in south Lebanon (ARA-E1-A1).

The attribution of responsibility was to both Israel and Hezbollah. Israel was attributed to the massive bombings which were described in an article titled “*UNIFIL warns: Escalation in Lebanon has devastating regional consequences,*” published on 23 September 2024, as “Israel’s most intense bombing campaign” (حملة القصف الإسرائيلي الأكثر كثافة) and was also accused of committing war crimes through a United Nations attribute (ARA-E1-A3, A5). Al Arabiya showcased security justification of some of Israel’s bombing through explaining it in the context of Hezbollah being the target and not civilians, and the goal being the return of the “northern settlers” (عودة سكان الشمال) to north Israel (ARA-E1- A1, A2, A3, A4, A6). This frame was also present through the high usage of Israeli attributes such as in an article with the headline including Yoav Gallant, Israel’s minister of defense at the time, saying, “we are destroying what Hezbollah has built for 20 years” (نهدم ما بناه حزب الله منذ 20 عام) and Benjamin Netanyahu, in their headlines (ARA-E1-A4, A6).

E2: Assassination of Hassan Nassrallah (September 27)

AJA's coverage of the assassination of Hezbollah's secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah was demonstrated through five frames: martyrdom, attribution of responsibility, victory/defeat, military-security, and diplomacy/peace. Although AJA used the word "killed" and not "martyred" in their lead and general wording, the martyrdom frame was present through using terms like "mourned" (نعى), such as in one of AJA's headlines, "Hezbollah mourns its Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah", published on 28 September 2024, whose lead included an excerpt from Hezbollah's statement which framed him as a martyr (AJA-E2-A2). Furthermore, Responsibility was primarily attributed to Israel for assassinating Hassan Nasrallah and other major leaders in Hezbollah and the Iranian revolutionary guard (AJA-E2-A2, A3, A5, A8). AJA also pointed out that Israel's assassination of Nasrallah, with Netanyahu's approval, was postponed due to this event, which held Israel responsible for preventing a ceasefire, "Netanyahu informed Washington of his agreement to a 21-day truce...but he made the decision to assassinate Nasrallah" (نتنياهو أبلغ واشنطن موافقته على هدنة لمدة 21 يوماً...غير أنه اتخذ قرار اغتيال نصرالله) (AJA-E2-A8). However, Hezbollah was shown as responsible for dragging Lebanon to regional conflict in an attribute of the Lebanese Maronite patriarch (AJA-E2-A5).

The victory/defeat frame was first demonstrated in Israel's failure to kill Nasrallah and the denial of their claims, describing them as "allegations" (ادعاءات) (AJA-E2-A1). Latter articles which included Hezbollah confirmation of Nasrallah's death mentioned Israel as having succeeded in killing Nasrallah, but it took them years and many attempts, "following several failed attempts and intelligence operations" (عقب محاولات عدة وعمليات استخباراتية فاشلة) (AJA-E2-A6). AJA also presented Hezbollah as continuing to fight Israel through the "support front" (جبهة الإسناد) despite the assassination of their leader and included quotes from experts voicing opinions that present the group as powerful resistance (AJA-E2-A3).

The military-security frame was presented through AJA's analysis of the security implications of Nasrallah death on Hezbollah and the region (AJA-E2-A2). AJA also offered detailed reports on the details of how Israel managed to assassinate Hezbollah where it included the collaboration of "three Israeli security units" (ثلاث وحدات استخبارات إسرائيل) (AJA-E2-A6). Another report titled "*Artificial intelligence: This is how Israel assassinated Hassan Nasrallah*," published on 29 September 2024, included an experiment where they used ChatGPT to understand how Israel succeeded in killing Nasrallah and mentioned many strategies like spies, cyber-attacks and Open-Source Intelligence (ONSIT) (AJA-E2-A7). One

article mentioned the issue of national security being threatened in the context of the outbreak of protests in Bahrain calling against the assassination of Nasrallah (AJA-E2-A4). As to the diplomacy/peace frame, it was manifested through articles that included calls for ending the war, such as Lebanon's Maronite Patriarch who called for the "adoption of diplomacy" (اعتماد الدبلوماسية) (AJA-E2-A5). The frame was also demonstrated in an article with the headline "*Lapid: Netanyahu agreed to a 21-day ceasefire before Nasrallah's assassination*," published on 9 October 2024, which included a discussion on a ceasefire (AJA-E2-A8).

Al Arabiya's articles showcased five frames: attribution of responsibility, victory/defeat, security justification, military-security, and organizational legitimacy/illegitimacy. Al Arabiya's articles showed attribution of responsibility towards Israel for assassinating Nasrallah and towards Hezbollah through demonstrating blame from political opposition in Lebanon who accused Nasrallah of "subordination to Iran and controlling the decision of peace and war in the country" (الإرتهان لإيران والتحكم بقرار السلم والحرب في البلد) (ARA-E2-A1, A3). As to the victory/defeat frame, Al Arabiya demonstrated the killing of Nasrallah as a definite success for Israel without any mentions of denial and quoted an Israeli official who said, "they [Hezbollah] hide the truth when we succeed" (يخفون الحقيقة عندما ننجح) (ARA-E2-A2, A5). Other articles pointed out Israel's failure to kill Nasrallah; however, they also mentioned that Hezbollah has become weaker after their involvement in Syria, making them susceptible to being penetrated by Israel especially through open-source data and spies (ARA-E2-A7, A9). Moreover, the security justification frame presented the reason for Israel's massive bombing of Dahye to assassinate Nasrallah, despite the huge destruction that resulted without mentioning any possible civilian human casualties (ARA-E2-A3, A4). Al Arabiya also emphasized the security justification through quoting US president at the time Joe Biden, "Israel's right to defend itself" (حق إسرائيل في الدفاع عن نفسها) and mentioning that the death of Nasrallah achieved "justice" (العدل) for many of his victims in its headline (ARA-E2-A6).

The military-security frame was illustrated through showing Nasrallah's high-security life where he lived under strict measures and his direct support from Tehran (ARA-E2-A1). This was further illustrated through mentioning the reasons for Israel's decision to kill Nasrallah, including his short-term stays and disappearances to different locations for security reasons and explained the details of the operation which included "80 bunker-buster bombs" (قنبلة خارقة للتحصينات 80) (ARA-E2-A5). As to the implications, it included discussions on who will replace Nasrallah such as Hashem Saffiedine and Naim Qassem, as well as the possibility

of an Israeli ground invasion in Lebanon and how the death of Nasrallah introduces shifts in the region's power balances (ARA-E2-A7, A8). The organizational legitimacy/illegitimacy frame appeared in one article through quoting a military strategic expert who presented Israel as a legitimate power capable of conducting security breaches and Hezbollah, alongside Hamas and the Houthis, as illegitimate militias that are Iranian proxies and “do not measure up to the armies of the countries in the region” (لا ترقى إلى مستوى جيوش دول المنطقة) (ARA-E2-A8).

E3: Heavy Israeli bombing of Dahye (September 27)

AJA's representation of the Israeli bombardment of Dahye, revealed two frames: attribution of responsibility and humanitarian consequences. In an article titled “*What happened in the southern suburbs of Beirut and what is Nasrallah's fate?*” published on 27 September 2024, AJA attributed the bombings to Israel which was targeting Hezbollah's main headquarters in Dahye – with the main goal to target Nasrallah - and referred to the Israeli army spokesperson Daniel Hagari who said the “headquarters is under civilian buildings inside Dahye” (المقر موجود تحت مبان سكنية بقلب الضاحية) (AJA-E3-A1). Additionally, the article pointed out several reactions to the attacks, including the American and Lebanese stances which accused Israel of ignoring ceasefire calls, and the United Nation's stance which showed worry about the attacks which were targeting heavy-populated areas (AJA-E3-A1). As to the humanitarian consequences frame, AJA mentioned that the Israeli attack, which they called, “Israeli aggression” (العدوان الإسرائيلي), led to mass destruction and human casualties, which included the complete destruction of six buildings and the death of two people (AJA-E3-A1).

Al Arabiya represented the event through three frames: humanitarian consequences, attribution of responsibility, and security justification. The humanitarian consequences frame was presented through mentioning the fear and horror that spread amongst civilians after the heavy Israeli bombings on Dahye and how they fled to the streets and public parks, as well as the numbers of human casualties and the people who fled in general from the start of the war (ARA-E3-A3). On the other hand, responsibility was attributed to Israel for their massive bombardment of Dahye where they showed Netanyahu approving the attack and showcased it as “the largest Israeli attack on Dahye” (“أكبر هجوم إسرائيلي على الضاحية”) and “the most violent bombing on Lebanon since the 2006 war” (القصف الأعنف على لبنان منذ حرب 2006) (ARA-E3-A1, A2, A3). As to the security justification frame, the articles consistently pointed out Israel targeting Hezbollah's main headquarters where the group's officials usually gather with the

main goal being the assassination of Nasrallah (ARA-E3-A1, A2). Al Arabiya also used the term “Terrorist Hezbollah” (حزب الله الإرهابية) to describe the group (ARA-E3-A2).

E4: Israeli Ground Invasion of south Lebanon (October 1)

Two frames dominated AJA’s coverage of the Israeli ground invasion of Lebanon: military -security and humanitarian consequences. The military-security frame was highly presented through AJA’s focus on the discussions of the possible scenarios for Israel’s ground invasion, such as occupying a part of Lebanon bordering Israel like in 1985 or entering deep into Lebanon reaching the Litani river (AJA-E4-A1). Further, AJA followed up on updates regarding the Israeli invasion and highlighted Israel’s goals and mentioned Hezbollah’s statement which denied claims that Israel has invaded Lebanon (AJA-E4-A2). On the other hand, the humanitarian consequences frame was minimally mentioned where they pointed out the continuity of the destruction of Lebanon with its internal conflicts and the control of Hezbollah (AJA-E4-A1).

Al Arabiya’s articles showcased three frames: security justification, military-security, and diplomacy/peace. The security justification frame was strongly present where the articles prioritized the Israeli military statement that pointed out that their invasion only targets bordering Hezbollah strongholds, such as in an article titled “*Israel warned 30 towns that its incursion into Lebanon targeted Hezbollah strongholds,*” published on 1 October 2024, where they pointed out that war is “with Hezbollah and not the people of Lebanon” (مع حزب الله وليست مع شعب لبنان) (ARA-E4-A1). As to the military-security frame, Al Arabiya demonstrated it through highlighting the possible scenarios for Israel’s ground invasion and its implications which included assuring the return of the northern Israeli settlers to their homes, dismantling Hezbollah’s infrastructure by the border and preventing an attack like October 7 (ARA-E4-A1). Another article, however, showcased the UNIFIL and Hezbollah’s denials of Israel’s ground invasion of Lebanon (ARA-E4-A2). Moreover, the diplomacy/peace frame was accentuated through an article quoting the UNIFIL, which considered the Israeli invasion a violation of Lebanese sovereignty and called for refraining from escalation, “which will only lead to further violence and bloodshed” (لن تؤدي إلا المزيد من العنف وسفك الدماء) (ARA-E4-A2).

E5: Assassination of Hashem Safieddine (Killed on October 3, confirmed on October 23)

AJA reported on the assassination of Hashem Safieddine in three frames: attribution of responsibility, martyrdom, and organizational legitimacy/illegitimacy. Responsibility was attributed to Israel where they mentioned Safieddine's "killing in an Israeli strike" (تأكيد مقتله في) (غارة إسرائيلية) and pointed out the Israeli army's confirmation for doing so (AJA-E5-A1, A2). Additionally, AJA pointed out Israel's blocking of ambulances from reaching the area where he was killed (AJA-E5-A1). The martyrdom frame appeared in AJA's usage of terms that indicate mourning like "Hezbollah mourns" (نعى حزب الله) and including a quote from Hezbollah statement on Safieddine's death, however, AJA's original text used "killed" and not "martyred" (AJA-E5-A1). As to the organizational legitimacy/illegitimacy frame, AJA emphasized both Hezbollah's legitimacy and illegitimacy. Legitimacy was reflected through depicting Safieddine as the "prime minister of Hezbollah" (رئيس حكومة حزب الله), where AJA highlighted the group's executive council as a legitimate government with complex structure with military and political units (AJA-E5-A2). The illegitimacy of Hezbollah was demonstrated through mentioning criticisms to the Safieddine, such as being under the U.S. terrorism lists and economic sanctions, as well as his brother who was accused of money laundering and drug smuggling for Hezbollah (AJA-E5-A2).

Only one frame was observed for Al Arabiya's coverage of this event: victory/defeat. The frame was observed through Al Arabiya's description of the assassination as a strong hit to the Hezbollah's main leadership and infrastructure, which weakened the group - which the outlet considered it to be a proxy of Iran – and questioned their internal security and stability (ARA-E5-A1, A2). Israel, on the other side, was portrayed as having superior military and security structures and the capability to penetrate Hezbollah (ARA-E5-A1).

E6: Hezbollah's drone attack on Benyamina, Israel (October 13)

Hezbollah's drone attack on Benyamina was reported by AJA through the victory/defeat frame. The frame was especially evident through AJA's depiction of the event as a victory and success for Hezbollah and a security failure for Israel, where they used Hezbollah's attributes which said the operation was "qualitative and complex" (نوعية ومركبة) (AJA-E6-A1). Furthermore, AJA highlighted the damage caused by Hezbollah's attack on Benyamina through quoting Israeli sources that confirmed Israel's security failure where, "The air defenses [...] lost track of the drone, which succeeded in reaching the dining hall of a Golani Brigade camp"

(فقدت الدفاعات الجوية... فقدت أثر المسيرة بعد ذلك، لتنتج في الوصول إلى قاعة الطعام في معسكر تابع للواء غولاني) and pointed out that the attack was “difficult and its consequences are painful” (صعب ونتائجه) (AJA-E6-A1). مؤلمة

Al Arabiya’s reporting of the attack included three frames: humanitarian consequences, attribution of responsibility, and victory/defeat. The humanitarian consequences were illustrated through mentioning the general human suffering and destruction since the start of the war where they pointed out the death of 15 people and the destruction of a mosque south Lebanon (ARA-E6-A1). These consequences were attributed to Israel where they reflected language of blame due to bombing areas, “outside traditional Hezbollah strongholds” (خارج) (ARA-E6-A1). (معاقلة حزب الله التقليدية). As to the victory/defeat frame, the article emphasized Israel’s security failure and presented Hezbollah’s attack as successful as Israel’s “air defense system failed to detect the drone” (منظومة الدفاع الجوي فشلت في رصد الطائرة) (ARA-E6-A1).

E7: Heavy Israeli bombing of the city of Tyre (October 28 and November 1& 22)

Four frames were detected in AJA’s articles tackling the Israeli bombing of Tyre: humanitarian consequences, attribution of responsibility, victory/defeat, and military-security. Humanitarian consequences included the collapse of some buildings and the partial destruction of others, as well as the deaths of seven people (AJA-E7-A1). These destructions and deaths were attributed to the Israeli army who used “internationally banned weapons” (أسلحة محرمة دولياً) and violating international humanitarian law (AJA-E7-A1, A2). As to the victory/defeat frame, AJA emphasized Hezbollah’s continued targeting of Israel and sending evacuation orders, while also pointing out the losses amongst the Israeli army (AJA-E7-A1, A2). The military-security frame was demonstrated through including analysis on the reasons for Israel’s focus on Tyre which included weakening the city as it is considered one of Hezbollah’s bases, its geographical location where it is close to the Israeli border as it has a competitive advantage of being a tourist city, as well as the historical Israeli prejudice against the city (AJA-E7-A2).

Al Arabiya represented this event through five frames: humanitarian consequences, attribution of responsibility, security justification, military-security, and culture. Al Arabiya highlighted the humanitarian consequences frame through mentioning that the “strikes killed 21 people” (غارات أودت بحياة 21 شخصاً) and the heavy destruction of some buildings (ARA-E7-A1). These strikes were attributed to Israel with the mention of a security justification that the “Israeli army said it is targeting Hezbollah strongholds” (يقول الجيش الإسرائيلي أنه يستهدف معاقلة حزب)

الله). The military-security frame was presented by pointing out the reasons for Israel's operation in Lebanon as due to Hezbollah's opening of the "support front" (جبهة الإسناد) for Gaza (ARA-E7-A1). Moreover, the culture frame was significantly emphasized in an article titled "*Lebanese heritage is in grave danger due to the bombing... fears for Baalbek and Tyre*," published on 6 October 2024, where Lebanese UNESCO heritage sites in Tyre and Baalbek were portrayed as possible victims of the conflict and warned from their destruction through quoting the UN Lebanon Rapporteur (ARA-E7-A2).

E8: Heavy Israeli Bombing of Bekaa Valley (October 6 – November 3)

AJA portrayed the Israeli bombing of the Bekaa valley through three frames: humanitarian consequences, attribution of responsibility, and victory/defeat. The humanitarian consequences, with the attribution to Israel, included pointing out the mass killings in Baalbek where AJA quotes the national Lebanese news agency, who reported that Israel has "committed massacres in the city of Baalbek" (ارتكبت مجازر في مدينة بعلبك) and similarly in the village of Sohmar in West Bekaa (AJA-E8-A2, A3). AJA further emphasized the massive economic losses that hit the West Bekaa village due to the complete evacuation of all the residents and destruction Israel has caused to commercial activity (AJA-E8-A3). Additionally, AJA used the term "Israeli aggression" (العدوان الإسرائيلي) to describe Israel's war on Lebanon (AJA-E8-A3). The victory/defeat frame was mainly presented in showing how Israel was being defeated by Hezbollah with its "raining" of rockets and Israel's inability to move forward in South Lebanon (AJA-E8-A1).

Four frames appeared in Al Arabiya's coverage of this event: humanitarian consequences, attribution of responsibility, security justification, and culture. The humanitarian consequences frame was showcased through mentioning the high human casualties where 60 people were killed in Baalbek – including two children - and pointing out the "panic" (حالة هلع) that occurred due to the unprecedented strikes, where civilians fled to the streets (ARA-E8-A2, A3, A4). Israel was portrayed as responsible for the bombings and mentioned how some of the strikes occurred without sending a "prior warning [of evacuation] from the Israeli army" (من دون اصدار انذار مسبق من الجيش الإسرائيلي) (ARA-E8-A2, A3). As to the security justification frame, Al Arabiya reported the reasons for the Israeli strikes as targeting Hezbollah since "Baalbek, located in the Bekaa Valley...is considered a Hezbollah stronghold in eastern Lebanon" (منطقة بعلبك الواقعة في البقاع...تعتبر معقل حزب الله شرق لبنان) (ARA-E8-A1, A3). The culture frame was

demonstrated through Al Arabiya's centering on the risk of destruction of the Baalbek ruins, which is listed as a UNESCO site, after an Israeli strike landed close to it (Al ARA-E8-A1).

E9: Announcement of the Ceasefire Deal (November 26)

AJA covered the announcement of the ceasefire deal through three frames: humanitarian consequences, victory/defeat, and diplomacy/peace. The humanitarian consequences and diplomacy/peace frames were highlighted through quoting an interview with Lebanon's ex-prime minister Fouad Sanioura who stressed on the necessity of the ceasefire due to the high loss of civilian human lives and the "need to save Lebanon" (حاجة إلى إنقاذ لبنان) as Israel "targeted Lebanese civilians" (استهدفوا المدنيين اللبنانيين) (AJA-E9-A1). The victory/defeat frame was demonstrated through AJA's presentation of two opposing opinions, including Sanioura's opinion who criticized both Israel and Hezbollah for not following the 1701 UN resolution (AJA-E9-A1). The other opinion was by a political analyst Ali Haidar who praised Hezbollah as a "resistance" group that "imposed its equation" (فرضت معادلتها) and was able to force Israel to give up its high expectations (AJA-E9-A1). AJA also referenced the situation in Gaza and discussed the possibility of a second ceasefire (AJA-E9-A1).

Al Arabiya's representation of the ceasefire deal showed the usage of two frames: diplomacy/peace and military-security. The diplomacy/peace frame was illustrated through the focus on the diplomatic efforts to reach a ceasefire and highlighting the role of the United States in its brokerage, where Al Arabiya included attributions from Anthony Blinken, the minister of foreign affairs (ARA-E9-A1, A2). The issue of demilitarization of Hezbollah was also mentioned – as stated in the 1701 UN resolution – where Al Arabiya pointed out the group was sending rockets to Israel as the diplomatic efforts were taking place (ARA-E9-A1). On the other hand, the military-security frame, was demonstrated through quoting Israeli government spokesperson who stated that any violation of the ceasefire by Hezbollah would give Israel the freedom to act in Lebanon, as well as it being necessary to assure the return of the northern Israeli settlers (ARA-E9-A2). This frame was further illustrated through mentioning the other implications of the ceasefire which include deployment of Lebanese Army troops along the border and the rebuilding the destroyed infrastructure (ARA-E9-A2).

E10: Enforcement of Ceasefire Deal (November 27)

The enforcement of the ceasefire deal was reported by AJA through four frames: humanitarian consequences, victory/defeat, military-security, and diplomacy/peace. AJA showcased the humanitarian consequences frame through mentioning the total human casualties of the war, “3800 killed” (3800 قتيل) and details on the injuries, evacuees and the destruction of housing and economic losses in the agricultural sector (AJA-E10-A1 A2). The victory/defeat frame, however, was demonstrated through describing Israel as defeated, while also portraying Hezbollah as pretending to gain victory of the war, “the ceasefire provides relief for both sides...and allows Hezbollah leaders to boast” (وقف إطلاق النار يوفر الراحة لكلا) (ويسمح لقادة حزب الله التقاخر...الجانبين) and admitting to the losses that hit Hezbollah (AJA-E10-A2). However, despite the group’s losses, AJA framed them as “resilient” as the ceasefire “agreement was imposed through resilience in the battlefield” (الإتفاق فرض بالصمود في الميدان) and Israel, on the other hand, did not succeed in subjugating Hezbollah and failed to achieve its goals (AJA-E10-A2, A5). Additionally, in an article titled “*How did the Israeli media react to the ceasefire agreement with Lebanon?*” published on 27 November 2024, AJA used Israeli media sources to highlight that the ceasefire agreement was not very beneficial to Israel and “was bad with many cons and gaps” (سيء وبه سلبيات وثغرات) (AJA-E10-A4). Israeli media was also sourced to point out how Lebanese people returned to their villages in the south, but “images of the return of Israelis to the north” were absent (غياب صور عودة الإسرائيليين إلى الشمال) (AJA-E10-A7).

The military-security frame was reflected in AJA’s discussions on the details and implications of the ceasefire where the agreement was said to be beneficial for both Israel, Lebanon and the security of the region and that Israel was forced to sign it due to its weakened army (AJA-E10-A1, A4). Moreover, Israel could not achieve their goals fully in the war despite Netanyahu’s claim that the war weakened Hezbollah because they signed a similar agreement in 2006 (AJA-E10-A5). Furthermore, AJA pointed out that the ceasefire would force Hezbollah to separate itself from the Gaza front and allows Israel to rehabilitate its army and refocus its efforts on the return of the Israeli hostages and the Gaza and Iran fronts (AJA-E10-A6). As to the diplomacy/peace frame, AJA emphasized it by mentioning the ceasefire entering into force with details on its terms and the significance of the 1701 UN resolution, as well as, the issue of Hezbollah’s demilitarization and “dismantling all unregulated military establishments” (تفكيك) (كل المنشآت العسكرية غير المرخصة) (AJA-E10-A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, A7).

Al Arabiya's portrayal of this event included three frames: humanitarian consequences, diplomacy/peace, and victory/defeat. Al Arabiya pointed out the humanitarian consequences where it showcased people rushing back to their villages and homes they evacuated right after the agreement was announced despite Israel's warnings (ARA-E10-A1). The articles also highlighted the massive destruction in the bordering villages in south Lebanon and Dahye in Beirut due to the violent Israeli airstrikes (ARA-E10-A1). The diplomacy frame was emphasized through the ongoing negotiations regarding the deal's terms such as Israel's right to move freely in case of violations where the Lebanese minister of exterior firmly denied "no freedom of movement to Israel" (لا حرية لحركة إسرائيل) (ARA-E10-A2, A3). Al Arabiya also mentioned the issue of demilitarization of Hezbollah and highlighted the terms of the ceasefire which stated that "the official Lebanese security forces and army are the only armed entities authorized to carry weapons" (قوات الأمن والجيش اللبناني الرسميين هي الجهات المسلحة الوحيدة المسموح لها) (بحمل السلاح) (ARA-E10-A2, A3). Furthermore, the victory/defeat frame was presented through quoting Hezbollah as having achieved "victory" but then mentioned Israel's assassination of much of Hezbollah's leadership with the ceasefire stating the disarmament of the group (ARA-E10-A3).

Discussion

The purpose of this study was to examine the Arab media framing of the 2024 Israeli war on Lebanon, through analyzing 65 articles from Al Jazeera Arabic (n=30) and Al Arabiya (n=35) published between 23 September and 27 November 2024. The paper employed framing theory as the theoretical framework of this study, and qualitative framing analysis as its methodological approach. The findings and analysis demonstrate the prevalence of nine frames across AJA and Al Arabiya: (1) Humanitarian consequences, (2) Attribution of Responsibility, (3) Victory/Defeat, (4) Security Justification, (5) Military – Security, (6) Diplomacy/Peace, (7) Martyrdom, (8) Organizational legitimacy/illegitimacy and (9) Culture Frames. These frames appeared at different frequencies for each outlet's articles. This is especially evident with the presence of the Security Justification and Culture frames in Al Arabiya's sample, but their absence in that of Al Jazeera Arabic. On the other hand, the martyrdom frame was used by Al Jazeera Arabic, but not by Al Arabiya.

Concerning Al Jazeera Arabic and Al Arabiya's media framing of the 2024 Israeli war on Lebanon, it was mainly dominated by four frames (1) Humanitarian consequences, (2) Attribution of Responsibility, (3) Victory/Defeat, and (4) Security Justification. The humanitarian consequences and the attribution of responsibility frames were mostly prevalent, appearing 7 times in AJA's sample and 6 times in that of Al Arabiya. This finding is consistent with Kalb and Saivetz's (2007) account of the 2006 July war, where both Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya were found to have the victimization theme in their coverage – which falls within the humanitarian consequences frame, which includes the victimization of civilians and showing human suffering. However, the frequency of the usage of this frame contradicts with Kalb and Saivetz's (2007) conclusion, where in 2006, Al Arabiya was found to use the victimization frame 25% more than Al Jazeera (p.52), while this paper's results showed an approximately equal emphasis on victimization in the 2024 war.

Relevant to the last frame, the attribution of responsibility frame appeared equally between the two outlets (n=6). This frequency was manifested differently as AJA attributed responsibility to Israel and blamed it for causing human suffering – mass evacuations, deaths and destruction, while Al Arabiya attributed the blame and responsibility to both Israel and Hezbollah. Al Arabiya, while admitting to Israel's role in causing destruction and death in Lebanon, did not primarily blame it for the war. On the contrary, Al Arabiya blamed Hezbollah for triggering Israel through the Gaza "Support" front and dragging the country into a war.

This is partially consistent with Kalb and Saivetz's (2007) analysis which pointed out that both channels referred to Israel as the aggressor in 2006, however, they did not mention Al Arabiya's blame of Hezbollah. In this matter, Melki (2014) found in 2006 that Al Arabiya, consistent with the findings of this paper, held Hezbollah responsible for triggering the war with Israel (p. 177). Similarly, Elmasry et al.'s (2013) study on the media representation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, concluded that Al Jazeera condemned Israeli actions more than Al Arabiya, suggesting that this dynamic is consistent with framing conflicts involving Israel.

As to the victory/defeat frame, AJA used the frame (n=7), significantly more frequently than Al Arabiya (n=4). The usage of this frame was used differently by the two channels, where AJA framed the war as a victory for Hezbollah, and Al Arabiya, as a victory for Israel. While the security justification frame was absent in AJA and present only in Al Arabiya's sample (n=7). And in relation to the attribution of responsibility frame, Al Arabiya used security justification to justify certain Israeli actions using the security trope, such as justifying bombing certain areas even when heavily populated with civilians if the goal is targeting Hezbollah. In other words, Israel's attacks and airstrikes were carefully positioned as negative yet justified. The justification was emphasized on the idea that Israel was targeting Hezbollah and its infrastructure that happened to exist within civilian populated areas, causing humanitarian consequences and suffering, and the outlet always mentioned that Israel sent evacuation warnings before the airstrikes. However, Al Arabiya would blame Israel when no prior evacuation warning was sent (ARA-E6-A1, E8-A4). This point is partially in line with Melki's (2014) conclusion of the 2006 war that Al Arabiya was not supportive of Hezbollah and was "mildly supportive of Israel" (p. 177).

Hezbollah was portrayed distinctively by the two channels. AJA portrayed Hezbollah as a "resistance" group that was being attacked by Israel and defending itself and Lebanon from it. However, AJA's depiction of Hezbollah and its leaders appeared to have some level of caution. This was evident with the subtle positioning of the group as positive for their opposition to Israel but would sometimes include critical perspectives. For instance, during both Hassan Nasrallah's news on his assassination and later, Hashem Safieddine, AJA published articles that reported on the news of their death and quoted Hezbollah's mourning statement in the lead (AJA-E2-A2, E5-A1). However, AJA used the word "killed" and not "martyred" – like in Hezbollah's official statements – which might indicate a neutral positive-leaning tone towards Hezbollah and its leaders. Additionally, AJA sometimes included quotes

critical to Hezbollah, such as that of the Lebanese Maronite Patriarch, who blamed the group for dragging Lebanon to a war (AJA-E2-A5).

These findings are consistent with Melki's (2014) conclusion that found AJA's reporting to align with Hezbollah's channel Al-Manar TV, but the difference being the inclusion of some criticisms. Similarly, Saber (2016) pointed out that in the 2006 war Al Jazeera portrayed Nasrallah as a leader of the Arabs (p.12). Furthermore, the killed/martyred terminology appeared to be used with caution when also reporting civilian casualties and deaths. The dominant term was "killed," however, AJA used "martyred" four out of the 30 articles in the sample, which were during the first day of Israeli attack and the assassination of Nasrallah and the Israeli bombing of Tyre, which indicates an inconsistency that cannot be clearly interpreted.

Al Arabiya often referred to Hezbollah as an Iranian proxy with the frequent use of the phrase of "funded" or "supported by Iran", which positioned the group as the opposite of resistance, but a mere ideological tool used by Iran – alongside Hamas in Gaza and the Houthis in Yemen - to achieve its interests in Lebanon and the region (ARA-E2-A1). Additionally, Al Arabiya recognized Nasrallah's strong leadership – during the reporting on his death – but also accompanied it with criticisms on his involvement in Syria (ARA-E2-A1).

As to AJA's and Al Arabiya's framing of major events during war, the first day of the attack (E1), the assassination of Nasrallah (E2) and the enforcement of the ceasefire deal (E10) demonstrated the most significant results. The first day of the Israeli attack on Lebanon was framed using the humanitarian consequences and attribution of responsibility frames by both channels. However, in addition to these frames, AJA used the victory/defeat frame and Al Arabiya, the security justification frame. Al Arabiya framed the attack as a security necessity for Israel for the return of their northern settlers. AJA's usage of the victory/defeat frame included positioning Hezbollah as a resilient and resistant to the Israeli attacks.

The assassination of Nasrallah's reporting was characterized by three common frames: Attribution of responsibility, victory/defeat, and military-security frames. AJA also used martyrdom and diplomacy/peace frames. The martyrdom frame was demonstrated through AJA's usage of attributions reflecting mourning of Nasrallah through including an extract from Hezbollah's official statement. The mourning aspect may evoke an indirect sense of martyrdom and value to the group's grief. The diplomacy/peace frame, on the other hand, was illustrated through including calls to ending the war, such as that of the Maronite patriarch. Al Arabiya

used security justification and organizational legitimacy/illegitimacy frames. Nasrallah's assassination was portrayed as a security necessity for Israel, despite the human casualties and destruction that occurred. Hezbollah was also delegitimized as an organization with the accentuation of Israel as a legitimate and more superior entity.

As to the ceasefire deal enforcement, it consisted of three common frames: humanitarian consequences, victory/defeat, and diplomacy-peace. There was only one additional frame from AJA: military-security. Nevertheless, the coverage of the ceasefire deal was mainly dominated by the victory/defeat frame, alongside the diplomacy/peace frame. AJA portrayed the deal as a win for Hezbollah and a loss for Israel. This was emphasized through framing Israel as being forced to sign the deal because it was in a weak position with depleted military forces which have been active on two fronts. Hezbollah, however, was depicted as resilient and victorious in the deal because they remained active on the ground despite their major losses and Israel's assassination of much of its leadership and destruction of their infrastructure.

This framing partially aligns with AJA in 2006 according to Saber's (2016) Ricoeurian analysis that found the channel to portray the end of the war as a victory with Nasrallah's "victory speech" (p. 12). However, the difference with the 2024 war is that the victory narrative was accompanied by attributions containing criticisms and describing Hezbollah's victory as a façade due to the massive losses that hit the group (AJA-E10-A2). AJA also pointed out that the ceasefire's terms included the disarmament of Hezbollah which signals a degree of defeat. Hence, in comparison to the studies on the 2006 war by Melki (2014) and Saber (2016), AJA in the 2024 war has reduced the extent of framing depicting the group as a winner through highlighting the losses, consequences and implications of the ceasefire which weakened Hezbollah's authority and military capabilities.

Al Arabiya portrayed the ceasefire deal almost opposite to AJA. Al Arabiya presented Hezbollah as defeated because the ceasefire deal required its disarmament, in addition to the losses sustained by the group, including the assassinations and destruction of their strongholds in the southern Beirut suburb, Dahye (ARA-E10-A3). Israel, on the other hand, was portrayed as the winner in the agreement and pointed out how any violation from Hezbollah would grant Israel the right to act freely in Lebanon. This is similar to findings from the 2006 war where Melki (2014) found Al Arabiya to be using more frames depicting Israel as victorious and Hezbollah as defeated.

Aside from filling the literature gap, it could be said that this study has contributed to broader research on media framing of war and conflict. The analysis resulted in the emergence of emphasis issue-specific frames that support the analytical effect of Semetko and Valkenburg's (2000) deductive typologies, which were partially present in the results – Economic consequences, responsibility and human interest. Moreover, the frames resulting from this study may assist in similar future studies investigating media framing of conflicts, especially those involving Israel and Hezbollah.

Conclusion and Limitations

Al Jazeera Arabic and Al Arabiya's coverage of the Israeli war in 2024 revealed polarizing results with the dominance of the Humanitarian Consequences, Attribution of Responsibility, and Victory/Defeat frames. Some frames were present only in AJA – the Martyrdom frame – and other only in Al Arabiya – the Security justification and Culture frames. AJA generally framed the war as an Israeli aggression and attributed responsibility to Israel for starting the war and causing human suffering, death, and destruction. Al Arabiya, however, while it did not deny Israel's responsibility, it tended to hold Hezbollah responsible for triggering Israel due to the opening of "Support front" for Gaza and dragging Lebanon into a war. With caution and without full endorsement, AJA would often refer to Hezbollah as a resistance group, while Al Arabiya portrayed it as an Iranian proxy. The end of the war and ceasefire agreement was depicted within a victory and defeat framing where AJA portrayed Hezbollah as the winner and Israel as defeated, while Al Arabiya depicted the latter as the winner and Hezbollah as defeated. The findings of this study illustrated highly similar results to AJA's and Al Arabiya's framing patterns during the 2006 war as concluded by Kalb and Saivetz (2007), Melki (2014) and Saber (2016).

The study was subject to multiple limitations. The original research intent was to study the Lebanese media coverage of the war and compare different Lebanese media outlets, like Melki's (2014) state-of-the-art analysis which not only included Lebanese media, but also Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, as well as US and Israeli media. Faced with data restrictions and the inability to acquire full data of some Lebanese media outlets, whether articles or news reports, a practical decision was made to analyze Al Jazeera Arabic and Al Arabiya, due to the ability to access the data, and because it was feasible for a single researcher. The second limitation was the inability to conduct interviews with Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya news executives and editors due to time and geographical constraints.

There were additional limitations concerning research design and sample. The sample unit of analysis consisted only of the textual elements of the articles. The analysis of the visual aspect – photos used in each article – was not possible as it would have required a more complex methodological approach. Furthermore, with the existing gap in the literature, and the previous studies analysis reports from Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya (Elmasry et al., 2013; Melki, 2014; Kalb & Saivetz, 2007; Saber, 2016), the discussion was limited to general conclusions of the channels' reporting of the 2024 war and previous wars and conflicts involving Israel.

These results, while consistent with previous similar studies, nevertheless raise new questions on their continuity after the recent developments in the Arab region. During the writing of this dissertation, Iran attacked Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain (Nereim & Desoukie, 2026). And with the renewed escalation between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon (Al Jazeera English, 2026), it is crucial to further examine Al Jazeera's coverage and portrayal of Israel, Iran and Hezbollah and their reporting of the conflict and comparing the two time periods. It is also important to examine Al Arabiya's reporting and whether the negative portrayals of Iran and Hezbollah have increased or remained the same.

Building on the theoretical contributions of this study, future research could examine the Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya framing of the 2026 Hezbollah-Israel conflict in Lebanon, as well as the Iranian attacks on the Arab Gulf states, especially Qatar, with consideration given to including mainstream Lebanese media outlets in the comparative analysis.

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Appendix

Appendix 1: The sample of Articles from Al Jazeera Arabic and Al Arabiya

#	Code	Headline	Translation	Date	APA in-text
1	AJA-E1-A1	لبنان يتلقى 80 ألف محاولة اتصال إسرائيلية في يوم واحد لإخلاء المنازل	Lebanon receives 80,000 Israeli phone calls in one day urging evacuation of homes	23/9/2024	Al Jazeera (2024a)
2	AJA-E1-A2	نزوح غير مسبوق من جنوب لبنان بعد غارات إسرائيلية دامية	Unprecedented displacement from southern Lebanon following deadly Israeli airstrikes	23/9/2024	Dahsha (2024a)
3	AJA-E1 – A3	صواريخ حزب الله تضرب مستوطنات بالضفة وإسرائيل تعلن حالة الطوارئ	Hezbollah rockets strike settlements in the West Bank, and Israel declares a state of emergency	23/9/2024	Al Jazeera (2024b)
4	AJA-E2-A1	غموض حول مصير نصر الله و 30 غارة إسرائيلية على الضاحية	Uncertainty surrounds Nasrallah's fate, and 30 Israeli airstrikes target the southern suburbs of Beirut	28/9/2024	Al Jazeera (2024c)
5	AJA-E2-A2	حزب الله ينعي أمينه العام حسن نصر الله	Hezbollah mourns its Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah	28/9/2024	Al Jazeera (2024d)
6	AJA-E2-A3	ما مصير جبهة جنوب لبنان بعد اغتيال نصر الله؟	What will be the fate of the southern Lebanon front after Nasrallah's assassination?	29/9/2024	Dahsha (2024b)
7	AJA-E2-A4	داخلية البحرين تدعو للحفاظ على الأمن عقب مسيرات منددة باغتيال نصر الله	Bahrain's Interior Ministry calls for maintaining security following marches condemning Nasrallah's assassination	29/9/2024	Al Jazeera (2024e)

8	AJA-E2-A5	بطريرك الموارنة بلبان يدعو لإنهاء الحرب ويعزي عائلة نصر الله	The Maronite Patriarch of Lebanon calls for an end to the war and offers condolences to the Nasrallah family	29/9/2024	Al Jazeera (2024f)
9	, ,	ثلاث وحدات استخبارات إسرائيلية وفرت معلومات لاغتيال نصر الله	Three Israeli intelligence units provided information for the assassination of Nasrallah	29/9/2024	Al Jazeera (2024g)
10	AJA-E2-A7	الذكاء الاصطناعي: هكذا اغتالت إسرائيل حسن نصر الله	Artificial intelligence: This is how Israel assassinated Hassan Nasrallah	30/9/2024	Jelaad (2024)
11	AJA-E2-A8	لبيد: نتنياهو وافق قبل اغتيال نصر الله على وقف القتال 21 يوما	Lapid: Netanyahu agreed to a 21-day ceasefire before Nasrallah's assassination	9/10/2024	Al Jazeera (2024h)
12	AJA-E3-A1	ماذا حدث في الضاحية الجنوبية لبيروت وما مصير نصر الله؟	What happened in the southern suburbs of Beirut and what is Nasrallah's fate?	27/9/2024	Al Jazeera (2024i)
13	AJA-E4-A1	لوفيجارو: 4 سيناريوهات محتملة للتوغل الإسرائيلي في لبنان	Le Figaro: 4 possible scenarios for an Israeli incursion into Lebanon	1/10/2024	Al Jazeera (2024j)
14	AJA-E4-A2	ما نعرفه عن العملية البرية الإسرائيلية في لبنان	What we know about the Israeli ground operation in Lebanon	1/10/2024	Al Jazeera (2024k)
15	AJA-E5-A1	حزب الله ينعى رئيس مجلسه التنفيذي هاشم صفي الدين	Hezbollah mourns the death of its Executive Council Chairman, Hashem Safieddine	23/10/2024	Al Jazeera (2024l)
16	AJA-E5-A2	هاشم صفي الدين رئيس "حكومة" حزب الله الذي اغتالته إسرائيل	Hashem Safieddine, the head of Hezbollah's "government" who was assassinated by Israel	23/10/2024	Al Jazeera (2024m)

17	AJA-E6-A1	تَحْقِيقَات إِسْرَائِيلِيَّة تَكْشِف كَيْف ضَرَبَتْ مَسِيرَةَ حَزْبِ اللَّهِ مَعْسَكَر بَنِيَامِنَا	Israeli investigations reveal how a Hezbollah drone struck the Binyamina camp	14/10/2024	Al Jazeera (2024n)
18	AJA-E7-A1	غَارَات عَلَى صُور وَمَنَاطِق أُخْرَى بَلْبَنَانَ وَحَزْبِ اللَّهِ يَواصِل اِسْتِهْدَاف إِسْرَائِيل	Airstrikes hit Tyre and other areas in Lebanon as Hezbollah continues targeting Israel	28/10/2024	Al Jazeera (2024o)
19	AJA-E7-A2	لِمَاذَا تَرَكَّز إِسْرَائِيلُ جَهْدَهَا الْحَرْبِيَّ عَلَى قِضَاءِ صُورَ بَجَنُوبِ لَبْنَانَ؟	Why is Israel focusing its war effort on the Tyre district in southern Lebanon?	22/11/2024	Al Jazeera (2024p)
20	AJA-E8-A1	حَزْبُ اللَّهِ يَمْطُرُ مَوَاقِعَ وَتَجْمَعَاتِ إِسْرَائِيلِيَّةَ بِالصَّوَارِيخِ وَغَارَاتِ جَدِيدَةٍ عَلَى الْجَنُوبِ وَالْبِقَاعِ	Hezbollah bombards Israeli sites and gatherings with missiles and launches new raids on southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley	12/10/2024	Al Jazeera (2024q)
21	AJA-E8-A2	صَوَارِيخُ لُبْنَانِيَّةٍ عَلَى الْجَلِيلِ وَعَشْرَاتُ الْقَتْلَى بِقِصْفِ إِسْرَائِيلِ بَعْلَبَكِ	Lebanese rockets fired at Galilee; dozens killed in Israeli shelling of Baalbek	29/10/2024	Al Jazeera (2024r)
22	AJA-E8-A3	بَلَدَةُ سَحْمَرٍ بِالْبِقَاعِ اللَّبْنَانِيِّ تَارِيخُ مِنَ الْعَدَوَانِ الْإِسْرَائِيلِيِّ وَالْتَضَحِيَّاتِ	The town of Sahmar in the Lebanese Bekaa Valley has a history of Israeli aggression and sacrifices	1/11/2024	Al Jazeera (2024s)
23	AJA-E9-A1	السَّيُورَةُ لِلْجَزِيرَةِ: اقْتَرَبْنَا مِنْ سَاعَةِ التَّوَصُّلِ لِاتِّفَاقٍ وَقَفَ إِطْلَاقُ النَّارِ بَلْبَنَانَ	Siniora told Al Jazeera: We are close to reaching a ceasefire agreement in Lebanon	25/11/2024	Al Jazeera (2024t)
24	AJA-E10-A1	اتِّفَاقٌ وَقَفَ إِطْلَاقُ النَّارِ بَيْنَ حَزْبِ اللَّهِ وَإِسْرَائِيلِ يَدْخُلُ حَيْزَ التَّنْفِيزِ	The ceasefire agreement between Hezbollah and Israel has come into effect	27/11/2024	Al Jazeera (2024u)
25	AJA-E10-A2	اتِّفَاقٌ وَقَفَ إِطْلَاقُ النَّارِ فِي لَبْنَانَ.. نَهَايَةُ لِلْقِتَالِ أَمْ التَّقَاطُ أَنْفَاسٍ؟	The ceasefire agreement in Lebanon: an end to the fighting or just a respite?	27/11/2024	Al Jazeera (2024v)

26	AJA-E10-A3	تفاصيل اتفاق وقف القتال بين إسرائيل وحزب الله بعد حرب 2024	Details of the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hezbollah after the 2024 war	28/11/2024	Al Jazeera (2024w)
27	AJA-E10-A4	كيف علق الإعلام الإسرائيلي على اتفاق وقف إطلاق النار مع لبنان؟	How did the Israeli media react to the ceasefire agreement with Lebanon?	27/11/2024	Al Jazeera (2024x)
28	AJA-E10-A5	اتفاق وقف النار في لبنان.. من ربح ومن خسر؟	The ceasefire agreement in Lebanon: Who won and who lost?	27/11/2024	Hamdani (2024)
29	AJA-E10-A6	مسؤولون إسرائيليون: اتفاق لبنان يفصل حزب الله عن الصراع في غزة	Israeli officials: Lebanon agreement separates Hezbollah from the conflict in Gaza	27/11/2024	Al Jazeera (2024y)
30	AJA-E10-A7	وقف النار في لبنان يعزز دعوات إسرائيلية لاتفاق مماثل بغزة	The ceasefire in Lebanon strengthens Israeli calls for a similar agreement in Gaza	27/11/2024	Al Jazeera (2024z)
31	ARA-E1-A1	مدخل صيدا يغص بالسيارات.. مشاهد لنزوح كثيف من جنوب لبنان	The entrance to Sidon is jammed with cars... scenes of a massive exodus from southern Lebanon	23/9/2024	Al Arabiya (2024a)
32	ARA-E1-A2	وسط تصعيد مع لبنان.. غالاتنت "الغارات ستستمر أياماً"	Amid escalating tensions with Lebanon, Gallant says: "The raids will continue for days."	23/9/2024	Al Arabiya (2024b)
33	ARA-E1-A3	اليونيفيل تحذر: التصعيد في لبنان له عواقب إقليمية مدمرة	UNIFIL warns: Escalation in Lebanon has devastating regional consequences	23/9/2024	Al Arabiya (2024c)
34	ARA-E1-A4	نتنياهو مهدداً نصر الله: الجميع في مرمى النيران	Netanyahu threatens Nasrallah: Everyone is in the line of fire	23/9/2024	Al Arabiya (2024d)
35	ARA-E1-A5	نار عانقت السماء ودخان لفها.. جنوب لبنان تحت القصف	Fire embraced the sky and smoke enveloped it...	23/9/2024	Al Arabiya (2024e)

			Southern Lebanon under bombardment		
36	ARA-E1-A6	غالانت: نهدم ما بناه حزب الله منذ 20 عاما	Gallant: We are destroying what Hezbollah has built over the past 20 years	23/9/2024	Al Arabiya (2024f)
37	ARA-E2-A1	يعيش بالخفاء وسط تدابير مشددة.. ما لا تعرفه عن حسن نصرالله	He lives in secrecy amidst tight security measures... What you don't know about Hassan Nasrallah	28/9/2024	Al Arabiya (2024g)
38	ARA-E2-A2	لهذا تأخر الكشف عن مصير نصرالله.. مسؤول إسرائيلي كبير يجيب	This is why the revelation of Nasrallah's fate was delayed... A senior Israeli official explains	28/9/2024	Al Arabiya (2024h)
39	ARA-E2-A3	يشبهه شكلاً وكلاماً.. من هو أبرز مرشح لخلافة نصرالله؟	He resembles him in appearance and speech... Who is the most prominent candidate to succeed Nasrallah?	28/9/2024	Al Arabiya (2024i)
40	ARA-E2-A4	بنفس الاجتماع.. مقتل قائد فيلق القدس بلبنان مع نصرالله	At the same meeting, the commander of the Quds Force in Lebanon was killed along with Nasrallah	28/9/2024	Al Arabiya (2024j)
41	ARA-E2-A5	وجدوا الجثة وتعرفوا عليها.. جديد عن اغتيال نصرالله	They found the body and identified it... New developments regarding Nasrallah's assassination	28/9/2024	Al Arabiya (2024k)
42	ARA-E2-A6	بايدن: موت نصر الله يحقق العدالة لضحاياه الكثيرين	Biden: Nasrallah's death brings justice to his many victims	28/9/2024	Al Arabiya (2024l)
43	ARA-E2-A7	مصادر إسرائيلية.. بايدن رفض اغتيال نصر الله بعد هجوم 7 أكتوبر	Israeli sources: Biden refused to assassinate Nasrallah after the October 7 attack	30/9/2024	Al Arabiya (2024m)

44	ARA-E2-A8	هل تتغير موازين القوى بالمنطقة بعد مقتل حسن نصرالله؟	Will the balance of power in the region change after the killing of Hassan Nasrallah?	30/9/2024	Abdulmenhem (2024)
45	ARA-E2-A9	خامنئي حذر نصرالله من خطة إسرائيلية لاغتياله.. وطالبه بمغادرة لبنان	Khamenei warned Nasrallah of an Israeli plan to assassinate him and demanded that he leave Lebanon	2/10/2024	Al Arabiya (2024n)
46	ARA-E3-A1	"أكبر هجوم" إسرائيلي على الضاحية.. مشاهد توثق	Israel's "largest attack" on the southern suburbs of Beirut: Footage documents the events	27/9/2024	Al Arabiya (2024o)
47	ARA-E3-A2	من نيويورك.. صورة لنتنياهو عند موافقته على هجوم الضاحية	From New York... a picture of Netanyahu when he approved the Dahiya attack	27/9/2024	Al Arabiya (2024p)
48	ARA-E3-A3	نحو 40 غارة إسرائيلية على ضاحية بيروت.. دخان يغطي السماء	Around 40 Israeli airstrikes on Beirut suburbs... Smoke covers the sky	28/9/2024	Al Arabiya (2024q)
49	ARA-E4-A1	حذرت 30 بلدة.. إسرائيل "توغلنا" ببلدان يستهدف معقل حزب الله	Israel warned 30 towns that its incursion into Lebanon targeted Hezbollah strongholds	1/10/2024	Al Arabiya (2024r)
50	ARA-E4-A2	حزب الله واليونيفيل ينفيان: إسرائيل لم تتوغل برية	Hezbollah and UNIFIL deny: Israel did not launch a ground incursion	1/10/2024	Al Arabiya (2024s)
51	ARA-E4-A3	قبيل الاشتباكات.. صور توثق تسلل قوات إسرائيلية لجنوب لبنان	Prior to the clashes, photos document the infiltration of Israeli forces into southern Lebanon	2/10/2024	Al Arabiya (2024t)
52	ARA-E5-A1	لا معلومات حول هاشم صفي الدين.. من يدير حزب الله؟	Hashem Safieddine, the head of Hezbollah's "government" who was assassinated by Israel	7/10/2024	Al Arabiya (2024u)

53	ARA-E5-A2	لبنان.. الجيش الإسرائيلي يؤكد مقتل هاشم صفي الدين	Lebanon: Israeli army confirms the killing of Hashem Safieddine	23/10/2024	Al Arabiya (2024v)
54	ARA-E6-A1	إسرائيل.. مقتل 4 جنود وإصابة 67 بجروح في هجوم بنيامينا	Israel: Four soldiers killed and 67 wounded in Binyamina attack	13/10/2024	Al Arabiya (2024w)
55	ARA-E7-A1	غارات على صور وبعبك.. واعتراض مسيرة وصواريخ بشمال إسرائيل قادمة من لبنان	Airstrikes on Tyre and Baalbek... drone and missile intercepted in northern Israel coming from Lebanon	28/10/2024	Al Arabiya (2024x)
56	ARA-E7-A2	التراث اللبناني بخطر شديد بسبب القصف.. مخاوف على بعلبك وصور	Lebanese heritage is in grave danger due to the bombing... fears for Baalbek and Tyre	1/11/2024	Al Arabiya (2024y)
57	ARA-E8-A1	يعود لآلاف السنين.. غارة إسرائيلية قرب موقع بعلبك الأثري	Dating back thousands of years... Israeli airstrike near the Baalbek archaeological site	6/10/2024	Al Arabiya (2024z)
58	ARA-E8-A2	60 قتيلا على الأقل في غارات إسرائيلية على شرق لبنان	At least 60 killed in Israeli airstrikes on eastern Lebanon	29/10/2024	Al Arabiya (2024aa)
59	ARA-E8-A3	إسرائيل: ضربنا خزانات وقود لحزب الله في سهل البقاع	Israel: We struck Hezbollah fuel depots in the Bekaa Valley	30/10/2024	Al Arabiya (2024ab)
60	ARA-E8-A4	غارات إسرائيلية على بعلبك.. ومسيرات تصل عكا وخليج حيفا	Israeli airstrikes target Baalbek; drones reach Acre and Haifa Bay	3/11/2024	Al Arabiya (2024ac)
61	ARA-E9-A1	تطورات جديدة بمفاوضات الهدنة بلبنان.. وقف النار سيتم خلال 36 ساعة	New developments in the Lebanese truce negotiations: a ceasefire will be implemented within 36 hours	25/11/2024	Al Arabiya (2024ad)

62	ARA-E9-A2	بليكن: محادثات وقف النار بلبنان في مراحلها النهائية	Blinken: Ceasefire talks in Lebanon are in their final stages	26/11/2024	Al Arabiya (2024ae)
63	ARA-E10-A1	رغم تحذير إسرائيل.. سيارات النازحين تتدفق نحو جنوب لبنان	Despite Israeli warnings, displaced people's cars continue to flow towards southern Lebanon	27/11/2024	Al Arabiya (2024af)
64	ARA-E10-A2	وزير الدفاع اللبناني: لا حرية حركة لإسرائيل في الاتفاق	Lebanese Defense Minister: Israel has no freedom of movement in the agreement	27/11/2024	Al Arabiya (2024ag)
65	ARA-E10-A3	أول تعليق لحزب الله على الهدنة.. "نحضر لتشيع نصر الله"	Hezbollah's first comment on the truce: "We are preparing to bury Nasrallah."	27/11/2024	Al Arabiya (2024ah)

(AJA = Al Jazeera Arabic; ARB=Al Arabiya; E=Event; A=Article)