El-Fasher’s Turning Point: Sudan Between the Risk of Fragmentation and Escalation

In late October 2025, Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (also known as Hemedti), captured the city of El-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, after an 18‑month siege. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) withdrew a day earlier. This development significantly strengthened the likelihood that Hemedti will consolidate a de facto autonomous political entity in Darfur, potentially using it as a strategic base to pressure the Sudanese government in Khartoum.

The fall of El-Fasher reflects both the SAF’s failure and earlier success. In March 2025, the army retook Khartoum, restoring its control over the political capital and boosting its legitimacy and recruitment. However, securing Khartoum, Port Sudan (the country’s trade lifeline), and Gedaref (the main food-producing region) required the concentration of SAF forces in eastern and central Sudan. This left Darfur—a quarter of Sudan’s territory—with only a limited defensive force. The RSF exploited this strategic gap, focusing its operations on Darfur, especially El-Fasher, their traditional power base. Hemedti’s Darfuri roots, tribal support, cross-border supply lines from Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic, and revenue from the Jebel Amer gold mines enabled the RSF to reinforce its presence and sustain a prolonged siege. The RSF also increased its fleet of drones through external support, tightening the encirclement of the city and wearing down SAF defences.

Control of El-Fasher strengthens Hemedti’s self-declared “Government of Peace and Unity”, announced in April 2025, which aims to administer four Darfur states and West Kordofan, print currency, issue passports and establish a civil registry. Although lacking international recognition, territorial control over an entire region could transform this parallel government into a more credible authority, complicating Khartoum’s claim to represent all of Sudan and forcing external actors to deal with Hemedti as a de facto ruler.

The RSF’s advance has also reshaped El-Fasher’s demographics. Human rights groups, including the Human Rights Watch and Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab, have documented ethnic cleansing, mass executions and forced displacement targeting groups perceived as hostile to the RSF—such as the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit—while favouring pro‑RSF communities. Tens of thousands fled, thousands remained besieged and starving, and many more were internally displaced. The United States has acknowledged the scale of these atrocities.

Territorial consolidation in Darfur will likely strengthen Hemedti’s external support, as foreign backers see him as a more viable actor. The region could serve as a logistical hub for military aid, training camps, intelligence facilities and drone operations, easing pressure on neighbouring states that previously supported the RSF discreetly under humanitarian cover.

For its part, the Sudanese government now faces a strategic imperative to retake El-Fasher to prevent the RSF’s military gains from translating into political legitimacy. Losing Darfur weakens Khartoum’s credibility, risks pushing domestic actors toward neutrality or alignment with Hemedti, and enables the RSF to consolidate control over the entire region and prepare for a future push into Kordofan.

The RSF is therefore expected to initiate a major offensive in Kordofan, particularly targeting its capital, El-Obeid. A successful advance would extend RSF control into a region that constitutes 20% of Sudan’s landmass, contains vital resources such as the Heglig oilfield, serves as a key food-producing area, and provides access to Port Sudan for gold exports. Kordofan is also the only land corridor that might allow the RSF to threaten the Nile valley. However, such a move would require redeploying large RSF forces from Darfur, leaving El-Fasher vulnerable to counterattack and making it difficult to replicate the prolonged siege strategy used there. Still, the RSF enjoys potential support from segments of Kordofan’s population, which share ethnic ties with the force.

Kordofan is strategically decisive for both sides. For the SAF, defending it is about protecting Khartoum and preserving the logistical backbone of the war effort. For the RSF, seizing it would cement their territorial project and expand their political leverage.

Three main scenarios emerge:

1. The SAF retains Kordofan (the most likely scenario).
   The RSF lacks the manpower and logistical capacity to impose a long siege on El-Obeid while safeguarding Darfur. Its forces would be exposed to the SAF’s airpower and long supply lines. The SAF, by contrast, can reinforce Kordofan with troops withdrawn from El-Fasher or other regions and enjoys multiple airfields in the area. If the SAF holds the region, Darfur may become exposed to counteroffensives to retake El-Fasher, or the frontlines may freeze, producing a situation similar to Khalifa Haftar’s entrenched rule in eastern Libya.
2. The RSF captures Kordofan (unlikely).
   This would require enormous sacrifices and risks leaving El-Fasher undefended. The SAF would respond with heightened escalation because losing Kordofan would threaten Sudan’s core economic and political centres.
3. The SAF retakes Darfur before the Kordofan battle (least likely).
   The SAF lacks the logistical capability to sustain large operations in Darfur. Its difficulties in defending El-Fasher suggest even greater challenges in mounting an offensive to retake it.

Ultimately, Kordofan remains the key to controlling Sudan. Whether the front stabilises or escalates will depend on how each side calculates the trade‑off between consolidating current positions and risking major battles for strategic expansion.

*This is a summary of a policy brief originally written in Arabic available here.