A war over the city: Exploring Kirkuk’s multi-layered conflict

Introduction

The recent crisis in Kirkuk, an oil-rich city located in northern Iraq, has once again highlighted the intricate historical ethnic and political factors behind the ongoing conflict. Kirkuk has historically been contested between the federal government in Baghdad and authorities in the autonomous Kurdistan region of the north. In 2014, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Peshmerga, the Kurdistan region's security forces, took over Kirkuk after they defeated the Islamic State (IS). However, in 2017, federal troops expelled them following an abortive referendum on Kurdish independence; and since then, the city has been generally stable until the latest developments.

In late August 2023, Prime Minister Muhammad Shia al-Sudani ordered his forces (i.e. army and the Popular Mobilisation Forces) to withdraw from security headquarters in Kirkuk and handover control to the Peshmerga forces, reverting to the situation that existed before 2017. This step comes in the context of improving relations between his government and the KDP, after the latter had given him confidence in parliament in 2022. The decision was met with rejection by the Turkmen and Arab residents who carried out demonstrations and closed the road linking Erbil to Kirkuk to prevent the Kurdish Peshmerga forces from entering the city. The Kurds took to the streets to hold rival demonstrations and express their support for the decision. This demonstration led to confrontations causing the deaths and injuries of a number of Kurdish and Arab protesters, and spreading chaos and panic in the city.

As a result, the Prime Minister suspended the implementation of his decision. Then, the Federal Court in Baghdad decided to halt the Prime Minister’s decision until the matter is resolved. These events are expected to have significant ramifications in the coming weeks, deepening the city’s crisis and perhaps contributing greatly to the complexity of finding fair and agreed-upon legal solutions.

This cycle of violence in Kirkuk prompts important questions: what is the essence of the conflict? Why is it intractable? And what are the divisive boundaries among Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen?

Anderson and Stansfield note that Kirkuk is “an ethnic powder keg waiting to explode”. (1) Kirkuk is on the border with the Kurdistan region, and accordingly, is in conflict over whether it is under the control of the federal government in Baghdad or follows the regional government in Erbil. (2) Baghdad sees Kirkuk’s borders as sacred, (3) while the Kurds have referred to it as “our Jerusalem”. (4) Kirkuk is seen as a deeply divided city with three main ethnic groups alongside several minorities that cannot accept dominance from each other due to perceived differences in language, culture or history. (5)

The conflict includes the people of Kirkuk (Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen) and the governments of Baghdad and Erbil, as well as regional powers, particularly Turkey and Iran. (6) The conflict has far-reaching political, economic and social consequences for Kirkuk, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Iraq since it involves land ownership, ethnic nationalism and sovereignty over billions of dollars in oil resources. (7)

This paper argues that the Kirkuk conflict is not just a war within the city but a war over the city, and that the conflict is on two levels: first, among different ethnicities – Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen – over ethno-national identity in order to legitimise their claim to the city; and second, between Baghdad and Erbil to claim the city by determining its majority’s identity and control its oil resources. These are sub-battles and tools within the larger existential conflict that can either establish or obstruct the foundations of an independent Kurdish state. Meanwhile, regional intervention aims to influencing the conflict’s course and results, which are subject to the interests of the countries engaged.

Why Kirkuk? Importance and resources

Vice president of the Kurdistan Region Jaafar Sheikh Mustafa stated in 2019, that they “will never accept a Kurdistan without Kirkuk”. (8) Iraqi Major General Sa’ad Harbia also made a defiant statement, saying, “even if they see the stars in the afternoon sky, they will not return to Kirkuk”. (9) The rhetorical nature of these two statements indicates the importance of the city.

Kurds regard Kirkuk as the heart of Kurdish resistance. (10) For Arabs, however, having it under Baghdad’s authority signals Iraqi unity; and for Turkmen, it is a symbol of their ethnicity in Iraq. (11) The city has several distinct languages, cultural values, historical narratives and different expectations giving rise to the perception that Kirkuk is the “wild card” and the most controversial of the disputed territories in Iraq, followed by parts of Nineveh, Diyala and Salaheddin. (12) Kirkuk is the only city explicitly mentioned in the 2005 Iraqi constitution, combined with the phrase “other disputed territory”. (13) It is distinguished from other contested regions because of its diversity, strategic significance, oil resources and identity conflict. (14)

Kirkuk is the capital of the Kirkuk Governorate in northern Iraq, and is located 236 kilometres north of Baghdad and 85 kilometres south of Erbil. The Kirkuk Governorate covers 9679 square kilometres, approximately 2.2% of Iraq. (15) It consists of four districts: Kirkuk, where the city of Kirkuk is situated; Dibis; Hawija and Daquq. (16) Kirkuk sits on either side of the most direct motorway linking the two major cities of the KRG, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah; and it was utilised as a staging point for military campaigns into the Kurdish Highlands by previous Arab governments. (17)

Moreover, Kirkuk sits on one of Iraq's largest oil fields, and has access to approximately 13% of Iraq's proven reserves, (18) as well as significant infrastructure and facilities, including refineries, an airport and the vital K-1 military base. (19) In addition, Kirkuk has remarkable agricultural potential; and along with other contested territories, it produces approximately half of Iraq's national crop of grains, hence playing an important role in national food security. (20)

Kirkuk also enjoys geopolitical value due to its location, which connects several Iraqi provinces and extends between multiple ethnicities and different geographical regions, including the disputed areas between the KRG and the Baghdad government. For the KRG, taking over the province means adding 10000 kilometres of agriculturally fertile lands that are also rich in natural resources to its area of more than 40,000 square kilometres. (21)

Three overlapping conflicts

• Ethno-national identity

Graffiti on buildings in Kirkuk reflects the pressure of ethnic identity on the conflict: one statement in Turkmen reads, “Kirkuk is Turkmen and will stay Turkmen forever.” Further along the street, another statement in an Arab area reads, “Long live Iraq.” (22) Kurdish politicians have a slogan: “Kirkuk is the heart of Kurdistan.” (23) This rhetoric is a common feature of the conflict, as is the use of ethno-nationalist symbols. The most recent open conflict between the KRG and the Baghdad government occurred in 2017, after a referendum on independence conducted in Kirkuk. At the time, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi ordered the hoisting of the Iraqi flag and the lowering of the Kurdish flag. (24) This incident became known as the “battle of flags”. (25)

The dispute over Kirkuk’s identity is not rooted sectarian enmity, but has been manufactured through forced ethnicisation, through both Arabisation and Kurdification efforts with the resulting displacement of people. (26) This has been exacerbated by the unequal political and economic allocation of resources by the successive Iraqi governments, as well as Saddam Hussein’s policies and the KRG’s drive for greater autonomy. (27)

Ethnicisation began with the discovery of oil in 1927, which drove successive Iraqi governments to settle Arab families in Kirkuk to benefit from oil and agriculture. This signalled the start of what was to be called “Arabisation policies”. (28) Arabisation resulted in waves of migration that changed the city’s demography, and was intended to marginalise the local Kurdish and Turkmen populations. (29)

Each ethnic group has its own narrative about who owns the land; and this has become more polarised and aggressive over the years. (30) Woods has stated that the highly emotional nature of national and ethnic identity is shown in the members of these groups’ willingness to take extreme measures, including sacrificing their lives, to prevent the loss or assimilation of their cultural characteristics. (31) This may partially explain the nature of Kurds' slogan "Our Jerusalem".

Arabs in Kirkuk defend their legitimate presence in Kirkuk by claiming that there were Sunni Arab families and tribes – such as Obeid, Jibbur and Hadid – who had historical roots in the province prior to Arabisation, unlike the newcomers imported by the Iraqi government. (32) The Kurdish narrative extensively discusses the actions taken by the Iraqi government that ultimately resulted in a decreased Kurdish population in Kirkuk. It tells stories of the Ba'ath regime's brutality, especially in its expulsion of Kurds from Kirkuk through forced deportation and mass killing. (33) The documents of the Ottoman historian Sham al-Din Sami confirm that three-quarters of the population of Kirkuk was Kurds in 1898. (34) Kirkuk also represents Kurdish national ambitions held for over fifty years, and its ownership has “mythical” importance and would be “ultimate proof” that the Kurds have achieved autonomy at last. (35)

Turkmen, however, point to a 1957 census that shows them to have to made up 37.6 percent of the population of Kirkuk (36) to argue that the influx of Kurds and Arabisation into densely populated Turkmen areas has already affected the delicate demographic balance. (37) They claim that Kirkuk has been their ancestral capital since 1869 and that British documents recognised their significant presence before the discovery of oil. (38)

These disputed narratives have caused what Al-Haj Saleh describes as “victimhood narratives”: discourses that strive to achieve future goals, unify societies in the pursuit of dominance and legitimacy, and seek justifications for unjust approaches to remedy grievances. (39) In the case of Kirkuk, each ethnic group leverages its own narratives to legitimise their claim to the city while labelling other groups as invaders and aggressors. Therefore, countering such narratives can shape the dispute within the city over ethno-national identity.

This conflict extends to a second level: over the city. Kurds argue not only that they are the rightful inhabitants of Kirkuk, but also that it is an integral part of the Kurdistan region and, hence, should be ruled by the KRG in Erbil. (40) They maintain that joining the KRG will be conducive to reducing tensions between Iraqi Kurds and Iraqi Arabs. (41) Meanwhile, Arabs see this justification as elusive and believe Kirkuk will be a significant key to the secession of Kurdistan. One of the few shared goals of Shiites and Sunnis in Iraq is to keep Kirkuk and its resources out of the hands of the Kurds. Sunnis, in particular, are worried that if the KRG annexes Kirkuk, the Sunni Arab nationalist goals of maintaining Iraq's cohesion and Arab identity would fail, and the consociational governance process would be affected. (42)

The Iraqi constitution addresses the Kirkuk conflict in Article 140, which outlines three stages to determine the final status of Kirkuk. It begins with normalisation by resettling Arabs in their original lands and returning expelled Kurds to Kirkuk. The second phase prescribes a census to determine the majority group, then the third step would be to hold a referendum. (43) If it is deemed to be Kurdish, it should become under the authority of the KRG. But if it is determined to be Arab and Turkmen, it would remain under the control of the central government in Baghdad. (44)

However, this remains ink on paper. Frequent accusations and attempts to impose a different reality have been made by all parties. Arabs and Turkmen claim that the Kurdish groups tried to influence the results of a supposed referendum by relocating Kurds who were not originally from Kirkuk (45) into the city. On the other hand, it is claimed that the Iraqi government avoids applying Article 140 because it poses an existential threat to the unity of Iraq, and applying it would mean that it would lose Kirkuk. (46)

• The battle for oil resources

During an interview in 2008, KRG President Masoud Barzani’s special representative, Qader Aziz, said, “If Kirkuk had no oil, no one would fight for it.” (47) Kirkuk is a geographically important strategic area, and the parties in the conflict routinely accuse each other of viewing the city through the lens of its oil resources, while also at turns denying that the struggle for it is centred on its oil. (48)

There is no doubt that the geo-economic importance of Kirkuk is due to the fact that the victorious side will be able to control its large oil resources. (49) Control of Kirkuk means having oil reserves of nine billion barrels that can be extracted. (50) It is considered very tempting for the regions of the Kurdistan region that are much less fortunate in terms of natural resources. (51)

Nonetheless, the argument that the struggle for Kirkuk is not based on oil is supported by a constitutional obstacle that ensures the Iraqi government could gain revenues from Kirkuk's current and future oil fields regardless of the city's final status. (52) In addition, there is no local refining capacity in the Kurdistan region to extract Kirkuk’s oil for local consumption or export, which may lead the KRG to concede its share of the Baghdad government's budget. (53)

However, this argument is refuted on the ground. When Erbil gained control of Kirkuk in 2014 after the IS attack, it did not commit to the rules of the oil laws in the constitution, and began selling oil without sharing the revenue with the Iraqi government. It also conducted an independence referendum. (54) In response to this, Baghdad decided to conduct a military operation to recapture Kirkuk, whose oilfields provided half of the KRG’s domestically-generated revenues, (55) and reduce Erbil's share of the national budget from 17% to 12%. (56)

One of the longest-standing major concerns of Kurdish elites is the cessation of funding from the federal government in Baghdad, which provides 95% of the KRG’s annual budget. (57) Statements by Kurdish leaders indicate that they have been planning to establish their own financial resources in preparation for a day when Baghdad breaks its promises and/or the economic self-sufficiency of Kurdistan. (58) For this reason, in 2013, the KRG conducted several agreements with multinational oil companies, and a pipeline in Kurdistan was connected with the strategic Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline. (59)

Both Erbil and Baghdad have allies that are waiting to see who will have the upper hand. Israel, Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia as well as major international oil companies are interested in benefiting from Kirkuk’s oil. (60) Therefore, it is reasonable to assert that Kirkuk oil reserves are not only an economic resource but also the core of a political conflict with significant regional and international repercussions.

• A regional intervention

Kirkuk’s future status will have implications for the region beyond Iraq. (61) As a result, Iraq’s neighbours in the region, particularly Turkey and Iran, have securitised the conflict in a such way that any dynamic or resolution within the city will affect their stability (62) as it may incite Kurdish communities to call for secession and the formation of a Kurdish state. (63)

In 2003, Turkey threatened military action against Iraq’s Kurds if they attempted to annex Kirkuk into Kurdistan. (64) Turkey has two objectives in Kirkuk: protecting the security of Turkmen population in northern Iraq, and eliminating the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). (65) Turkish interference in Kirkuk has escalated to almost daily statements against the Iraqi government’s decisions related to Turkmen. Even a decree stipulating the use of the Kurdish and Arabic languages officially in Kirkuk was considered by the Turkish government to be a threat to the Turkmen language. (66)

In 2017, Turkey and Iran were antagonistic towards the referendum on the independence of Kurdistan. (67) This manifested in joint military exercises on the borders with the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and several threats against its government, including the threat to halt oil exports. (68)

The annexation of Kirkuk by Kurdistan is perceived as a breach of security for Tehran as well and a source of empowerment for Kurds in Iran. If the KRG were to gain Kirkuk, it would be a massive boost to Kurdistan’s regional political and military power, and by extension, strengthen US dominance through permanent military bases in Kurdistan. (69) Iran is also interested in Kirkuk due to its vicinity to Tal Afar, a vital point for the transport of supplies to militants in Syria. (70) Therefore, Iran has supported the growth of Shi’a militias (known as the Popular Mobilisation Forces) that have established major training camps in established Kirkuk to equip local Shi’a Turkmen and Arab volunteers. (71) This has added further complexity to the internal conflict. Moreover, although Iran is an oil-rich country, its oil production has suffered due to the sanctions. As a result, Tehran is interested in Kirkuk’s oil and agreed with Baghdad on constructing a pipeline connecting the Kirkuk oil fields to a refinery directly on the border. (72)

Conclusion

The different aspects of the conflict over Kirkuk are inseparable and overlap. The battle over ethno-national identity is the most prominent in the conflict. Nonetheless, it does not lessen the gravity of other aspects related to petroleum politics and regional interests. Therefore, the conflict over Kirkuk is primarily an ethno-national one among the various ethnic groups, each with its own narrative and demands, as well as part of the existential battle between Baghdad and Erbil. Although oil is not discussed very openly, it is a significant factor, as taking control of the oil would be a prize for the KRG and a significant step towards establishing a prosperous and autonomous Kurdish state. Regional powers, especially Turkey and Iran, influence the dynamics of the conflict in Kirkuk; and the independence of the city is seen as a threat to both Turkish and Iranian national interests as it would revive the Kurdish independence movements within their borders, and ignite other security threats in the region linked to the PKK and the United States.

As such, the aspects of the conflict over Kirkuk are leveraged to different degrees, both facilitating and aggravating one another depending on the context and realities on the ground. The current status quo is held in place by the fact that the KRG is bound to Baghdad financially. Attempts to break away have been met with military operations by the federal government in Baghdad. However, there are ongoing efforts towards independence. The struggle between the KRG and Baghdad as well as the conflict among Kirkuk’s ethnic groups have resulted in Kirkuk resembling a ‘powder keg’ waiting to explode, or a can of soda that is shaken up by political and resource-related ambitions, while the people that make up its contents struggle and wait for relief.