What Will Iran Do with Trump?

With Donald Trump’s return to power, the spotlight on Iranian-US relations intensifies once again. Promising voices emerged from both ends: In Tehran, President Masoud Pezeshkian, who assumed office in July 2024 with a call for expanding ties with the world—and possibly with the West—sent signals of potential talks with the United States. Meanwhile, in Washington, President Donald Trump, when asked if he trusts Iran’s leaders, said, “there are ways that you can make it absolutely certain, if you make a deal.” (1) This optimism may paint an initially hopeful picture, but the reality is a blank canvas, waiting for the unpredictable strokes of diplomacy and strategy to reveal the true outcome. For the time being, let’s temper our expectations and not get too hopeful.

President Trump’s administration has historically taken a hard-line stance against Iran, imposing stringent economic sanctions. He brings with him a legacy of highly hostile behaviours. The unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018 marked a significant turning point in Iranian-US relations. This move not only strained diplomatic ties but also led to the re-imposition of severe economic sanctions aimed at crippling Iran’s economy. His maximum pressure campaign further exacerbated the situation, aiming to isolate Iran economically and politically. The assassination of General Qasem Soleimani in January 2020 was a particularly provocative act, leading to widespread outrage among Iranian leadership and escalating tensions in the region. These actions have left a lasting impact on the Iranian psyche.

The memories of these actions are still fresh; and given this history, Iranians are now faced with the challenge of President Trump’s second term in office. With power changing hands in the White House, Iran diplomatically weighs the potential benefits of engagement against the risks of conflict. This diplomatic overture comes at a time when the country is seeking to chart the intricate geopolitical terrain, redefining its regional ambitions with the need for economic stability. Will Tehran seek to engage in talks with the United States and find common ground? If so, how? Or will it adopt a more defiant stance, preparing for renewed confrontation?

Under the current circumstances, Iranian officials first stated that they will regulate their policies towards the US based on the behaviour of the new administration. This cautious approach reflects the uncertainty surrounding Trump’s return to power, with which it may bring a broad range of possibilities: it could involve renegotiating a new deal with Iran, potentially extending beyond the nuclear dossier, or maintaining the sanctions under a ‘maximum pressure campaign 2.0’. There is also the more dangerous scenario of direct confrontation. While the likelihood of each scenario may vary, the threads of possibility weave a tapestry where any one of them could come to pass.

Iran is now considering these scenarios, among others, and will devise its counter-strategies based on several key contextual considerations:

1) The political elites are now very well aware of a need for a dynamic and pragmatic reassessment of regional policies in light of the new geostrategic realities. As part of a strategy initiated even before tensions ramped up in the Middle East, this involves strengthening alliances with neighbouring countries and regional powers to create a more stable and hopefully supportive environment.

2) As the economic challenges faced by Iran are substantial, the government tends to focus on remedying the economic hardships in the country by seeking ways to alleviate the impact of sanctions, boosting domestic production, and exploring new trade opportunities.

3) With tensions reaching unprecedented levels and the tit-for-tat strikes between Iran and Israel last year, Tehran cannot overlook the possibility of becoming the next door to be knocked on after what happened in Lebanon and Syria. This necessitates not only preserving but also enhancing its military strength to deter aggression and safeguard its sovereignty.

4) After blows to its regional allies, Iran may appear to be in a weakened position. This perception could make it an inopportune time for Tehran to initiate talks, as it might be seen as negotiating from a position of vulnerability. Consequently, it is argued that engaging in negotiations now could undermine Iran’s strategic leverage and embolden its adversaries. However, Pezeshkian does not buy that argument. “Gentlemen who are sitting abroad in Europe and the US, their analysis is that Iran is in its weakest possible status,” he said, brushing aside this analysis as a mere ‘dream’. (2)

5) Iranian-US relations cannot, and will not, unfold in a vacuum. Reduced tensions between the two sides could pave the way for significant economic and political shifts, not only within Iran but across the entire Middle East. A decrease in hostilities could lead to a more stable and prosperous Iran, which, in turn, might influence regional rivalries and alliances. A consequent potential shift in the balance of power may alter regional geo-economic calculations, unsurprisingly benefiting some while disadvantaging others. Accordingly, it comes as no surprise that players other than Iran and the US may seek to influence where the bilateral ties go.

With all these considerations in mind, the question arises: what scenarios will Iran consider in dealing with the US under Trump’s new administration?

Direct talks with the US

On several occasions, Pezeshkian has implied a willingness to engage in dialogue with the US, particularly with the Trump new administration. The most notable instance was when Pezeshkian did not hesitate to schedule an interview with the American television channel, NBC, just days before President Trump’s inauguration. In this interview, he conveyed a clear message: “We are ready for negotiations.” (3) This move, aligned with similar statements from top Iranian diplomats, underscored Iran’s initial readiness to explore diplomatic avenues and potentially mend strained relations with the US.

However, this was not the only perspective within Iran; the notion of engaging in talks with the US sparked significant controversy and criticism. Part of the Iranian political establishment viewed any attempt at negotiation with deep suspicion and scepticism. They argued that past experiences with the US have shown that such talks often lead to increased pressure and demands rather than genuine cooperation and tangible gain. This interpretation might have been indicative of either a discrepancy among the political leaders, or part of, in Wittgensteinian terms, a sprachspiel. Either way, Tehran seemed to be waiting for the first move, practical rather than rhetorical, from the new US administration.

The wait was brief. Approximately two weeks after his inauguration, Trump unveiled his initial move by issuing a National Security Presidential Memorandum. When signing the memorandum, he claimed that the primary objective was to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. However, the scope of the memorandum extended beyond that to include countering Iran’s influence abroad and development of missiles, as well as other asymmetric and conventional weapons capabilities. (4). This shift in focus was not lost on Iranian officials, who perceived it as an overture to a renewed cycle of hostility rather than a genuine invitation to dialogue. Trump’s assertion that he hoped not to implement the new measures against Tehran (5) fell flat in the ears of Iran’s leadership, who read between the lines of the memorandum and saw only the familiar contours of confrontation.

The Iranian government started to grapple with the implications of this latest manoeuvre, weighing its options amidst a backdrop of historical grievances and strategic calculations. Iranian Government Spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani’s remarks regarding potential talks with the US were cautious as the first reaction. Her reference to the principles of dignity, wisdom and expediency (6) served as a reminder that Iran’s foreign policy is steeped in ‘realistic idealism’— an intricate interplay of ideological principles and pragmatic considerations. Nonetheless, Mohajerani’s statement left much to be desired in terms of clarity. Hence, it was the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei who stepped in a few days later to provide unequivocal clarity: “Negotiating with such a government is neither rational, nor intelligent, nor honorable, and [we] should not engage in negotiations with it.” (7) This stark declaration, alongside the memorandum signed by Trump, not only reinforced the prevailing narrative of resistance, but also underscored the challenges any future diplomatic overtures would face, as Iran remained steadfast in its commitment to uphold its sovereignty against perceived external threats.

Amid circulating speculations about previous semblances of interaction between the two sides here and there, the overall situation has now become a fusion of high hopes and disappointing realities. At the end of the day, and at least hypothetically, if there is genuine intent to engage in meaningful direct negotiations beyond rhetorics, there will be historical considerations to be taken into account. Drawing from previous experiences, particularly those during the JCPOA negotiations, it would be prudent for both sides to conduct talks behind closed doors. Keeping the discussions less public can help mitigate external pressures and allow for more candid and productive exchanges. Furthermore, it is essential to untangle the knots one by one to build a foundation for successful negotiations; and a stepwise approach sounds more effective in achieving lasting agreements leading to comprehensive talks and solutions, again hypothetically. However, it is still crucial to have a mutually agreed overarching framework that guides the negotiations.

Mediated talks, or maybe no talks at all

Indirect talks, facilitated by intermediaries and backchannels, still present a viable alternative—though not necessarily an equally probable one—to direct negotiations between the US and Iran under the Trump administration. They can help create a less contentious environment, allowing both sides to communicate their positions and concerns without the immediate pressure of direct interactions, making it easier for both sides to focus on the substantive issues at hand. Another advantage of mediated talks is that they carry fewer consequences in the event of failure compared to direct negotiations. If the talks do not yield immediate results, the involvement of a mediator can help manage expectations and prevent a complete breakdown in communication. Additionally, mediated talks can serve as a preliminary step to establish a framework for future direct negotiations for mending the long-deteriorated ties between Iran and the US.

Moreover, with regards to US-Iranian relations, it is not all about talks. In 2015, I wrote that “rarely has there been another instance of such a rancorous relationship between Washington and any other country in recent decades.” (8) The majority of recent history, with a few exceptions, has been characterised by a period of neither serious dialogue nor outright quarrel. As communication remains essential in many occasions regardless of conflicting interests, we have witnessed more periods of what I prefer to term ‘case-by-case bargaining’, rather than ‘systematic talks’—periods of ‘no talks, no wars’.

The possibility of a ‘no talks, no wars’ scenario presents two contrasting perspectives. On one hand, it appears less likely to prevail given the increasingly unpredictable nature of developments in the Middle East, highlighting the exigency for negotiations aimed at avoiding further conflicts in the region and even beyond. On the other hand, such a scenario seems more likely to endure, as Iran needs to play more cautiously with the cards it possesses right now; and this caution will make Tehran a more circumspect negotiator than in the past.

Mistrust and uncertainty reign. Iran’s Supreme Leader once said, “We must understand that behind diplomatic smiles lie hidden enmities and hatred. We should open our eyes and remain alert to whom we are dealing with and speaking to.” (9) Similarly, but in a more diplomatic vein, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi addressed the prospect of negotiations with the US under the current Trump administration, stating in his interview with Sky News, “I am not denying the possibility of a new deal or a new round of negotiations [...] but we have now much more mistrust compared to the previous time.” (10) Araghchi reiterated this sentiment during his late January visit to Doha, in an interview with Al Jazeera, saying that due to the lack of trust between the two sides, there is no solid basis for starting a new chapter with the US government. (11) These statements all coincide with Trump’s apparently middle-of-the-road approach, “Iran hopefully will make a deal. I mean, they don’t make a deal, I guess that’s OK, too.” (12) This approach is also evident in the appointments within Trump’s current administration compared to the previous one, as they reflect his desire “to keep his options open, with talking being his first instinct”. (13)

It is understandable that Iran and the US may want to avoid appearing overly enthusiastic or rushed to start talks, as both sides are likely engaged in a careful assessment of each other’s intentions and capabilities. This reciprocal evaluation is critical, and both sides recognise the necessity of time to recalibrate their strategies. This period may facilitate unpublicised interactions that could lay the groundwork for formal negotiations. However, time is not unlimited; the geopolitical landscape is constantly evolving, and the window for meaningful engagement may close sooner or later. As both parties steer through this precarious situation, they must remain acutely aware that delays could exacerbate tensions or lead to miscalculations, ultimately diminishing the prospects for a successful diplomatic resolution.

The potential for more confrontation between the US and Iran cannot be ignored. Escalation of military posturing, intensification of economic sanctions, and the involvement of regional actors like Israel could significantly heighten tensions. Iran, in response, could adopt more aggressive tactics, increasing the risk of miscalculation and unintended consequences. The volatile nature of these interactions makes the situation precarious, with the possibility of rapid escalation into a broader conflict. As non-resident senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy Bruce Riedel aptly notes, “it is easy to start a conflict with Iran and very difficult to end it.” (14)

Conclusion

The future of Iranian-US relations needs to hang in a delicate balance. The potential for renewed negotiations is tempered by a history of hostility and mistrust. Iran, under Pezeshkian, signals a willingness to engage, yet remains extremely cautious. The US, under the Trump administration and with its legacy of hostile actions against Iran, represents a formidable counterpart. The path forward requires careful navigation, strategic patience, and a willingness to explore diplomatic avenues while preparing for the possibility of heightened tensions. As both nations assess each other’s intentions and capabilities, the window for meaningful engagement remains open but not indefinitely. The stakes are high, and the outcomes uncertain, but the potential for a new chapter in Iranian-US relations could be within reach, contingent on the actions and decisions of both sides in the coming months.