The New Battleground: Competing International Interests in the Gulf of Guinea

There have been reports in recent years that China has been making concerted efforts to establish a military presence in West and Central Africa to allow it access to the Gulf of Guinea and the Atlantic Ocean. The United States (US) has been said to be putting up efforts to contain China in the region, and various joint naval exercises by various international actors in the Gulf of Guinea are being carried out in cooperation with the region’s countries. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi also recently visited Nigeria. One of this visit’s goals was to deepen cooperation in the field of maritime security.

These developments and reports point to the increasing international interests in the Gulf of Guinea, and indicate that the region has become a new battleground for the “great powers” competing to secure their economic, security and strategic interests.

Gulf of Guinea and Regional Influence in West Africa

The Gulf of Guinea is the north easternmost portion of the tropical Atlantic Ocean. It extends along the western African coast, encompassing 17 countries: Benin, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Togo, Sao Tome and Principe, the Gambia, Senegal, Angola, Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea (Conakry) and Guinea-Bissau. (1) The region is strategically close to the Sahel through countries bordering Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, and links its countries to the other African countries and the rest of the world (2). It enables international trade and maritime transportation to and from major world markets, accounting for up to 25% of Africa's maritime trade. The region's vast natural resources, such as oil and lucrative fishing, and its strategic maritime advantages, along with its colonial legacy, have led to a number of languages, systems of governance, and frameworks that sometimes lead to tension between some of its countries, especially with regard to their reprioritisation efforts with international powers operating in the area or aspiring to establish their presence there. (3)

The willingness of the Gulf of Guinea countries, in recent years, to take advantage of the increasing international interests in the area is obvious, as they are all aware of the foundation that the area has already laid for West Africa’s economic empowerment, as evidenced by oil and gas revenues that contribute to national budgets, infrastructure development and social programmes. Countries such as Nigeria, Angola, Ghana and Equatorial Guinea are key forces in Africa's and global energy supply, while others with enormous hydrocarbon potentials such as Cameroon, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Gabon and Togo continue to reorganise their focus to further attract the interest of regional powers and multinational corporations.

There are indications that the rising strategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea might be fuelling some silent rivalries between regional organisations and their countries, particularly the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), both of which seek to coordinate policies that maximise the benefits of resource exploitation while addressing cross-border challenges such as revenue sharing and environmental impacts. Another organisation is the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC), established in 2001 with its headquarters in Angola and comprising as its members Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, the Republic of Congo, Gabon and Angola. These regional organisations also address security concerns in the region in line with their objectives and organisational structures, which pose some coordination challenges in the region, some of which are reflected in the difficulties in addressing the region's problems. (4)

In addition to being an essential tool for West Africa, the Gulf of Guinea is a critical “negotiating chip”. It gives its countries the opportunity to take advantage of the conflicting interests of international players jostling for the region. This means that the region’s governments, especially West African governments, can maximise their strategic advantages by working with different partners to achieve their goals of upgrading infrastructure, social development, economic cooperation and others.

Dimensions of interest and competition

International interests and competition in the Gulf of Guinea encompass different dimensions under three categories:

1. Economic interests: The Gulf of Guinea is economically significant due to its immense natural resources, particularly its oil and gas reserves. The region contains 10% of the world's oil reserves and is one of Africa's key oil-producing areas, as it is home to Africa's two largest oil producers, Nigeria and Angola. The region produces a range of commodities, including timber, diamonds, tin and cobalt, as well as agricultural items. The specific weather conditions, along with the Atlantic Ocean currents, result in abundant seasonal fisheries, particularly off the coasts of Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Congo and Gabon, all of which have proven to be an economic benefit. This is in addition to the region's oceanic islands, which are rich in biodiversity and facilitate scientists' fieldwork. (5)

The recent Western focus on Angola, one of the Gulf of Guinea's countries and the headquarters of the GGC, the ambitious Lobito Corridor project, and former US President Joe Biden's December visit—his only trip to sub-Saharan Africa during his presidency—all suggest that Angola plays a significant role in US soft power in Central and Southern Africa, as well as the Gulf of Guinea. (6) However, the ambitious ongoing development and infrastructure projects in Nigeria, especially in the oil and gas sector, have also shown that Nigeria, in the context of the Gulf of Guinea, is seeking to assert its dominance in security and economic policies by balancing relationships with other Gulf of Guinea countries and continental and global powers.

One of the Nigerian projects targeting European markets is the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline (TSGP), a proposed pipeline that would run from Nigeria's Warri region (in the Niger Delta region that sits directly on the Gulf of Guinea) through Niger to Algeria's Hassi R'Mel. Another one is the Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline project, a proposed pipeline aiming to transport Nigeria’s natural gas through several West African countries, including those along the Gulf of Guinea, ultimately reaching Morocco. (7) In August 2024, Nigerian president Bola Ahmed Tinubu visited Equatorial Guinea, another Gulf of Guinea country with significant oil and gas reserves. During the visit, the two countries signed an agreement for the construction of the Gulf of Guinea Gas Pipeline Project, a joint regional pipeline development that will transport gas from Nigeria to Equatorial Guinea. (8)

The Russia-Ukraine crisis has put a strain on hydrocarbons, making the Gulf of Guinea an even more important supply of alternative fuel, such as liquefied natural gas, as European countries try to strengthen their energy security. Major oil firms from the US, China, France and the United Kingdom have significant operations in the region. Also, China is boosting its investments in the region's oil and gas infrastructure, while the US and European nations have taken steps to guarantee their energy supplies and influence economic policies.

However, the absence of coordinating national and regional regulatory frameworks and the contradictory transnational approaches due to the competition for export and extraction is affecting the Gulf of Guinea's economic activity. These make the region vulnerable to the illicit export and exploitation of resources that are essential to the survival of its people, as evidenced by the illegal foreign fishing, particularly by Chinese vessels that destroys small-scale fishing and drives local fishermen to engage in illegal activities.

II. The governance of maritime trade routes: The governance of maritime trade routes and security dimensions of the regional and international competitions in the Gulf of Guinea are noticeable in initiatives targeting the region as a centre of trade that links Africa, South America and Europe, and a hub of economic activity for both coastal and landlocked African countries. The region's ports, including Tema in Ghana, Douala in Cameroon and Lagos in Nigeria, are important hubs for international trade. (9) Governments in the region, including Nigeria, Ghana and Angola, seek sustainable economic potential in fisheries, marine biotechnology and tourism in the blue economy, and invest in revamping their ports to deal with higher shipping volumes and increase efficiency.

Indeed, there have been efforts by ECOWAS and the African Union (AU) toward policies aimed at standardising port operations and facilitating intra-regional trade. The AU published “Africa's Integrated Maritime (AIM) Strategy for 2050” in 2012 as a pan-African strategy on maritime affairs. (10) The document addresses marine governance issues such as pollution, illicit fishing and unregulated maritime operations, helping some African countries like Ghana and Nigeria align their national maritime strategies with that of the pan-African maritime strategy. The Gulf of Guinea Commission fosters regional collaboration on marine trade with an emphasis on shipping safety, customs harmonisation and logistics.

III. Maritime security and military rapprochement: Maritime security is an emerging issue in the Gulf of Guinea, as the challenges facing the region include piracy, armed robbery at sea and illegal fishing. The issue of piracy has been the major focus of concern for the international players and competitors in the region because energy security and trade depend to a large extent on sea-based transport. According to reports, two crew members were abducted on 29 May 2024, and nine crew members were abducted on 1 January 2024, south of Bioko Island, Equatorial Guinea. (11) The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) stated that piracy cases in the Gulf of Guinea increased in 2023, with 21 incidents in the first nine months of the year, compared to 14 in 2022. (12)

Security concerns, especially piracy, exacerbated growing international perceptions (13) that threats in the Gulf of Guinea could be further fuelled by armed militants and terrorist activities coming from the inland, given the Gulf of Guinea's proximity to the Sahel. These concerns also increased the fear of disruption of economic and hydrocarbon interests. This is in addition to the fact that illegal foreign fishing in the region has had a major negative influence on human development in the area, leading to food insecurity and poverty as well as encouraging criminal activity among the local populace. Hence, international oil and gas companies and foreign geopolitical rivals adopt a military cooperation policy with their allies in the region.

Several regional organisations work in their capacity to address maritime security. The most prominent of them are the GGC, the G7 Friends of the Gulf of Guinea Group (G7++FOGG), the Maritime Organisation for West and Central Africa (MOWCA), ECCAS, and the ECOWAS Regional Maritime Security Centre (CRESMAO), among others. Some of these organisations have also come up with a unified approach to address the situation, such as the ECOWAS, ECCAS, and GGC’s establishment of the Maritime Safety and Security Architecture of the Gulf of Guinea based on the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, a framework that was adopted in 2013 by heads of states of the Gulf of Guinea so as to put an end to the acts of piracy, armed robbery against ships and illicit maritime activities. (14) The framework of other components includes Yaoundé Architecture (a large hub made up of different divisions), the Yaoundé Architecture Regional Information Sharing network (YARIS), and maritime centres.

The lack of security in the Gulf of Guinea allowed several competing international actors to develop military influence as well as engage the navies and military forces in countries of the region. The international actors, including the US, United Kingdom (UK), China, Russia, India the European Union (EU), and some of its members (France, Italy, Denmark), have all conducted exercises with navies of countries in the region and backed regional initiatives, such as the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, to address maritime security issues. European naval missions and the United States’ Africa Command (AFRICOM) have also participated in local navies’ capacity building. There is also the Gulf of Guinea Inter-Regional Network (GoGIN), an EU-funded initiative led by Expertise France, which seeks to increase marine domain awareness and reaction to maritime accidents in the region.

The Gulf of Guinea and competing international “powers”

The patterns in alliances and partnerships between the countries of the Gulf of Guinea and the international powers show a clear legacy of colonialism and variables in language and culture. The Anglophone countries in the region tend to be more favourably disposed toward the US and UK, as well as their companies, while France retains strong links with the Francophone countries of the region. The US, UK and France, which are also the main international actors in the region, are deepening their relations with the region, giving financial aid and security expertise in return for influence through investment and connections.

The US's involvement in the Gulf of Guinea is part of a larger strategy aimed at countering China and Russia's expanding influence in Africa and securing energy supplies. This blending of strategic interests is epitomised in various activities, such as the continuous investments in oil and gas exploration and production by major US firms in the region; counter-piracy initiatives; equipping and providing technology for regional navies and coast guards; and supporting regional security mechanisms such as the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. Similarly, the UK’s engagement in the Gulf reflects broader interest in maintaining its historical and colonial influence in West Africa. British energy firms, such as BP and Shell, are major players in the region. The UK has helped the Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF), a group of hydrocarbon trading companies, establish a Maritime Trade Information Sharing Centre (MTISC) in Ghana. (15)

To France, good historical relations with former colonies in the region are not only rewarding economically but of great military importance in a period when French security presence in the region is shrinking. Therefore, France has maintained naval ships in the Gulf of Guinea. Also, the EU seeks to connect its regional partnerships with its overall strategic priorities since the energy diversification agenda for Europe, especially those related to reduction in the dependence on the supplies of Russian energy, will require substantial inputs from the oil and gas of the Gulf of Guinea. The EU's strategy to safeguard its own interests in the region is further demonstrated by the support for both the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and its architecture through the Critical Maritime Routes Gulf of Guinea (CRIMGO).

Besides, other actors, such as China, Turkey, Russia, Japan and India, are contributing to the dilution of the preeminent dominance of the US, UK and France in the Gulf of Guinea. The presence of these emerging actors is being strengthened through arms sales, military cooperation and trade agreements. China is investing actively in infrastructural projects to boost trade connectivity under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), (16) through which access to oil and gas supplies is acquired from the coastal countries. Two Chinese corporations engaged in the hydrocarbon operations of the region are China Petrochemical Corporation (SINOPEC) and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). China has also begun to assert its naval presence, indicating a broader desire to protect its overseas interests. For example, China Exim Bank and the Equatorial Guinean government inked a $2 billion oil-backed buyer's credit facility agreement in 2006 to develop Bata's port. Some US media since late 2021 also reported that China is attempting to seek out a military base at Bata port, a claim that supports Beijing’s regional aspirations in the Gulf and Africa.

Russia's presence in the region could be seen as part of a larger effort to counter Western dominance. Russia remains one of the largest providers of military hardware to the Gulf of Guinea countries, including fighter jets, helicopters and warships. Equally, Russian companies are seeking contracts for the development of offshore oil and gas fields, while the Russian government has begun to take steps toward security consultations aimed at countering piracy and terror incidents and police training.

Likewise, India is among the countries supplied with hydrocarbons from the Gulf of Guinea for refining purposes. The Indian Navy has so far taken part in a series of cooperative naval exercises and capacity-building programmes with nations from the region and frequently sent its ships to the region in an effort to safeguard the security of maritime commerce routes. Nigeria, the region's economic powerhouse, is a key crude oil supplier to India, and part of the bilateral discussions during India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Abuja was on the coordinated action to safeguard maritime trade routes and combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. (17)

The huge challenges in the Gulf of Guinea, despite the enormous benefits that global actors and multinational firms gain from the region, led to accusations that these international actors put resource exploitation ahead of sustainable development. This, coupled with the fact that geopolitics and global rivalry in the Gulf of Guinea have substantial environmental and socioeconomic consequences, as overfishing, oil spills and environmental degradation all pose threats to local ecosystems and livelihoods. Many also believe that these actors' efforts to promote inclusive development and environmental stewardship in the region are limited, while local populations usually feel excluded from the benefits of resource wealth, a situation that usually sparks protests and conflict, as in the case of the Niger Delta crisis in Nigeria.

Conclusion

The growing global interest in the Gulf of Guinea comes with immense opportunities and challenges. Its strategic importance makes it a perpetual hotbed of competing foreign interests, with countries like Nigeria and Angola taking more leadership roles to balance global pressures with regional concerns. Smaller countries in the region can leverage international competition and contestation to negotiate better conditions for development assistance, security cooperation and economic partnerships. However, rivalry among world powers threatens to militarise the region, while opposing marine presence may escalate tensions. The importance of hydrocarbons in the Gulf of Guinea to global energy markets, most especially to Europe and Asia, means that interruptions within the region could have far-reaching consequences for global supply networks.

Finally, increased regional security in the Gulf of Guinea is desirable and important for West Africa. Cooperation among regional governments in combating piracy and other maritime crimes improves collective security. Such cooperation improves their ability to engage with foreign countries and exercise control over their maritime territories.