A Spectre is Haunting in Post-Ottoman Kurdish Lands

Türkiye’s response to recent crucial developments in the Middle East—the Arab Spring, the Gaza genocide, the Syrian revolution and intensifying regional and global power competition—underscores its urgent need for structural recalibration. Recognising the Kurdish issue as both its most pressing domestic challenge and a critical factor in its regional and global strategy, Türkiye sees the Kurdish question as central to its evolving role in the Middle East.

Over the past two decades, the Kurdish issue has experienced significant shifts, driven largely by the transformative policies of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and President Erdoğan’s leadership. This ongoing transformation reflects a revisitation of Türkiye's foundational principles, rooted in Kemalist nation-building, while simultaneously redefining its political legitimacy.

The historical framework of the Misak-ı Milli (National Oath) (1) and the 1921 constitution, (2) along with the structure of the first parliament in Ankara offer a contrasting legacy to what followed during the Kemalist era. The Misak-ı Milli, drawing from the Ottoman imperial legacy, upheld the historic Muslim heritage across Kurdish-Turkish majority territories within the borders defined by the Mudros Armistice just after the World War I. It also affirmed the self-determination rights of post-Ottoman Arab-majority regions, standing in stark contrast to the colonial designs outlined in agreements like Sykes-Picot and the Treaty of Sèvres. However, the trajectory of the republic that followed diverged significantly, offering a contrasting legacy to this Ottoman imperial inclusiveness for the sake of nation building.

Türkiye ’s historical resistance to external interventions in Ottoman territories now informs its reassessment of the Kurdish issue and highlights a broader agenda to counter foreign interference in post-Ottoman Kurdish and Arab lands. In this context, discussions around redefining Türkiye and drafting a new constitution (3) represent a critical shift in how Türkiye addresses contemporary challenges. These discussions aim to legitimise a new political framework in a rapidly evolving regional landscape, creating opportunities for internal cohesion and external influence.

Recent developments illustrate the gravity of this moment. Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the mainstream Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), called on imprisoned Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan to address parliament with the objective of dissolving the PKK. This unprecedented move, followed by a meeting between Öcalan and two deputies from the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM party), reportedly yielded a positive response from Öcalan, referencing both Bahçeli’s proposal and President Erdoğan’s role. (4) These events raise a pivotal question: What did Bahçeli mean when he said, after the May 2023 presidential election and before the Syrian revolution, “Everything will change; I hope Türkiye does not change”? (5)

Two Tales of Post-Ottoman Politics: National Movements vs Sykes Picot

Two contrasting visions emerged for the post-Ottoman lands: the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1917, a British and French partition plan to dismantle the Ottoman Empire and colonise its lands, and national movements, most notably Türkiye's Misak-ı Milli.

The Sykes-Picot Agreement, designed to divide Ottoman territories, was to be implemented through the Treaty of Sèvres based on the Paris Peace Conference famously described by David Fromkin as a "peace to end all peace". (6) In contrast, Türkiye ’s Misak-ı Milli, rooted in the ideals of sovereignty and self-determination, prevailed through the National Salvation War, ultimately leading to the establishment of modern Türkiye under the Treaty of Lausanne —excluding post-Ottoman Arab lands which fell under the expansive colonial control of British and French powers across the Middle East.

However, modern Türkiye perceived the lingering spirit of the Treaty of Sèvres (7)—along with the experience of the politicisation of the Ottoman Empire’s ethno-religious diversity— as existential threats to its sovereignty. In response, the Kemalist nation-building project sought to assimilate diverse Ottoman Muslim communities into a singular Turkish identity. Similar to Italian thinker Massimo d’Azeglio’s famous remark “We have made Italy; now we must make Italians”, the new Republic vied to create a unified “Turkish” identity which raised the critical question: Where did the Kurds fit into this definition?

This nation-building process sought to redefine "Muslim" within a more secular and ethnically homogeneous framework, aligning with modernisation and state-building objectives. However, this approach also side-lined the multi-ethnic and multi-religious legacy of the Ottoman Empire, leaving unresolved tensions that persist to this day.

The Kurdish Question: A Way Forward?

The Kurdish uprisings remain one of the most significant political challenges in Turkish history, particularly during the nation-building period. Revolts such as Şeyh Said, Dersim and Ağrı stand out, with at least 150 conflict groups emerging during that period. (8) Today, Türkiye continues to grapple with the Kurdish issue, a challenge that not only shapes domestic policy but also influences the regional dynamics of Iraq and Syria.

While the roots of these conflicts trace back to the foundational period of the Turkish Republic, the solutions may also lie within that era. The National Salvation War, embodied in an inclusive Ankara parliament under the first constitution rules, united Turks, Kurds and other ethno-cultural diversities against external threats. Today, similar dangers arising from global instability and its spill over into the Middle East prompt the need for renewed Turkish-Kurdish and regional fraternity—just as it was forged a century ago in the context of the Misak-ı Milli.

In my university lectures, I ask, “Who are the minorities of Türkiye?” My students frequently cite the Kurds, reflecting a common misunderstanding. According to the Treaty of Lausanne, minorities in Türkiye are strictly defined as non-Muslims. (9) After the population exchanges, the departure of Greeks, Türkiye became predominantly Muslim, with Kurds recognised as a founding element of the Republic. Revisiting these foundational principles and acknowledging this shared history could open pathways for progress.

During the Misak-ı Milli period, Kurds were acknowledged as a political entity, and the 1921 Constitution explicitly recognised certain rights. Far from being the root of the Kurdish question, the Republic’s founding period offers valuable lessons. The spirit of unity between Turks and Kurds in the face of external threats provides a historical framework for addressing today’s challenges.

In contrast, Kemalist assimilation policies, which aimed to integrate Kurds through cultural and demographic strategies, largely failed, as did the secular Turkish identity model. However, Ankara’s centralised power grew stronger, positioning it as the key arbiter of national issues.

Under the AKP and Erdoğan’s leadership, a synthesis of Turkish and Islamic identities has created a unifying hegemonic power structure, extending even to conservative Kurds. This dynamic ties Türkiye's domestic Kurdish policies to its broader regional ambitions, including projecting influence in post-Ottoman Arab lands and in the Turkic world through the Turkic Council. The AKP has also skilfully blended Kemalist traditions—especially anti-colonial rhetoric while being a part of the Western alliance, identified as a “Westernism against the West” by Professor Baskin Oran (10)—into its agenda instead of directly and fully challenging them, as opposed to the first decade of the AKP governments, leveraging these frameworks to advance regional and global influence. (11)

For this political consensus to materialise into lasting solutions, Ankara aims to transcend the Kemalist nation-building framework and adopt a new, inclusive approach. A surprising political move has already come from the MHP, historically opposed to any kind of Kurdish political movements and even existence of Kurdish identity. Bahçeli’s call to address the Kurdish issue in parliament, including the involvement of Öcalan, signals a significant transformation—from rejection to recognition.

In contrast, figures like Ümit Özdağ of the far-right Victory Party and Müsavat Dervişoğlu of the nationalist İYİ Party—both with roots in the MHP—have strongly opposed these developments. (12) Their rejection highlights enduring divisions within Turkish politics over the Kurdish question. Yet, the Republican People's Party (CHP), a party rooted in Kemalist tradition, has demonstrated a notable shift. Newly elected CHP leader Özgür Özel has expressed support for this process, framing it as a historic opportunity rather than a transient debate. (13) His position underscores the broader significance of the Kurdish issue in Türkiye's political evolution, further emphasised by the latest GENAR poll, which indicates that Kurdish voters have played a key role in boosting CHP's support. (14)

The AKP, CHP, DEM and MHP, along with smaller supporting parties, represent nearly 90% of the political spectrum. Hence, this evolving political consensus marks a pivotal moment, though it is too early to draw conclusions about its implications for social consensus. According to GENAR, the support for a new peace process is little less than 50 percent, but has potential to increase. It may redefine Türkiye's approach to the Kurdish question, reforming the country’s political and social trajectory.

In addition to this emerging political consensus, Ankara’s centralised state remains a powerful institution capable of addressing both internal and external threats. (15) Kurdish movements, historically seeking to reform Ankara rather than pursue independence, (16) emphasise the centrality of Ankara in resolving the Kurdish issue.

Amid these shifts, one question remains: Where do the Kurds truly stand in this evolving picture? Their role, not merely as a minority or citizens of the country but as integral participants in shaping Türkiye's future, will ultimately determine the success of any new approach to the Kurdish question—potentially culminating in a new constitution built on a broader political consensus.

The Kurdish Nexus: Türkiye's Path to the Post-Ottoman Middle East

The Kurdish issue, often perceived as a domestic challenge for Türkiye, is in fact a geopolitical fault line shaping the future of the Middle East. Its roots trace back to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the ambiguities surrounding the Treaty of Sèvres, which left Kurdish lands tied to unresolved questions about Armenian and Arab state borders. Despite efforts to establish a Kurdish state, (17) Türkiye ’s determined independence movement under Misak-ı Milli thwarted these colonial ambitions, reshaping the region’s geopolitical landscape.

Understanding the post-Ottoman concept of Kurdistan is essential for contextualising contemporary Kurdish dynamics among Türkiye, Iraq and Syria. The division of Kurdish lands between the Ottoman and Safavid Empires in the 1639 Treaty of Zuhab created borders that, despite subsequent amendments, remain influential today. (18) In addition to historical demarcations, the post-Ottoman process underpinned the modern geopolitical landscape of Iraq, Syria and Türkiye, highlighting the enduring significance of Kurdish questions.

The occupation of Ottoman Mosul Vilayet, a key part of Misak-ı Milli, by British forces after the Mudros Armistice, separated Iraqi Kurds from Türkiye, which was not settled in the Treaty of Lausanne but in the 1926 Ankara agreement under the League of Nations Council. Nevertheless, Ankara continued to exert influence in the region. (19) After Barzani’s rebellion against the British failed in 1932, he sought asylum in Türkiye, (20) exemplifying the enduring ties between Iraqi Kurds and Ankara. Over time, Iraqi Kurds have emerged as a balancing force and main component of the state in Iraq’s Arab Sunni-Shia dynamics, representing a distinct identity—non-Arab and Sunni—within the Arab Shia-majority state.

In Syria, Kurdish history unfolds differently. Historically semi-nomadic, Syrian Kurds were sedentarised under the French Mandate for agricultural benefits from the fertile Jazira valley, (21) while others were culturally integrated into Arab-majority urban centres such as Aleppo and Damascus. Politically, however, Syrian Kurds have maintained enduring connections to Türkiye. Many became refugees in Syria following their participation in the Sheikh Said Rebellion in 1925, (22) subsequently establishing the Kurdish nationalist Khoybun movement and publications of Kurdish magazines. Their ties to the Bedirhan family and involvement in the Ararat Rebellion in Türkiye in 1930 further underscore the intricate links between Turkish and Syrian Kurdish political narratives. (23)

Unlike in Iraq, where Kurds are territorially and ethnically autonomous, or in Syria, where they are often marginalised as a minority, Türkiye's Kurds have been deeply integrated into the fabric of the state. (24) This integration, however, came at the cost of suppressing their unique identity. While the Kemalist nation-building project codified Kurds as integral to the Republic, it also sparked existential debates over their role in the state’s and nation’s framework.

If Türkiye adopts a more inclusive approach to Kurdish identity, it could not only strengthen its domestic cohesion but also extend its influence into Iraq and Syria and even Iran—considering events such as the rebellion of Sheikh Ubeydullah, a respected authority in Botan area, who sent soldiers in response to Iran’s oppression of Kurds and easily dominated Iranian Kurdistan in 1880 and only drew back because of international pressure and the call of Sultan Abdulhamid II— (25) where the functionality of state institutions remains deeply compromised.

By bridging the Kurdish divide, Ankara could leverage its geopolitical and cultural ties to foster stability and assert power across the region. A reconciliatory stance would enable Türkiye to engage more effectively with Iraqi and Syrian Kurds, capitalising on shared histories and mutual interests. This approach could position Türkiye as the dominant force in the Middle East, addressing long-standing internal tensions while reshaping the balance of power in the post-Ottoman Middle East.

Türkiye's Foreign Policy: A Kurdish Lens

Türkiye's foreign policy has always been intrinsically tied to its Kurdish question, shaping its relations with neighbouring countries and influencing broader frameworks of nation, religion, minority, ethnicity, human rights, democratisation, security, counterterrorism, etc. These intertwined dynamics frequently define Ankara’s regional and global strategies, highlighting the Kurdish issue as a central piece of its foreign policy calculus.

Türkiye's initial post-Arab Spring momentum in positioning itself as a dominant regional power faced significant setbacks. Kurdish politics was a vital issue and determinant power during that process. Following the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia during the Arab Spring, Ankara expected an upcoming revolution in Syria and got actively involved by architecting the Syrian opposition and even engaging Kurdish movements within this coalition. However, the trajectory unravelled sharply. Assad’s regime endured despite allegations of chemical weapons use, (26) and U.S. intervention under the President Obama never materialised. Simultaneously, counter-revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia negated many of Türkiye's early gains.

While Iran and Russia consolidated their power in Syria, the Kurdish question emerged as a critical fault line, disrupting Ankara’s regional strategies. U.S. support for Syrian Kurdish forces against the Islamic State (IS) further complicated matters, fuelling Ankara’s concerns over the empowerment and weaponisation of the People's Defense Units (YPG) as a branch of the PKK. (27) Domestically, the collapse of Türkiye's peace process with the PKK, and regionally, tensions in IS politics coincided with the Hendek Politikasi (Trench Politics) (28) as urban warfare in Kurdish cities.

The setbacks were not limited to Syria; Türkiye's allies in Egypt and Tunisia also experienced significant losses of power. Additionally, Erdoğan’s government, increasingly shaken in the domestic politics, defamation campaigns orchestrated by the “Fethullahist Terrorist Organisation” (FETO) (29) and isolated in the regional and global politics, was characterised by “precious loneliness,” a term coined by İbrahim Kalın, presidential advisor and the current director of the National Intelligence Organisation. The Kurdish question became pivotal as PKK-aligned forces aligned with U.S. (30) policies, obstructing Türkiye's broader Middle East vision and heightening Ankara’s perception of external threats.

However, Erdoğan’s resilience reshaped Türkiye's narrative and position. The failed coup attempt of 15 July 2016, became a pivotal moment, followed by assertive military and diplomatic strategies, including interventions in Syria, steadfast support for Qatar during its blockade, alignment with Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh, and firm resistance to regional alliances in the Mediterranean involving Greece, Israel and Egypt. In Libya, Türkiye strategically backed the central government and signed an agreement in Mediterranean Sea further expanding its regional influence. (31)

Türkiye's adaptive strategy has rested on three pillars. First, the AKP governments under the leadership of President Erdogan reshaped Türkiye's identity, blending Turkish-Islamic values with its Ottoman legacy, positioning Ankara as a stabilising force in the Middle East. (32) This redefinition emphasised unity over division, reframing Kurdish policies domestically and internationally.

Second, Ankara utilised military advancements, such as drone technology and cross-border operations, to undermine the PKK’s capabilities. This strategy redirected Kurdish movements toward political engagement rather than armed conflict and terrorist attacks pushing such groups to look for legitimacy in Syria without involving the elements of violence in Türkiye.

Finally, Türkiye integrated Kurdish dynamics into its broader regional strategy, evident in its involvement in Iraq’s Development Road Project. (33) These efforts aim to stabilise Kurdish regions while solidifying Türkiye's geopolitical influence across the Middle East.

Despite a wave of rapprochement in the Middle East in 2022, (34) ongoing crises—such as the escalating Gaza conflict and Syrian revolution—underscore the complexities of regional dynamics. Iranian proxies have diminished in power, while the Syrian revolution continues to be cautious, further emphasising that the Kurdish issue is not merely a domestic concern but a critical in Ankara’s broader regional strategy.

Türkiye's ability to reconcile its Kurdish policies with its regional ambitions will be vital to defining its role in the evolving Middle East, without experiencing “precious loneliness” again and being obsessed with Kurdish issue both internally and externally. A spectre is haunting the Post-Ottoman Kurdish lands, symbolising the unresolved complexities of Kurdish politics, now at a critical juncture, challenging Türkiye to address the issue independently or risk external intervention, but the current situation is not sustainable.

*Selçuk Aydın holds a PhD from King’s College in the School of Security Studies. He has conducted projects and published articles, book chapters and opinions on Turkey’s history, the Turkish diaspora, Kurdish studies, and Middle East politics. He is currently an assistant professor at Bogazici University and post-doctoral researcher at Shanghai University.