In what could be a pivotal turning point in the war in Sudan, the Sudanese army recaptured Wad Madani, the capital of the Gezira state, in early January 2025. The army surrounded the city from the south, west and east, to close in on the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), using a combination of weapons, most notably air strikes, to target RSF sites, infrastructure and supply depots, thus weakening RSF morale, preventing it from gathering its forces, and paving the way for army’s ground operations.
The recapture of Wad Madani will disrupt RSF supply lines to its forces in the capital, thereby alleviating pressure on the Sudanese army in Khartoum, as well as giving the army control of roads connecting southern and eastern Sudan.
The failure of the RSF to hold Wad Madani is attributable to successive strikes by the Sudanese army that wore down the RSF. Moreover, in November 2024, Sudanese armed factions in Darfur announced they would join the Sudanese army in the fight against the RSF. This joint force was able to thwart RSF attempts to take al-Fasher, the capital of Darfur, as well as strategic areas in North Darfur, disrupting RSF supply lines and hampering their operational capabilities.
The regional and international environment is also tilting slightly in favour of the Sudanese army, as demonstrated by the shift in the position of the Kenyan government, which in early January 2025 refused to allow Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (also known as Hemedti), Head of the RSF, to hold a press conference. This will further isolate Hemedti in East Africa and enhance the legitimacy of the government of Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council and the de facto ruler of Sudan, perhaps spurring other countries to follow Kenya’s example. Turkey’s offer of mediation has also been welcomed by the Sudanese government and Abu Dhabi.
The Trump presidency may further tip the balance in favour of the Sudanese army. In addition to Trump’s expressed desire to end wars, the US administration may act to curtail the influence of rivals like Russia, which is aiding Hemedti’s forces.
All of these developments could enable the Sudanese army to gradually encircle the RSF. The first RSF positions to be affected will likely be in Khartoum and its suburbs, where the RSF will face increasing difficulties in obtaining support personnel, equipment and supplies. The army may also use its position in Wadi Madani to prevent RSF deployments on the Ethiopian border, cutting off supplies and hindering RSF efforts to obtain recognition from the Ethiopian leadership.
These partial pressures may ultimately weaken the cohesion of Hemedti’s forces in Darfur and exacerbate, or create, cracks in the RSF’s support structure. The RSF maintains rear bases in Chadian territory near the Sudanese border but the relationship between the RSF and the Chadian government is fragile and could be undercut by tribal differences and rising tensions between Chad and the Burhan government.
The Sudanese army and allied militias will also seek to cut off RSF supply lines in the Central African Republic, which relies on Russia’s African Corps to maintain the current government. The Sudanese government could offer Russia incentives—gold concessions or facilities on the Red Sea—to withdraw its support for the RSF.
Given these conditions, the likelihood of the Sudanese army retaking full control of the capital seems high, but other developments, such as the defeat of the RSF in Darfur, depend on too many unknown variables to predict with any certainty. Chad may alternately intensify its cooperation with the RSF, and influential regional actors could act to ease international pressure on Hemedti’s forces. If Hemedti consolidates his control over Darfur, the two warring parties may end up in a stalemate similar to the one in Libya.
Historically, the Sudanese army has not ended internal wars with a decisive military victory, but through political settlements. This war, however, has distinct features and so may diverge from this pattern. The RSF does not have a large base in Sudan, being limited to some areas of Darfur. It also depends on the leadership of Hemedti and his relatives. If the Sudanese army manages to overthrow the leadership, the forces may disintegrate. Moreover, the length of the war, the scale of atrocities committed, and widespread popular support for the Sudanese army has prompted several countries to reevaluate their support for the RSF and may lead others to do so.
If the Sudanese army is able to exploit these weaknesses to dismantle the RSF, it will still face many challenges. RSF remnants may turn to organised crime, spreading terror across Sudan. And while the political forces currently rallied around the Sudanese army have put aside their differences to confront the RSF threat, once the threat is removed, their differences may resurface, making it difficult to reach a consensus on a political system that can succeed military rule.
*This is a summary of a policy brief originally written in Arabic available here.