The Geopolitics of Global Trade: Why the Middle East Matters Now More Than Ever

The shift is evident without recourse to complex interpretation: US President Donald Trump’s second term marks a decisive transformation in US foreign policy, with economic interests overriding traditional strategic priorities and alliances. Although often portrayed as an unpredictable leader, Trump’s intentions are clear: he seeks to reshape American global leadership through a self-serving “America First” agenda that disregards multilateral concerns.

President Trump’s administration launched a global trade war to recalibrate trade imbalances—most notably with China, but also with long-standing allies like Canada and the European Union. This approach represents a clear departure from strategic diplomacy in favour of a transactional and economy-first foreign policy. President Trump’s first official visit abroad was to the Gulf, signalling that economic deals—not shared values or security frameworks—would define US engagement under his leadership.

This return to economic-centric geopolitics echoes earlier historical transformations. During the Crusades and subsequent Ottoman-European conflicts—most notably after the Ottoman conquest of then-Constantinople in 1453—the Pope responded by imposing a trade ban on the Ottomans. This embargo targeted key economic exchanges, particularly in strategic materials like metals, with the aim of weakening the growing Ottoman military power. Yet, pragmatic Venetian and Genoese merchants, whose livelihoods depended on Levantine commerce, often circumvented these prohibitions, maintaining vital, if sometimes illicit, trade flows. This dynamic, coupled with the Ottomans' control over traditional overland routes, which increased costs and reduced reliability rather than cutting them off entirely, spurred new developments. European powers, seeking to bypass these intermediaries and access lucrative Asian markets directly, embarked on ambitious maritime expeditions that would launch the Age of Exploration—and with it, more consequentially, usher in one of the darkest chapters in human history: colonialism. Now, Trump's policies raise the question: what global realignments might today’s trade wars trigger?

Western dominance—historically rooted in control over international system, economic infrastructure and global trade routes—is now facing unprecedented challenges. The global order is shifting from US-led unipolarity to a multipolar landscape, characterised by intensifying great power competition and the rise of multilateral platforms such as BRICS, as well as regional partnerships that continue to erode American primacy. Unlike the relatively cohesive post-Cold War era, today’s power dynamics are shaped by an assertive non-West, growing internal fissures within the West, the economic ascent of China, the coercive deterrence strategies of Russia, and the diplomatic activism of emerging regional powers. (1)

In this context, the Middle East—strategically positioned at the crossroads of key trade corridors and energy routes—has reemerged as a central arena in global geopolitics, particularly as competition is increasingly expected to shift toward East Asia in the economic, strategic and ideological realms.

Beyond the Great Powers’ Mapping: Regional Alternatives in Global Trade Politics

The United States has moved away from its liberal post-Soviet-era narrative and reverted to a Cold War-style approach of containment and encirclement of rival powers. (2) This competition spans diplomatic, economic, social and military arenas, as global and emerging regional powers form strategic alliances.

Amid this geopolitical contest, regional and global initiatives are gaining increased prominence. Global projects initiated by the great powers aspire to fashion an international system by the great powers’ own design, with little concern for the realities and necessities of regions and states in the way.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) constitutes one such project, which aims to connect Chinese supply hubs to European and other markets over land and naval routes spanning Asia, Africa and Europe, through infrastructure investments with rigid conditions and heavy reliance on Chinese labour, so as to lead the vulnerable national markets towards “debt-traps”. (3)

The US-backed India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is a counter-initiative to BRI, aiming to substitute Chinese supply chains with Indian ones and to reduce the dependency on Russian energy in favour of Middle Eastern energy resources. The United States’ ‘grand design’ for the Middle East, including the IMEC initiative, has been undermined by regional crises—most notably the ongoing genocide in Gaza—which deter many countries in the region from pursuing these policies because their links to Israel.

In contrast, locally-sourced solutions to regional and global challenges are more responsive and sensitive to regional necessities and hence more stable and achievable. The Development Road Project (DRP) initiated by Türkiye and Iraq envisions a trade corridor that links East Asia to the Gulf, Türkiye and Europe through Iraqi ports. The initiative has garnered strong regional backing from countries such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and highlights the strategic need for ties with Iran, particularly given the importance of the Strait of Hormuz.

Regional peace is central to the DRP's success: it has the potential to support political stability in Iraq by strengthening the Baghdad government, easing sectarian tensions, and encouraging a more constructive approach to Kurdish politics across the region. Drawing on historical precedents like the Spice Route and, more significantly, the colonial-era trade routes through India developed under British hegemony, the DRP represents a locally driven initiative that could significantly contribute to regional peace and prosperity. In doing so, it presents a compelling regional alternative within the larger landscape of global power competition.

Interconnectivity and Global Order: Geopolitical Shifts and the Rise of China’s Symbiotic Vision

Interconnectivity projects have regained geopolitical importance, though the idea is not new. From China’s 7th-century Grand Canal to the 19th-century Suez and Panama Canals, major powers have long used infrastructure to cut transport costs and boost trade. A major shift came in 2013 with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), further advanced by the Global Development Initiative in 2021 to connect Asia to Africa and Europe, aiming for completion by the Chinese Revolution’s centenary in 2049.

This conceptual turn is both a cause and result of the changing geopolitical dynamics where China arises as a global power able to profit massively from globalization. (4) It saw interconnectivity projects become full-fledged comprehensive economic, political and security arrangements rather than mere production and financial activities. This transformation reflects a broader rethinking of international relations, giving rise to new theoretical approaches by Chinese scholars (5) that emphasise symbiosis—or cooperative interdependence—as a foundation for global development and stability.

These global initiatives aim not only to facilitate trade but also to shape a particular vision of global order with a strategic agenda. Unlike regional efforts, the political significance lies as much in which states are excluded as in which are included, (6) as this determines who gains primacy in the emerging global landscape. This dynamic is also influencing new political trajectories, particularly as the Chinese bloc and its development model gain growing appeal in the Global South and the Middle East. (7)

An intensified search for new interconnectivity projects has emerged in the 2020s with geopolitical tensions threatening the safe conduct of trade in established trade corridors. The blockage of the Suez Canal in 2021 had already pushed some to pursue other trade routes, (8) while the emerging security implications, like the Houthis threatening maritime shipping in the Red Sea as a response to the genocide in Gaza, have materialised these pursuits into plans. (9)

An important aspect of interconnectivity projects is their long-term viability, particularly in geopolitical terms. While such projects call for state-level cooperation, multilateralism and transparency, they also require a solid regional, national and socio-political foundation to ensure long-term functionality. In a region as diverse and complex as the Middle East, securing the endorsement of neighbouring countries—even those excluded from the project’s core—is essential, making diplomatic engagement a critical component. (10)

The Blunder of Global Initiatives: From Tracks for Regional Peace to IMEC

IMEC is a US-backed global initiative to establish a trade and data route between India and Europe via the Middle East built on Israel’s 2017 Tracks for Regional Peace (TRP) proposal. Initially a regional railway project connecting Haifa to the UAE through Jordan and Saudi Arabia, TRP aimed to economically integrate the region while forming an anti-Iran axis centred around Israel. (11)

However, the U. transformed TRP into a global initiative without multilateral consultation, favouring hegemonic bargaining over regional consensus, as later seen in the Abraham Accords. (12) These Accords prioritised US strategic aims—especially countering Iran and creating transactional normalisation with Israel—over the region’s actual needs. (13) Arab states were enticed through political and military concessions: Morocco’s claim to the Western Sahara was recognised, the UAE was promised advanced arms, and Sudan was removed from the terrorism list—all in exchange for normalisation with Israel. (14)

Moreover, a critical flaw of the Abraham Accords was their near-total neglect of the Palestinian issue. Despite public expectations that Arab-Israeli normalisation would be conditional on Palestinian progress, the Accords offered no concrete commitment. (15) Post-signing, Israel escalated settlement expansion and settler violence, including the transfer of Palestinian land from military to civilian control and the 2021 Al-Aqsa Mosque raid, with silence from Accord signatories. (16)

The Accords’ fragility stems from new US leadership and unpopularity in the Arab world because of Washington’s strong ties to Israel. A 2022 poll revealed that 71% of Emiratis and 76% of Bahrainis opposed normalisation without the resolution of the Palestinian issue—a figure that is likely higher after the Gaza genocide. (17)

Despite this, the Biden administration continued pushing for Saudi Arabia's inclusion, albeit with a less transactional tone than Trump’s, revealing the superficial nature of normalisation efforts. The project was institutionalised with I2U2 (India, Israel, UAE and the US), (18) and IMEC was announced during the 2023 G20 summit as a means to counter China and Russia while excluding Iran and Türkiye. (19) At the same time, IMEC’s viability is compromised by its ignorance of regional political dynamics. The Gaza war collapsed regional support for the project, exposing the futility of excluding Palestine from Middle Eastern strategies. (20) The initiative’s neglect of Palestinian justice not only triggered regional unrest but also emboldened anti-normalisation pressures in countries like Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. (21)

Interestingly, US Ambassador to the Republic of Türkiye and Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack criticised colonial history, Sykes-Picot and Western interventionism – the main causes of the immense turmoil in the Middle East – and addressed regional initiatives for the solution during his meeting with Syrian President Ahmed al-Shara. (22) This might mark a significant turning point for the Middle East to engage more actively with regional initiatives such as the Development Road Project, while also adopting a more constructive stance on the Palestinian cause.

Moreover, core IMEC members like India, the UAE and Saudi Arabia maintain ties with Russia and China, undermining the United States’ containment strategy. Additionally, recent tensions between India and Pakistan further complicate the situation. (23) The corridor’s reliance on routes like the Strait of Hormuz—where Iran holds sway—adds further geopolitical risk. (24)

The Prospect of Regional Initiatives: Development Road Project

Aligning regional interconnectivity initiatives with global partnerships is crucial, as they offer pragmatic, locally grounded solutions shaped by regional dynamics. Unlike hegemonic global strategies, these efforts prioritise concrete goals over geopolitical dominance, enhancing stability and sustainability. In the absence of a dominant superpower, they are more inclusive and collaborative, fostering consensus and mutual benefit.

The Development Road Project had been under discussion for some time, but it was solidified during Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s 2024 visit to Iraq, where the two sides agreed to form a Council of Ministers to oversee its construction and operation. In the inaugural meeting of this council, a roadmap for the project was determined by the joint efforts of Türkiye, Iraq, Kuwait and the UAE. The project aims to connect Iraq’s Al Faw port to Türkiye’s already-established railway network through Ovaköy. It aims to reduce the transport time of goods from Eastern producers to Western markets by 15 days compared to the Suez Canal, while also being significantly cheaper and more politically feasible than IMEC. (25) Additionally, Türkiye’s membership in the EU Customs Union is expected to significantly ease bureaucratic processes and reduce costs. (26)

The project is also vital for Iraq, not only economically but also politically and socially. Ravaged by decades of civil war, Iraq sees in this initiative a chance to unite its ethno-sectarian divisions and diverse social groups by mobilising its large and growing youth population around a common national goal. Recognising the potential benefits of the project’s success, Iraq has pledged to play a key role in ensuring its security. This makes the project far more than just an infrastructure investment; it represents a potential solution to Iraq’s challenges. Moreover, it addresses a key obstacle often cited as hindering the project’s success: Iraq’s instability.

The DRP has also fostered regional collaboration, particularly on security issues. Tensions between Iraq and Türkiye have long persisted, stemming from the sectarian policies of previous Baghdad governments and Turkish military operations against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Northern Iraq. However, a significant shift occurred during high-level discussions on the DRP, when Baghdad, for the first time, officially declared the PKK an illegal organization, following the PKK’s disarmament. (27) This unprecedented move represents a major shift not only in Türkiye’s internal security landscape but also in broader regional security calculations and the security of the DRP. A key turning point in Turkish-Iraqi relations came after the defeat of the Islamic State (IS), when Türkiye pledged support for Iraq’s reconstruction during the Kuwait Conference- (28) an initiative that helped ease tensions previously fuelled by Iraq’s internal sectarian divisions. This collaboration has since deepened, with Turkish officials pledging to contribute to the rebuilding of Erbil, Mosul, Kirkuk and Baghdad if the corridor is opened. (29)

The success of the project ultimately depends on regional collaboration. Historically, Türkiye and Iran have maintained a complex relationship marked by both rivalry and cooperation. Their competition, dating back to the 16th century, often played out in present-day Iraq through the lens of Sunni–Shia tensions. However, this conflict was formally resolved by the 1639 Treaty of Zuhab—one of the oldest border agreements still in effect today. Tensions re-emerged in recent decades due to Iran’s proxy policies and the destabilising impact of US intervention in the region.

The project also carries significant implications for Iran, as it may undermine Tehran’s influence over its regional proxies—an outcome that could impede the project’s progress. To mitigate this risk, the initiative has not entirely excluded Iran. In fact, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has explicitly stated that Türkiye seeks to involve Iran in the initiative. (30) Furthermore, Türkiye is playing a bridging role between Iran and the West; notably, a round of nuclear diplomacy talks took place in Istanbul in May 2025. This emerging collaboration, grounded in mutual interest and benefit, could pave the way for broader regional partnerships. If managed effectively, it holds the potential to foster stability, prosperity and peace across the region.

*Selçuk Aydın holds a PhD from King’s College in the School of Security Studies. He has conducted projects and published articles, book chapters and opinions on Turkey’s history, the Turkish diaspora, Kurdish studies, and Middle East politics. He is currently an assistant professor at Bogazici University and post-doctoral researcher at Shanghai University.