In the month following the fall of the Assad regime, Damascus became a destination for Western and Arab officials carrying their list of priorities for the new government. Their views reflect their own interests and concerns, but do not constitute a comprehensive framework for addressing the current transition. Looking more broadly at the needs of an ethnically and religiously diverse state coming out of a popular revolution, we can identify the most pressing challenges at the moment.
First and foremost is defence. States are built on the shoulders of soldiers, who bear the responsibility of maintaining security, guarding borders and imposing state sovereignty over the land and people. Without a capable defence establishment, stability cannot be achieved. In the first phase, Syrian leaders are seeking to rebuild the defence establishment by disarming and dissolving all armed revolutionary organisations and incorporating their members into the new army or security forces.
Most, but not all, organisations have accepted the idea. The stance of military formations in the Druze-majority province of Suwayda and in Daraa remains ambiguous, but the biggest problem is the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), led by a Syrian Kurdish party with close ties to the Turkish Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The SDF is asking for special status within the Defence Ministry, but the latter has rejected the demand. Negotiations have been underway for weeks, but the issue will likely not be resolved until the Trump administration’s position on the US military presence in eastern Syria and its relationship with the SDF crystallises.
Closely linked to this challenge is the unification of Syria and the restoration of central state sovereignty. Since most armed factions are regionally based, their integration into the defence establishment will facilitate unification, but, again, the situation in the northeast is especially complicated given the SDF’s relationship with the United State, the presence of some 2000 US soldiers in the area, and the sensitivity of the issue for Turkey.
The SDF-controlled area encompasses one-third of Syria’s territory, and is the site of the most important wheat-growing centre and most of Syria’s oil and gas wealth. It is also the area where the Islamic State (IS) is active. Bringing it under state sovereignty is thus both a security and political issue, with implications for national security and stability.
The Israeli incursion is a third urgent challenge. In the weeks after the fall of the Assad regime, Israel launched a series of devastating airstrikes that targeted Syria’s remaining defensive capabilities. Israeli forces then crossed the 1974 ceasefire line, penetrated several kilometres into Syrian territory, and took the strategic summit of Mount Hermon. Expelling Syrians in the border villages and establishing facilities in the area, Israel seemed to be settling in for a long-term occupation.
Because they were unable to confront it, Syrian leaders initially ignored the aggression, but it represents a grave violation of Syrian sovereignty. It is not clear whether Syria’s allies are pressuring the US administration to compel Israel to withdraw or whether Damascus is preparing to confront the aggression by other means.
A final vital challenge is the forging of a new political class and political consensus among the ethnically, religiously and ideologically diverse forces that participated in the Syrian revolution. Although the nature of the transitional phase requires strong individual leadership, if this tendency persists, it will lead to the emergence of an authoritarian regime. Neither unity nor legitimacy can be achieved without a degree of consensus within the political class on the foundations of the new Syria. Absent this, political action will turn into a zero-sum conflict, which, as it escalates, makes a coup against the regime and political pluralism more likely.
A few days after the fall of the Assad regime, Syria’s new leaders announced plans planning for a national conference of 1000–1500 members that would lay the foundations for of the state, outline the general directions for the transitional phase, and form a committee to draft the constitution. The project has faltered, however, as it is not clear that such a large conference would be an effective way to promote national dialogue and reach a consensus among Syrians, or how a legislative council might emerge from it.
Nevertheless, the transitional phase cannot continue without a national body of some sort that works to lay the foundations of national consensus, acts a national authority for transitional governance, and determines the priorities of the transitional phase and how to achieve them.
All revolutionary movements enjoy what is known as the legitimacy of victory, but this legitimacy is typically short-lived. As it fades, disputes rise to the surface, divisions become more acute, and the clear vision of the way forward may become muddled. This is what the new Syria must avoid.
*This is a summary of a policy brief originally written in Arabic available here.