The recent US-Israeli war on Iran has so far failed to achieve its central objective: toppling or reshaping the Iranian regime in line with US strategic interests. It has also failed to establish Israeli dominance over the Middle East as part of a broader regional project. However, the conflict has still produced significant consequences within Iran, particularly in how the Iranian leadership perceives its identity, position in the region and its regional environment. This marks the first time since the Iran–Iraq War that Iran has faced such an intense, multi-front confrontation affecting several neighbouring Arab states.
Iran’s relations with its Arab and Islamic neighbours have long been marked by fluctuation between cooperation and confrontation, dating back to the Safavid period. Since the final demarcation of its borders in 1914 and the consolidation of the modern state, Iran has fought only one major interstate war with a neighbour: the Iran–Iraq War, initiated by Iraq in 1980. That war became a decisive reference point in shaping Iran’s later strategic thinking.
In the current conflict, Iran has responded with missile and drone strikes targeting sites in Gulf states, Iraq, Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and even Turkey. At the same time, Iran’s regional allies in Iraq and Lebanon have participated independently of their host governments. The timing and coordination of these actions suggest prior strategic planning and indicate a shift toward a more explicitly militarised regional posture. Iran is no longer viewing its region only through the lens of state security, but increasingly as an arena for regional influence and confrontation with major adversaries.
This shift is situated within a longer historical trajectory. Since the Safavid era, Iran has moved between imperial expansion, religious transformation through Shiite propagation, and later contraction under competing regional empires such as the Ottomans, Afghans and Russians. By 1925, under Reza Shah Pahlavi, Iran had been reduced territorially but remained ethnically diverse. His state-building project emphasised centralisation and Iranian nationalism, influenced by Atatürk’s Turkey, and promoted an “Aryan” Iranian identity distinct from Arab neighbours.
Under Mohammad Reza Shah, Iran experienced internal instability alongside close alignment with Western powers, including cooperation with Israel and intervention in regional conflicts. Despite modernisation efforts, tensions with religious authorities persisted. The 1979 Islamic Revolution fundamentally transformed Iran’s ideological identity, embedding Shiism within the state and institutionalising the doctrine of velayat-e faqih, which positioned the Supreme Jurist as both religious and political authority. This enabled Iran to present itself as a leader of Shiite communities beyond its borders.
The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) became a turning point. It reinforced the belief that Iran should avoid fighting on its own territory and instead project power outward. This strategic lesson later justified the development of regional networks of allied militias and proxy forces in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan. Regional conflicts came to be framed as extensions of Iran’s confrontation with the United States and Israel.
In contrast, Gulf Arab states increasingly relied on Western security guarantees, especially after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. This deepened regional polarisation. In the current war, Iran extended attacks across multiple Arab states, targeting not only military sites but also energy infrastructure and transport networks, including strategic maritime routes such as the Strait of Hormuz. These actions further strained relations across the region.
Although Iran often justified its operations as targeting US or Israeli assets, the strikes also affected civilian infrastructure and sovereign economic facilities. In Iraq and Lebanon, Iran acted through allied militias as if it were a parallel authority, using them to pursue strategic objectives and escalate pressure on adversaries. This contributed to Israeli military escalation, particularly in Lebanon, and intensified regional instability.
The conflict has therefore produced a rupture in Iran’s relations with its Arab and Islamic neighbours that will be difficult to reverse. At the same time, internal Iranian debate has emerged over whether to rebuild regional ties on the basis of geography and shared cultural and religious ties, or to leverage perceived wartime resilience to demand greater regional acceptance of Iranian influence.
Iran has never faced a fully unified regional front. At various points, its interests have overlapped with those of some Arab states, including shared opposition to Iraq in 1990-91 and 2003. Qatar and Oman have often played mediating roles, while Saudi Arabia has at times adopted a more cautious stance. This reflects a fragmented regional environment rather than a monolithic opposition to Iran.
The deeper causes of regional tension are not reducible to US influence. Iran’s regional behaviour predates periods of hostility with Washington, and even during phases of cooperation with the United States, Iranian regional interventions were already underway. Likewise, Iran and the United States have at times cooperated indirectly, including during Afghanistan and Iraq interventions.
Overall, the underlying issue lies in Iran’s distinct historical, cultural, sectarian and strategic identity, which has repeatedly translated into expansionist or interventionist behaviour when combined with regional security pressures. This has shaped a long pattern of mistrust and conflict between Iran and its Arab neighbours.
A broader reassessment of regional order is therefore needed. Neither post-war arrangements nor external containment alone can resolve these structural tensions. A sustainable framework would require an inclusive regional security system in the Middle East that incorporates all states, avoids exclusion, and discourages zero-sum competition. At the same time, Iran is urged to reconsider its regional role, as shared interests across the region are deeper than divisions, and prolonged military confrontation is unlikely to produce decisive outcomes for any side.
*This is a summary of a policy brief originally written in Arabic available here.