A Year After the Storm of Al-Aqsa: Moving Beyond Initial Assumptions to Future Scenarios

A year has passed since the unprecedented operation by the Palestinian resistance was launched under the name, Tufan al-Aqsa. An example of a successful military action, this operation marks the Islamic Resistance Movement’s (Hamas) transition from a purely defensive approach to an offensive strategy. However, Israel's brutal military response in Gaza and later in Lebanon resulted in the martyrdom of more than 43,000 civilians in the former (1) and more than 2,400 in the latter. (2) A year into the operation, it seems that the Israel has also made changes in its strategies compared to the past, which the Resistance Front must now carefully take into account.

After various successful intelligence endeavours by Israel resulting in the martyrdom of high-profile leaders (3) of the Resistance Front and two unparalleled direct military retaliations by Iran, the scope of tensions in the region has irrevocably broadened today, pushing the region and the world to the verge of an extensive conflict. Nevertheless, it appears that the events of the past year have challenged conventional assumptions and analytical frameworks concerning Israel, which will be discussed in this paper. 

The first assumption of the Resistance Front was that Israel could not bear the risk of losing its soldiers as captives (4), or at least that it was disinclined to bear substantial burdens for each soldier taken prisoner. This analysis was predicated on prior confrontations, notably the 33-day war, during which Israel demonstrated readiness to pay significant price to swap the coffins of two Israeli captives with members of the Palestinian and Lebanese resistance, both alive and dead. In fact, it was based on this basis that Hamas devised and executed its operation on 7 October 2023 .

The second assumption was that Israel would not be capable of engaging in prolonged wars, and on multiple fronts simultaneously, with its adversaries. (5) But the past year and the spread of war from the Gaza Strip to Lebanon, along with covert intelligence operations in Iran and ongoing airstrikes in Syria and Yemen, has disproved this assumption and proven that the Israel has been able, to some extent, to continue fighting while maintaining its initial military strength.

A third assumption was that Israel's economy is highly fragile. (6). One of the resistance leaders even stated in a meeting that if a missile hits one of the Israel's ports, its economy would collapse quickly and that Israel's economy has low tolerance against attacks targeting the country’s infrastructure. However, in practice, this assumption has also proven to be wrong, at least in the short term. 

Another assumption was that the pressure emanating from public opinion and international organisations would influence Israel’s decisions. Since the ground assault on the Gaza Strip, and with the spread of images of the killing of innocent civilians, particularly women and children, we

we have witnessed an unprecedented global mobilisation of public opinion against Israel, especially in the United States. Moreover, numerous officials in the international community have made statements against Israel’s endless violations of human rights. Nonetheless, that has not had any impact on Israel’s behaviour, nor has the Zionist entity felt any pressure to reconsider its strategy. (7) 

Another miscalculation on the part of Hezbollah leaders was that if Israel acts against Lebanon, it would not attack residential areas, and the shelters located under residential buildings would be safe due to humanitarian and human rights considerations. This assumption was also proven wrong. 

The impact of internal strife in Israel was also an incorrect assumption. In spite of numerous domestic protests against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government and the pressure on the Israel from within society, these pressures proved insufficient to collapse his government. In fact, after the assassination of Seyed Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General of Hezbollah, public support within for the government increased. (8) 

Another challenge was the incorrect perception of the Israel's advanced technological capabilities and the extent of its security and intelligence infiltration, as evidenced by the mass explosion of pagers, handheld radios and other communication devices that occurred last month.  This revealed the Resistance Front's incorrect understanding of the other side's capabilities. This becomes even more challenging if we assume that the Israel has greater access to critical domains which the Resistance Front is unaware of than previously thought, leaving the Front in a state of confusion.

The next issue is the public desire in Israel to continue the war. In the region, the highest level of support for continuing the war comes from the Israeli people, (9). However, according to surveys, public opinion, particularly in Iran, is not in support of an all-out war. Another issue is the Resistance Front’s lack of familiarity with Israel's tactics. General Moshe “Chiko” Tamir's plan for a ground invasion of Gaza has proven to be a successful one, and the Axis of Resistance has been unable to predict the Israel's ground assault operations, especially in Gaza and in Lebanon.  In fact, the ambiguity in the Israel regime's intentions, goals, and means of achieving them, along with the regime’s information and technological superiority, has strengthened Israel's position.  The resistance's misjudgements, lack of sufficient information, and loss of tools—such as those Israel uses for assassination, precise information gathering, and penetration into security and intelligence systems—are considered weaknesses that the Axis suffers from.
Regarding the current situation and future scenarios, the most significant and definitive achievement of Operation True Promise was the conclusive end to the baseless rumour of Iran's betrayal of the Arab front and the Axis of Resistance.  Another achievement was the dismissal of Israel's assumption that Iran would refrain from taking any action that could escalate the current crisis until after the U.S. elections, as this would lead to Trump's victory. Israel did not expect Iran to respond directly with Operation True Promise 2, which has now created confusion for Israel.

Regarding the possible future scenarios of the Israel's response to Operation True Promise 2, the following seem likely:
The first scenario involves a direct attack on military bases, particularly those used for Operation True Promise 2. If there is a widespread attack on military bases that inflicts significant damage, Iran intends to respond proportionately and without delay. In this scenario, Israel is aware that Iranian officials are serious and unwavering in their determination to respond, and these back-and-forth attacks could continue for an extended period, possibly even leading to the current situation spiralling out of control.

Another scenario involves an attack on military bases and oil and energy facilities in Iran, which could lead to a full-scale war between the two actors, possibly spreading to U.S. bases in the region and energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Kuwait. This scenario would significantly affect global oil prices, impacting people's lives around the world and directly influencing the U.S. elections. The Biden administration is likely to oppose this scenario due to its potential to benefit the Republican Party’s presidential frontrunner, Donald Trump, in the upcoming U.S. elections. China and Japan, the largest consumers of energy from the Gulf region, would be the biggest losers in this scenario. It is also possible that a deal between Netanyahu and Trump to escalate the crisis in favour of Trump's re-election has been made.

The scenario of attacking nuclear facilities is also on the table. This scenario can be assessed on two levels: first, a regular attack with MOABs and GBU smart bombs, the latter which would not cause significant damage, allowing Natanz and Fordo to return to normal operations in a short time. The second level involves Israel launching nuclear bombs to destroy Iranian nuclear infrastructure; but without U.S. support, this seems unlikely. The consequences of this scenario would include a direct Iranian retaliatory attack on Israel’s Dimona nuclear facility and its immediate withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). well as potential contamination in both countries due to radioactive fallout.

On its part, Israel may engage in sabotage carried out by enemy cells inside Iran, cyberattacks, targeted assassinations and explosions. Lastly, a hybrid-war scenario against Iran is also a possibility, involving military strikes, sabotage operations, targeted assassinations, major political pressure and the imposition of sanctions by the West, accompanied by simultaneous psychological and media warfare. Regarding the last two scenarios, it should be noted that Iran's response would face difficulties, and these two scenarios, which seem the most likely to occur, would surely require adequate preparation. 

In these circumstances, the need for decisive actions to better manage the situation and prepare for future responses from the Israel is more important than ever. In this regard, the following actions are recommended:

• Priority should be given to separating the operator from the evaluator. In Iran, the operational body and the evaluating body are traditionally the same, meaning that the entity responsible for carrying out operations also evaluates the outcomes. The country needs institutions that, parallel to operational bodies, evaluate the performance and success of the operational bodies, whether through attacks or by reviewing policies.
• Changes in leadership roles, supporting and promoting credible individuals as trusted media figures, creating a platform for the country's elite to express their critiques, and fostering consensus and unity are also recommended. The media should prepare society and elites for all possible scenarios. 
• Maintaining diplomacy alongside military readiness is also crucial because, in the event of war, Arab countries may not provide the necessary support for Iran. Therefore, holding security dialogues with the regional countries, as well as with Europe, the U.S., China, and Russia, can be effective.  China, in particular, could be the primary loser in a major Middle Eastern crisis, and the threat to its interests could shift it from a passive player to an active one.
• Enhancing military capabilities in Operation True Promise 2, as well as in Operations True Promise 3 and 4, should not be disregarded.
• Lastly, instead of responding in a conventional manner as expected, responses should be unconventional. Although this may have consequences, it merits deeper discussions. The same perspective exists within Israel and could create new boundaries of deterrence for Iran. Ultimately, both conventional and unconventional scenarios within Iran's intellectual and command structures must be examined, and the implications of each should be discussed at various levels.