In the aftermath of the war on Gaza and its expansion across the region, the Middle East has entered a new phase in which shifts in power are undeniable but far from settled. The idea of “changing the Middle East”, first promoted by Israel’s prime minister after the 7 October 2023 attack, came to mean reshaping regional power relations in Israel’s favour. Over two years of war, Israel acted as if determined to fulfil that promise, waging simultaneous conflicts against Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, Iran, and later Syria. Yet the results reveal a complex picture of partial gains, enduring resistance and new strategic costs.
Before the war, regional power was shared mainly by Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel, each relying on distinct economic, military and ideological foundations. Turkey combined economic growth, military industry and soft power rooted in historical and popular ties. Saudi Arabia drew influence from its size, religious standing and wealth, pursuing stability while cautiously managing Iranian expansion. Iran relied on its revolutionary identity, imperial legacy and regional alliances, especially after the US invasion of Iraq. Israel, despite limited geography and population, wielded overwhelming military and technological superiority backed by Western support, while remaining isolated and mistrusted by its neighbours.
7 October shattered Israel’s sense of invulnerability. The attack exposed deep security failures and eroded Israel’s deterrence, long central to its defence doctrine. Israel responded not only with a full-scale war on Gaza but with a campaign aimed at crushing the resistance and reasserting dominance across the region. Gaza was subjected to unprecedented destruction, targeting Hamas and its social base and leading to massive civilian devastation. While this catastrophe forced Hamas to accept a harsh ceasefire and consider relinquishing governance, Israel failed to defeat the movement militarily or politically. Hamas retained tens of thousands of fighters and remained a dominant political force, while Israel could not fully control Gaza or force mass displacement.
Beyond Gaza, Israel escalated on multiple fronts. In Lebanon, it assassinated senior Hezbollah leaders, devastated strongholds, and pushed the group north of the Litani River. Although Hezbollah suffered major losses and was forced onto the defensive, it retained its popular base and capacity to rearm, while the Lebanese state remained unable or unwilling to disarm it. In Yemen, Israeli strikes failed to deter the Houthis, who demonstrated an ability to disrupt global shipping and gained regional legitimacy through their support for Gaza.
Israel also used the war to pursue long-standing objectives against Iran. Direct and indirect attacks culminated in a major confrontation in 2025, with U. participation, targeting Iranian air defences, leadership and nuclear facilities. Despite heavy damage, Iran preserved core expertise and likely retained enriched uranium, while accelerating efforts to rebuild deterrence with Russian and Chinese support. The war exposed Iranian vulnerabilities but did not eliminate Iran as a regional power.
In Syria, the collapse of the Assad regime, which was an unintended consequence of the war’s regional effects, marked a major shift. Iranian and Hezbollah influence receded, but Israel responded by deepening military incursions, striking Syrian assets, and intervening in southern Syria. Instead of consolidating calm on its northeastern front, Israel reopened the Syrian arena, turning a weakened but post-Assad Syria into a new source of tension.
These developments reshaped broader regional relations. The decline of Iranian influence in Syria reduced Saudi Arabia’s sense of strategic threat, while Israel’s actions in Gaza and beyond made normalisation politically impossible. Saudi leaders publicly tied any normalisation to a credible path toward a Palestinian state, effectively shelving a process Israel once viewed as a major strategic prize. At the same time, relations between Israel and Turkey deteriorated sharply. For the first time since 1950, Ankara no longer ruled out direct confrontation, while Israeli institutions began treating Turkey as a potential strategic adversary, particularly over Syria.
Overall, the war altered the Middle East but did not deliver Israel clear strategic dominance. Israel weakened its adversaries but failed to remove them from the regional balance of power. In doing so, it lost major diplomatic opportunities, deepened hostility with key regional states, and reinforced its isolation. The result is a region more volatile, with power redistributed but no stable order in sight.
*This is a summary of a policy brief originally written in Arabic available here.