The US war against Iran was not driven by compelling American national security requirements but was a war of choice by the Trump administration. Although the United States has maintained a bipartisan commitment to Israel’s security since the 1960s, there was insufficient evidence in late February 2026 that Iran posed a strategic threat to Israel, whether nuclear or conventional. Since October 2023, Israel, with American assistance, had inflicted extensive destruction on its regional adversaries. During the 12-day war in summer 2025, US-Israeli strikes disabled Iran’s nuclear facilities, although the fate of its highly enriched uranium remained uncertain.
Despite US President Donald Trump’s insistence that preventing an Iranian nuclear weapon was the primary objective, negotiations had been progressing before the war. Iran had reportedly agreed to reduce uranium enrichment to the minimum level permitted for peaceful purposes and accept permanent international monitoring. The conflict instead reflected Israel’s ambition to reshape the Middle East politically and culturally, establish regional hegemony, and secure Arab-Islamic acceptance of its existence. By early 2026, Israel’s failure to achieve these objectives made a victory in Iran increasingly important for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s political survival and Israel’s confidence.
The initial campaign aimed to overthrow the Islamic Republic within two or three weeks, allowing a successor government to accept American and Israeli demands. When regime change proved unlikely, the objectives shifted towards restricting Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities and severing its regional relationships. A ceasefire and negotiations mediated by Pakistan and Qatar followed. A memorandum of understanding signed on 17 June 2026 offered a framework for managing the consequences of the war, including navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, but opposition in Washington led to its abandonment. Fighting resumed in July, followed by a US naval blockade of Iranian ports.
Three principal options remain for ending the conflict:
- Renewed and expanded air strikes would target Iran’s remaining leadership, government institutions, military infrastructure, and essential national infrastructure, including Tehran. However, the previous 40-day campaign, which struck more than 13,000 targets according to American figures, failed to break the regime’s will. Further bombing could strengthen Iranian nationalism, turn public indifference towards the government into hostility towards the United States, and rally citizens around the regime as the defender of national sovereignty. Limited American ammunition stocks would also constrain the duration of a new campaign. Iran would likely retaliate against American positions and infrastructure in Gulf states and Jordan, potentially targeting oil facilities and power stations. Escalation could trigger a global economic crisis and undermine confidence between Washington and its regional allies, while damaging the American and European economies.
- A ground invasion could involve limited operations to seize Iranian islands in the Gulf, neutralise military positions threatening maritime traffic, or capture Pickaxe Mountain (also known as Mount Kolang Gaz La), a site believed by the United States to contain much of Iran’s highly enriched uranium. But the intelligence surrounding the facility and the scale of Iranian resistance remain uncertain. A comprehensive invasion intended to overthrow the regime is highly improbable: Iran’s vast territory, difficult terrain, population exceeding 90 million, and substantial military and security forces would make occupation exceptionally costly. Experts estimate that such an operation would require more than a million troops, far beyond the roughly 20,000 US Marines deployed in the region.
An alternative would involve supporting Iranian opposition groups, particularly armed Kurdish organisations operating from northern Iraq. However, their limited capabilities and internal divisions previously led Washington to halt a proposed intervention. Kurdish political cohesion, the loyalties of Kurdish Shiites, and the strength of Iranian defences remain significant uncertainties. The regime’s rapid suppression of armed opposition in January further weakens the prospects of this strategy.
- Continued negotiations under an intensified blockade offer the most rational option. The US naval blockade and expanded primary and secondary sanctions have severely restricted Iran’s imports and exports. Because Washington exercises considerable influence over international dollar transactions, circumventing the restrictions has become increasingly difficult. Iran can partially mitigate their effects through small-scale maritime trade, land routes through neighbouring countries, Chinese financial channels, and assistance from friendly states, but these alternatives cannot sustain its economy and state institutions indefinitely. By early October, Iran’s remaining offshore oil stocks had reportedly fallen to approximately 20 million barrels, while declining liquidity, rising inflation, currency depreciation and mounting bankruptcy risks indicated worsening economic distress. Nevertheless, indirect negotiations continued through Pakistani and Qatari mediation.
A negotiated settlement requires both sides to recognise that continued fighting is increasingly costly and unlikely to produce decisive victory. Washington faces mounting military and economic costs, growing concerns about global instability, and the prospect of leaving the next administration an unresolved war. Iran faces unprecedented economic pressure and increasing isolation.
However, neither side is ready to abandon its expectation of victory. Trump remains unwilling to end the war without appearing victorious, while Iranian leaders believe further resistance could improve their strategic position. Combining intensified sanctions with renewed bombing could cause Iran to abandon negotiations and expand the conflict across the region. Unless both sides relinquish the expectation that the other will soon collapse, the war may continue far longer than anticipated, ending only through decisive defeat or negotiated compromise.
*This is a summary of a policy brief published in Arabic here.