At the conclusion of a fifth round of US-mediated negotiations held over four days, Lebanon and Israel reached a framework agreement on 26 June 2026 that is intended to establish a new phase in relations and pave the way for future peace negotiations. The agreement declares both countries' intention to end their conflict, address its underlying causes, terminate the state of war, and gradually transfer security responsibility in parts of southern Lebanon to the Lebanese Armed Forces. It also affirms the right of both states to exist peacefully as sovereign neighbours and outlines a phased process under which Lebanon would extend state authority across its territory by disarming all non-state armed groups and dismantling their infrastructure. In return, Israel would gradually redeploy from Lebanese territory. Lebanon also commits to restoring the state's monopoly over the use of force, implementing a performance-based programme to enable the army to assume full security control, and seeking international—particularly US and Arab—support to achieve these objectives.
The agreement further states that both countries retain the right to self-defence under international law but that no third party may exercise that right on their behalf. It envisages the creation of working groups to prepare a comprehensive peace and security agreement and commits both sides to confidence-building measures, including ending hostile political and legal actions against one another in international forums, searching for and returning human remains, and releasing detainees.
The agreement generated sharply divergent reactions in Lebanon. President Joseph Aoun described it as the first step toward restoring full Lebanese sovereignty, ending occupation, and enabling displaced residents of the south to return home, while Prime Minister Nawaf Salam welcomed it as an initial step whose implementation would require clear mechanisms and international guarantees. In contrast, Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem denounced the agreement as invalid, humiliating and a surrender of sovereignty, rejecting any linkage between Israel's withdrawal and Hezbollah's disarmament. Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri similarly condemned it as an imposed arrangement even worse than the 17 May 1983 Agreement and predicted that it would never be implemented. Walid Jumblatt, the veteran Lebanese Druze leader and former head of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), criticised the framework for effectively sidelining the 1949 Armistice Agreement, while the Islamic Group adopted a less confrontational tone, insisting that decisions on war, peace and the state's monopoly over arms must emerge through national dialogue rather than external pressure.
In Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu praised the agreement as historic, emphasising that it recognises Israel's right to maintain a security zone inside Lebanon until Hezbollah and other armed organisations are disarmed and the threat from Lebanon is eliminated. He argued that the agreement advances peace while strengthening Israel and weakening both Iran and Hezbollah.
However, despite Lebanese officials presenting the agreement as the beginning of a path toward sovereignty, its ultimate destination remains uncertain. The unpublished security annexes have fuelled suspicions that they contain provisions unlikely to gain public acceptance. Even the published framework reveals significant Lebanese concessions in exchange for vague Israeli commitments lacking clear geographical or temporal limits.
The agreement is interpreted as effectively accepting the continuation of Israeli occupation in parts of southern Lebanon for an undefined period while relinquishing Lebanon's ability to challenge that occupation in international political and legal forums. By committing to disarm all non-state armed groups and inviting international assistance to do so, the Lebanese state also delegitimises armed resistance to the occupation. These commitments reflect a broader strategic shift toward ending hostility with Israel and ultimately pursuing comprehensive peace. The agreement also signals Lebanon's rejection of third-party representation in its conflict with Israel, implicitly distancing itself from Iran and separating the Lebanese front from the broader US-Iran understanding that had linked ceasefires across multiple regional fronts.
In return, Israel merely acknowledges Lebanon's sovereignty in principle while offering only an undefined future redeployment rather than a full withdrawal. The agreement establishes neither a timetable for Israeli redeployment nor clear boundaries for the security zone that Israel may continue to occupy pending Hezbollah's disarmament. It also provides no schedule for the return of displaced civilians or the reconstruction of southern Lebanon. Instead, Israel would withdraw only from selected “pilot” areas after verifying that Lebanese forces have removed armed groups and eliminated security threats.
These outcomes are largely attributed to the strategic imbalance that characterised the negotiations. Lebanese leaders entered the talks determined to restore state authority by ending Hezbollah's independent military role and limiting it to political activity. This objective had already been reflected in the government's 2024 decision to confine all weapons to state control, despite doubts about its ability to enforce such a policy. The government also chose to negotiate directly with Israel without reaching an understanding with Hezbollah or conducting a broader national dialogue on negotiating objectives, leaving Lebanon with little leverage beyond its expectation of US support.
However, the negotiations were managed primarily by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio's team amid divisions within the Trump administration over Iran policy. Rubio sought both to separate the Lebanese track from US-Iran negotiations and to strengthen Israel's position. His efforts included securing Arab backing during the Gulf Cooperation Council ministerial meeting in Manama, whose final statement strongly supported Lebanese state authority, the disarmament of non-state groups, and continued negotiations with Israel. The language of the Manama communiqué closely anticipated the framework agreement announced the following day.
Looking ahead, the agreement faces formidable political obstacles. Most Lebanese political parties either oppose it outright or object to major provisions, particularly those concerning Hezbollah's disarmament, legitimising Israel's continued occupation, abandoning international legal action against Israel, and pursuing peace with Israel. Although parliamentary rejection is uncertain because the framework may not require legislative approval, implementation remains impossible without broad political consensus.
Moreover, Syria is concerned over Lebanon's internal divisions and the possible regional implications of the agreement. While Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani planned visit to Beirut is officially intended to address bilateral issues, it may also seek to encourage Lebanese consensus on Hezbollah's disarmament and implementation of the framework. Nevertheless, Syria’s position on the agreement and its capacity to shape its implementation are uncertain.
Ultimately, implementing the agreement by force would risk internal confrontation, while neither the Lebanese Army nor foreign powers appear willing to impose such a solution. Rather than strengthening the Lebanese state, advancing peace, and reshaping the regional balance of power, the agreement is therefore likely to expose the state's weakness, deepen internal divisions, prolong the Israeli occupation, and perpetuate the conditions for continued confrontation between Israel and Lebanese armed groups.
*This is a summary of a policy brief originally written in Arabic available here.