The collapse of the Assad regime and the victory of the Syrian revolution on 8 December 2024, generated a climate of optimism and euphoria. Since then, the new regime has achieved notable foreign policy successes; in contrast, pressing domestic issues remain unresolved.
The leaders of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the force that assumed power after Assad’s fall, easily earned the support of influential regional powers like Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which in turn facilitated the early thaw in Syria’s relations with the United State. Shortly after meeting President Ahmed al-Sharaa in mid-May 2025, President Trump declared his intention to lift decades of US sanctions. The United Kingdom and France responded positively as well, normalising relations with Damascus earlier than the US. The Syrian government has also sought to avoid falling captive to a dependence on the West by making overtures to Russia, despite the latter’s support for the Assad regime.
Following the partial lifting of sanctions, Syria’s Arab and Muslim allies, as well as some Western countries, have offered assistance for the country’s economic recovery and reconstruction. A group of Gulf officials and businessmen have also directly announced several major investment projects in Syria.
Yet, Syria’s tangible achievements in foreign policy and relations have not been matched in the realm of domestic political and security policy. After years of conflict and regime policies that rent the Syrian national fabric, fragmented the country, and unleashed ethnic and sectarian resentments, the new Syrian leadership readily understood that its legitimacy hinged on the reunification of the country.
Damascus took its first successful step toward the restoration of unity and sovereignty in the Daraa governorate. In the Alawite-majority coastal region, once the rebellion led by remnants of the former regime was quelled in March, the state faced no tangible challenge to its sovereignty.
In the northeast, where the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have established an autonomous administration, al-Sharaa and the SDF commander signed a framework agreement in March providing for the integration of the region into the Syrian state. But the agreement’s terms were broad, and implementation has been hindered by negotiations over its interpretation, as well as new demands made by Kurdish leaders. In Suwayda, a Druze-majority province, a faction led by Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri is working to establish a form of autonomous governance; and despite truce agreements with Damascus, state agencies and security forces are still unable to operate in the province.
On 8 August, a conference was held in the SDF-controlled city of Hasakah. Bringing together ethnic and religious communities in the northeast with Druze and Alawite opposition sheikhs and leaders from Suwayda and elsewhere, the conference became a forum for what has become known as Syria’s minorities. Druze, Alawite and Kurdish clerics accused the new Syrian regime of abuses in the coastal region and Suwayda, calling for a restructuring of the new regime. Ultimately, the conference revealed the existence of two very different visions for the future of Syria. The first, that of separatist, sectarian leaders, advocates for decentralised governance in regions drawn on sectarian or ethnic lines; the other, held by the leaders of the new Syria and most Syrians, including many minority citizens, envisions a state based on equal citizenship and a single set of national governing institutions. This conceptual disagreement lies at the root of the domestic crisis in post-Assad Syria.
Eight months on, the outcome of political efforts abroad has not fully lived up to expectations. Some, but not all, sanctions have been lifted; and while the economic returns from Arab aid and investments are promising, no direct Arab or international support has been provided to the Syrian state itself. Neither the US nor France has withdrawn its protection from the SDF, and Washington has not exerted sufficient pressure on Kurdish leaders to reach an understanding with the central government. Similarly, Western powers proved unable to stop Israeli interference in Syria’s internal affairs or Israel’s territorial incursions and bombings in the country since December 2024.
The new Syrian leadership made missteps, too. It did not do enough to rally diverse segments of the Syrian people behind it after Assad’s ouster; and it failed to expand the government to include a broad spectrum of revolutionary forces, including former opposition factions.
Syria now stands at a crossroads with perils on both sides. The state could use force to resolve the situation in the northeast, Suwayda and the coast, but this is a certain path to communal violence, with unpredictable consequences for national cohesion and the stances of Western powers. Or it could continue its dialogue with separatist forces absent any guarantees of how or when a consensus will be reached, or even whether separatist forces will act to establish further facts on the ground while dialogue is underway.
*This is a summary of a policy brief originally written in Arabic available here.