On the evening of 28 October 2025, and into the following morning, intensive Israeli airstrikes targeted the Gaza Strip, resulting in at least 104 deaths and 250 injuries. The strikes hit areas from Rafah in the south to Jabalia in the north, including residential neighbourhoods and temporary refugee camps, marking one of the heaviest Israeli attacks since the ceasefire came into effect on 10 October as part of the first phase of US President Trump’s Gaza plan. However, violations of the ceasefire were ongoing, with Israeli attacks having already caused at least 250 deaths by early November. Even after Israel announced the end of its military campaign, intermittent air and artillery strikes continued, and systematic destruction persisted in areas still under Israeli occupation, effectively redefining the ceasefire to allow Israel to target and demolish infrastructure while avoiding full-scale war.
Notably, these ceasefire violations elicited little substantive response from mediators, particularly the United States, the supposed guarantor of both the ceasefire and Trump’s plan. While Trump characterised Israeli actions as self-defence, other US officials emphasised the resilience of the ceasefire and suggested that escalation was not unexpected. In parallel, the United States provided assurances to the Egyptian, Qatari and Turkish mediators during talks in Sharm El-Sheikh that the ceasefire and prisoner exchange would mark the end of hostilities and that Washington would engage all parties fairly following acceptance of Trump’s plan.
Israel justified its violations using two pretexts: first, an attack on Israeli forces in Rafah that killed a soldier, which Hamas denied involvement in, attributing it instead to an uncoordinated group unaware of the ceasefire; second, accusations of Hamas delaying the release of deceased Israeli prisoners, despite Hamas citing logistical and technical difficulties in recovering the bodies. Throughout the attacks, mediators appeared unsurprised, seemingly prepared to manage a fragile, ambiguous peace plan whose implementation remained unclear.
In the three weeks following the ceasefire, the United States pursued three main objectives to stabilise the agreement and advance to the second phase of Trump’s plan. First, securing the release and exchange of Israeli and Palestinian prisoners within 72 hours. Despite Israeli violations, US officials assumed that completing the first phase would allow progression to the next stage in the second or third week. Second, establishing effective US oversight on the ground, including a security and coordination centre in Kiryat Gat near Gaza, staffed primarily by US military personnel with some civilian and international security advisors. This centre monitors ceasefire compliance, oversees humanitarian aid, and functions as the main instrument of US control over Gaza without deploying troops. Third, a series of high-level US visits to Israel – including Jared Kushner, Steve Whitaker, Vice President J.D. Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and senior intelligence officials – aimed to ensure Israeli compliance with the ceasefire and coordinate the transition to the plan’s second phase.
Despite these efforts, Israel continued to violate the ceasefire, restricting humanitarian aid to fewer than 100 trucks per day instead of the agreed 600, exceeding withdrawal boundaries, and delaying engagement with the second phase. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu insisted that Israel would decide the composition and participation of the international “stability force”, which remains a critical and unresolved issue. The United States prefers the force to include Arab and Islamic countries – potentially Egypt, Jordan, Indonesia, Turkey and Qatar – to maintain oversight and influence over Hamas. Israel rejects Turkish participation due to political tensions and historical sensitivities and demands significant control over the force and Gaza’s administrative apparatus.
The Palestinian administrative and security structures in Gaza also present major obstacles. Egypt has mediated on the composition of a transitional administrative authority, seeking candidates acceptable to both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority (PA). Hamas insists that all members remain local Gazans, maintaining continuity in security forces and preventing external interference, while the PA advocates for integration under its authority to ensure future governance coherence. These competing visions, combined with Israeli demands to include pro-Israel collaborators, create a high potential for internal conflict.
Security arrangements, disarmament of resistance groups, and the establishment of the transitional authority remain among the most sensitive issues. The United States and other mediating countries presume Hamas may have implicitly agreed to surrender weapons, but details regarding which arms, the authority receiving them, and how disarmament would occur remain unresolved. These uncertainties, alongside Israel’s readiness to resume limited military action at any perceived violation, maintain a constant risk for Gaza’s civilian population.
While Trump’s plan has temporarily halted full-scale war, the remaining phases are fraught with uncertainty and danger. Israeli threats to forcibly disarm Hamas, halt withdrawals or push the yellow line deeper into Gaza, coupled with political considerations ahead of Israeli elections, leave the ceasefire highly fragile. Hamas remains committed to preserving the truce, but Israel’s disregard for obligations and the ambiguity of Trump’s plan place the burden on the Arab-Islamic mediators to ensure the plan proceeds with minimal harm to Gaza’s residents.
*This is a summary of a policy brief originally written in Arabic available here.